We have made the argument about democracy and the eonic series many times here, but it doesn’t sink in. It doesn’t make any sense out of context. It might be useful to consider that it resembles the ‘end of history’ meme but without the muddle of that debate which used Hegel to make an argument about teleological history. I would leave Hegel out here but consider that democracy has a strange historical directionality. The same can be said of socialism, and in fact the ‘end of history’ theme was at first a leftist argument, connected to Marx. We can’t resolve that here save to note that it might help to see how the eonic model automatically picks up the ‘end of history’ argument in its cow catcher. But it also shows that multiple potential outcomes can appear shotgun style in parallel. They are lookalikes that need to be mutually adjusted, democratic socialism is one example, already successful as such a concept. The mystery is subject to theological confusions, that Hegel tried to overcome by embracing them. But the larger model of the eonic series is not a theistic historicism nor does it profit from the concept of ‘geist’. The larger eonic model can free discussion from those confusions.
The issue of democracy has an even more elusive aspect as reflected in the model of the eonic effect. It will barely suffice to point it out in the context of current confusions over democracy but it is a final source of insight, if the study of the eonic model becomes more general. Short of that it is useful to generate interest in the subject by pointing to the strange connection to the eonic model: here’s the strangest mystery of all with respect to the emergence of democracy: it is directly correlated with the divide era of the eonic sequence, very weakly, but still successfully, with the period 600 BCE in Greece: the appearance of Solon, and 1800 in the modern case, or better the generation around 1800 in the European, then American sector.
In the context of the model the odds against this being chance are hard to compute, but very large. A hint is given: a larger (macro) system is trying ot induce democracy into a barbarous system that can barely manage rational government. It is clear in the Greek case: peoples stuck in slavery began to conceive freedom, and in close concert with the eonic series. It cannot induce freedom by acting against freedom, but it can try, and at least seed the idea. We should note that the British warned of the danger, hardly saints themselves, and counseled against independence. And the issue of slavery was a further contradiction. Sure enough the so-called demoracy became a strange experiment in democratic induction on peoples who were still stuck in slavery and prone to the genocide of the Indians. The tide of abolition however was also an aspect of the modern transitions, again not chance and the experiment, a failure from the start, buys time and then most strangely we see the Civil War. We could go on at length here but the record of American ‘democracy’ was at risk throughout of one screwup after another, and the record of imperialism, capitalist excess, etc, created just the kind of confusion the socialists always saw coming.
We should note that America (and Russia, who both come to dominate world history) is just barely a part of the eonic sequence but becomes a theatre for a democracy experiment. Modern history ends up the tale of two barbarous sectors, America and Russia. The rich legacy of the British and other transitions are not replicated in the American sphere. It will suffer from shallowness, as is obvious from the strange success of success and tragedy that follows. But there is the excellent chance that the US as a sudden extension of the British transition will pick all that up, and it does, but… That is because the Americas were a theatre or diffusion field for the modern transition and the early legacy of the English Civil War had initiated a democratic strain in the Brits’ noosphere (?something like that). But the core eonic transition while generating proto-democracy moves to the fringe of the British transition in the vacuum of the Americas where such an experiment can arise with less opposition than in the core zone of the modern transition (Germany, Holland, England, France, Spain). But it risks sinking into barbarism in its wilder aspect and its collision with indigenous peoples.
Why would this happen near a divide and what does it mean? The data as we see it suggests that democracy appears twice as ‘system action’ or induction and is realized a free action JUST AFTER THE DIVIDE as induction ceases. It might help to study the eonic model to see the point here. But it is not intuitive so far with a larger public. But the scary point is that a system where ‘democracy’ is system-induced has sacrificed the freedom to create democracy for the freedom to carry it out, and will be carried as free agency which will not fully comprehend the ambiguity of freedom and its realization in history. We should note that the Athenian example (next to many republican parallels in the Greek city-states) cannot escape chaotification and wanes by 400 BCE, although something remains until the era of Alexander. In the modern case, we can see most eerily that within two centuries into our own generation the democratic field is strong and then suddenly begins to wane. Since we are in the middle of that even now we are not condemned to any fatalism, but the correlation is ominous and a warning to batten down the hatches. The problem is that democracy was never correctly realized and is hard to repair or prolong without a new and stronger definition.
The question of democracy is confused by its own lack of precise definition. The problem is reflected from the start in the attempts to define the then vague term ‘democracy’ inherited …