

Out of Revolution

*The Annotated Manifesto: A companion volume to
Toward a New Communist Manifesto*

John C. Landon

South Fork Books

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John C. Landon

Published by South Fork Books

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PREFACE

Out of Revolution is a companion volume to *Toward a New Communist Manifesto (TNCM)* containing material in the Appendices to that work. The material is useful in a separate work. This material also includes a chapter from *World History and The Eonic Effect (WHEE)*, a set of so-called 'netbooks' from eonic-effect.net, and an essay on the strange connection of dialectical materialism to the ancient *Samkhya*. These netbooks or booklets were created with the older Publisher software and include *A New Model of History, Kant and the Philosopher of History*, and *1848+: Theory, Ideology and Revolution*. The latter was one of the sources of *Last and First Men*, which first discussed the issues raised in TNCM.

Our historical model is a useful analysis of world history. Our discussion attempts to highlight a simple fact, the birth, or else massive frequency, of revolution in the early modern, and from there the relationship to theories, and ideologies attempting to explain the phenomenon in terms of some historical process. This discussion must also ask how a proposed dynamic can relate to any justification of ideological perspectives. That is, isn't a theory proposing an historical dynamism for its perspective propaganda? Such questions are important in the context of legitimation tactics of economic theorizing which are a form of pseudo-science. And the classic 'end of history' debate is notoriously a part of this zone of confusion. The question of teleology lurks in the background as a spoiler for most attempts at theory, with or without any invocation of such. There are models of history that can resolve this problem, and the one shown here is an example. In this type of model, potential and free agency are in a correlated relationship.

The material examines the nature of modernity, the question of revolution, both in the early modern and its continuation in the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century. The question of evolution at the high end matches the novel analysis of economies at the low end. Attempts to find a science of history have notably all failed, but there is a very simple alternate line of attack in relation to Kant's thinking on history using simply systems analysis.

In all the discussions of the philosophy of history no one has ever thought to apply a frequency analysis as a heuristic for detecting some kind of system. There have always been many hints about such an interpretation, and a close look at the increasingly

detailed results of historical and archaeological research exposes quickly strong albeit incomplete evidence for an almost routine version of a cyclical driven system operating behind the ad hoc sprawl of emergent civilizations/Civilization. This approach yields a cornucopia of new insights, and will also connect with our questions about the values emerging from a dynamical system, a question science is hard-pressed to answer. Here our new kind of model can proceed with greater success. The solution is elegant in that 'freedom' is logically, suspiciously, close to 'causality' as a logical antithesis in a curious symmetry of opposites. It is stunning to consider that in the field of greater nature there is a 'dynamic' to freedom, a curiously antinomial circumstance well known to Kant.

Our subject demands such questions about theory and I think we can claim to do the job right, first because our framework is so general that we must interpret our own model, which is potential to a spectrum of different views, and second because the core of our theory is about the emergence of freedom and this has a dynamical character that makes its realization a carrier of the various ideologies of freedom emergent in the modern, yet also the ancient, world. If this is ideological then there is an historical dynamic to that. This is the advantage of our novel approach to dynamics: the issue of ideological action is built in. But if we claim that there is a dynamics to freedom itself we are on shaky grounds unless we can specify how we deal with the inherent contradictions. Here our puzzle seems to court metaphysical breakdown until we realize that such issues are very much a part of our repertoire of action and reaction: we deal with hybrid systems all the time and these balance degrees of freedom in the context of causality.

The type of model we discover thus skirts possible bias in the use of a construct to propose a social or revolutionary ideology. The answer to that is that our approach does not propose a 'theory', the latter being the victim of Kantian contradictions, but creates a broad framework that encompasses a whole spectrum of realizations. This points directly to the tension between democratic and later socialist or communist outcomes and our model faithfully reflects not one as a teleological outcome, but a system where free agency must realize the future in the context of a potential set of outcomes. A close look thus shows that the categories or 'eonic emergents', the essential innovations in the sequence of transitions, are architectural and are reified in the later periods as free agency. This issue is simple: our 'dynamic' will equivocate the end of history issue to bring more democracy to communism, and more communism to democracy.

We endure the charge of bias by using a framework so vast it is really a series of potentials. And there is a built in bias to history itself: it shows a dynamic directly related to the emergence and realization of freedom, carefully understood. This creates something that moves beyond the standard, and in all cases, failed efforts to produce causal models of a system of freedom.

The solution, in principle, was hinted at by Kant who produced a notion of the 'causality of freedom', and it is thus a question of how 'freedom evolves' or emerges in

history in the appearance of free agents (who may or may not have free will). In a remarkable demonstration of the acuteness of our model we will see that a dynamic of freedom cannot overdetermine free agency, yet must not underdetermine the induction of freedom. Induced freedom is not fully free, thus in an elegant dynamic our system shifts gears at its 'divide' points to the open field of free agents. This is reflected in the facts of the case, the contrast of democratic ideas of freedom and their critique in the critique of 'bourgeois revolution'. We have arrived at one of the most contentious debates, that over the 'end of history'. The proposition that the fall of Bolshevism signaled capitalist neo-liberalism as the end of history in some teleological sense was a pastiche of Hegelianism shown in its true colors as the planetary crisis of planet change exposes free markets run wild as the deviations they are.

At a time of great social crisis in the appearance of disastrous climate change this debate is as important as ever and beggars the notion of the 'end of history' at the endgame of modern Bolshevik communism in 1989. It was clear that Bolshevism had failed, but now the same is becoming clear for its antithetical rogue capitalism that has devolved to an even more ideology Ayn Rand version of the basic ideology. The triumph of neo-liberalism has rapidly produced a drastic refutation in motion of any sentiment of capitalism at the 'end of history', an ironic phrase indeed.

The planetary crisis is thus producing a crisis of modernity itself. This idea was explored at length by the movement of postmodernists, but that discourse was beset by the fallacy of thinking in terms of creating simplistically some successor to modernity, sometimes with an attempt to critique the Enlightenment, or its rationality. And there have been many religious and New Age variants of this strategy, but they have all failed because the nature of 'modernity' is that of a time period and this is no associated one to one with its content. And our model shows clearly that the modern transition is an analog to the Axial Age itself.

We cannot indict the theatre for its productions. Our larger study will show a progression of epochs whose time period is fixed by another logic. Our framework is fair from the start and shows the equal progression from the early modern of the bourgeois revolution, the capitalist phase of globalization, and the revolutionary response of the nineteenth century. The issue is to find the path forward from the modern transition through interpretative free agency.

The Crisis of Modernity The idea of the crisis of modernity is a response to the postmodern fallacy of seeking a 'new age' after modernity. We are confronted with something different: a decline from the assumptions of the early modern. And this is compounded by the effect of capitalism on everything else, and its destructive impact. As we move to detect a strange new historical dynamic we will attempt to understand the nature of free agency in a system of epochs.

One of the mysteries of modernity is the question of what we mean by the term. A kind of 'New Age' cliché version of the idea is that of rogue secularism that has reached the endgame of historical decadence in a bias against religion. Many religious versions of this exist, and in figures like Toynbee and Spengler modernity is almost incomprehensibly analyzed as some kind of marginal irrelevance. These religious reactionaries reject modernity but embrace capitalism. Classic marxism was a bit closer to the reality and saw the implications of an integrated cultural phase of history taken over by the emergence of capitalism.

The search for a science of history has always failed, but a different approach can succeed handily with a slightly different objective, and result. This is provided by the 'macro' model so-called, from *World History and the Eonic Effect*: world history shows a developmental logic in a macrosequence of transitions and modernity is the last, or latest, in the series. These transitions exhibit a discrete series and in the process exhibit an exotic new property in which we see the alternation of system action and free agency. We cannot close on the argument due to the lack of data, but we should be wary of those who promote crippled views of history in low gear, nihilist chronicles of randomness.

This will imply that the modern transition, carefully defined, is thus a complex whole, a transition between epochs, and is at a higher level than what follows, which defaults to free agency. We have the gist of our answer...The crisis of capitalism is that of modernity itself, as the element of free agency distorting a system. But we must proceed with an open examination of the question of capitalism in world history to see how we are to understand the question of economic determination. Our model shows us a far larger scale of processes and that the system in question is not a causally close 'machine', and that it can process values, beginning with the value of freedom.

We can see the key to the rise of modernity is more than its scientific revolution, it is also its counterpoint of causality and freedom. And the idea of freedom is an explosive driver of the dynamic of revolution that animates the whole cascade from the early modern. The narrative of modernity is requires seeing it in the context of a larger dynamic of world history and what we will call the 'macro effect', and its macrosequence. The macrosequence is a form of developmental 'evolution', a term that refers in its correct usage to a complex directional manifestation, one visible in world history...

The sudden appearance of revolutionary movements in the last phase of this sequence, i.e. in modernity is a illustrative of what the overall progression of civilization is about, in a complex interplay of slow/fast factors...The issue of revolution is critical for an understanding, but has tended to suffer false theoretical frameworks, e.g. the dialectic. We should see 'revolutions' not via theories but as associated with the macro factor itself, with a warning that 'revolution' outside of the macro sequence can change its character. The macrosequence is discovered via a complex set of clues, starting with the Axial Age. The understanding of the Axial Age is that of a step in a sequence: with the basic clues we can easily complete the analysis to discover, or suspect a larger sequence

Out of Revolution Our new insight into history shows us the indirect source of so much revolutionary activity in the early modern. Our macro effect is itself a form of 'macro-revolution' and the micro-revolutions reflect this.

We have found the basis for understanding the equal enigma of modernity, or its genesis in the early modern: it is a finite transition starting in the fifteen century in a larger sequence and shows a termination point or 'divide' around 1800+: this key issue is vital for seeing the later chaotification now overtaking a whole planet. Our macro system does not control this.

The term 'dialectic' is subject to many confusions, although we should try to adopt transparent usages because the idea, prior to abuse, can be useful. For example the modern transition shows outcomes that are 'dialectical', which simply means that two or more outcomes emerge in potential and/or in parallel. We thus see capitalism emerging with a parallel synchronous process, e.g. the democratic revolutions evolving into socialist/communist resolutions... The dialectic should refer to such 'counterpoint' opposites and not indulge in mystical triads... The dialectic of dyads versus triads is hopelessly confused by marxists, and we should use only the simplest dyads until and unless we can find a better or larger understanding...

Our model tells us that the onset of socialism/communism is parallel to that of capitalism just at the divide to the modern transition and both aspects have the appearance of apparitions, i.e. appear at the last moment and tend to contradict the long early modern preparation. Capitalism begins to distort modernity, as socialism/communism attempt a 'chase plane' pursuit and response. Both aspects show the ominous transition from system action to free agency characteristic of our model and both aspects are liable to distortion. Capitalist distortion is obvious from start to finish. The marxist left produces a powerful corpus in response, but this factor of free agency is a warning that we are dealing with fallible agents. We might suspect the influence of positivism, which had a clear critique in the early modern, scientism, darwinism, reductionism, and preposterously, the Hegelian dialectic. The overall result is flawed and has no correct theory of revolution...the Russian Bolshevik revolution proceeds with inadequate theories and is different in character from the revolutions of the early modern....

1848: the prophetic year The divide process at the end of the modern transition extends through the first generation after around 1800, and this period, with a symbolic drama altogether apt ca. the 1848 revolutions, with Marx, Engels et al in attendance (we should include the counterpoint dialectic of anarchist synchronous actors, e.g. Bakunin)

Once and Future Communism The basic development of communism is nonetheless a world historical outcome to the modern transition, in ambiguous relation to democracy, and will spawn sooner or later a new version in the wake of the failure of bolshevism...

Nietzsche was a distortion of the early modern, but had a point about the 'last man': the participants in the modern experiment are moving toward the completion of the 'great transition' or the evolution of man, and this requires that 'free agency' come to an understanding and self-replication of the macrosequence...

The ends of history The end of history debate is related to this issue of the 'last and first men', but has been distorted upside down to make capitalism that 'end'. But surely the original and true meaning is that of a system to succeed the capitalist phase, and this without voiding the basic democratic outcome of the modern transition...

We have thus gotten away with a blend of ideology and theory that seems biased or preposterous to the conservative view. But the reality is nothing of the kind, and instead warns us of the perilous nature of our freedom in such a complex system which has bestowed a gift that we might too easily abuse. It shows us a potential with two options: the early modern is overtaken by capitalism ad infinitum (and yet we see the endgame already) or modernity is recast via revolution to a stage of postcapitalism, which implies a version of communism. The idea of the end of history seems quite absurd here: the most probable outcomes resemble those of the Axial Age's occidental oblivion in the decline and fall of Rome, thence a dark age, a thorough medievaly. A revolutionary option thus attempts to select a better future from the improbable.

1848+: THEORY, IDEOLOGY, AND REVOLUTION

Introduction

One of the unexpected successes of the eonic model is the way it highlights the rise of modernity in the context of an historical dynamic, visible in the eonic effect. This model allows us to harmonize the ideas of history and evolution, and mediate the contradiction between random and teleological conceptions applied to history. The discovery of historical directionality where least expected is a by-product of eonic periodization, and the result is the depiction of the modern transition, and just as important, its 'Great Divide', or the point at which the modern transition terminates and yields to the new age of modernity as such. This property of a discrete-continuous model, its finite interval transformations in a series, finds a surprising confirmation in the facts of modern history, the extraordinary period of innovation that we see at the end of the eighteenth century. The model distinguishes carefully between the so-called macro and micro levels of the eonic sequence, and this, applied to the modern transition and its aftermath, suddenly uncovers the enigma of modernity in its often confusing and seemingly contradictory aspects: after the divide period the action changes its character from macro to micro. The transitional interval from ca. 1500 to 1800, from the Reformation to the Enlightenment, is

climaxed by the generation of the French, American, and Industrial Revolutions, and a host of other so-called 'eonic emergents', and the result is a spectacular take-off point, the generation leading up to the period of the transformed mid-nineteenth century world of liberal/bourgeois civilization. That these events in a massive cluster from ca. 1750 to 1850, the Great Divide, are an aspect of the 'non-random (eonic) evolution' of civilization is, at first, surprising, and a strange way to analyze both history and modernity, but the match of the model to the facts is so striking that we gradually begin to get a sense of a tremendously subtle and deep system at work, one that resolves the chronic confusions of historical determinism and free history that have bedeviled all efforts to construct universal histories. Even if one found the eonic model a bit odd it would be worth one's while to get this kind of analysis under one's belt, because this kind of systems analysis, however outlandish at first, uncovers something less organized approaches would miss completely.

The appendix of *World History And The Eonic Effect* constructs a periodization database using a special terminology, and in this context the term '1848+' is simply one way of referring to the Great Divide period, or rather its immediate aftermath, clearly visible in the generation of the 1840's and after. This period is, ironically, the theatre of one of the classic failed revolutions, that of 1848, but one that left a mysterious question mark, and thus the 1848+ glyph is a topical notation serving to force a question on us: how should we take the phenomenon of revolution, and ideology, in the context of the eonic model. More generally we should look at the whole outcome of the modern transition in its many dimensions and the way the nineteenth century comes to floodtide at the onset of globalization. The generation of the 48's shows a host of other parallel incidents of interest, but we can focus on the moment of emergent Marxism at the conclusion to the modern transition.

Actually, while most so-called scientific approaches to history attempt to ape the objectivity of the hard sciences even as they end in ideological bias, the eonic model makes no pretense to transcend ideology, doing ideology wholesale, and keeps itself honest by forcing the issue of looking at the full spectrum of ideologies. The Axial Age alone shows us a multiplicity of differing perspectives and views on a stupefying scale, each hard to fully understand without a full-scale scholarly expedition. Thus we (can optionally as an exercise of post-eonic analysis) actively reconstruct the classic collision of liberal and post-liberal ideologies as this occurred instantly in the wake of the French Revolution, hoping to find some tactic of reconciliation between them, and some resolution of the immense tragedy emerging from leftist promotion of revolutionary adventurism. We should note at once, without conservative or reactionary bias, that the eonic model puts a high premium on basic liberalism as an eonic emergent process, and the reason for this is that it correlates exactly with the eonic structure, and cascades with

the coming of the multiple democratic revolutions that proceeded in parallel to the leftist 'deviations' attempting spasmodically to both fulfill them and overcome them. Marx or no Marx, the liberal revolutions outstripped their far leftist competitors, for reasons not hard to uncover, given a little eonic study. Liberal emergentism has solid roots in the seventeenth century, and crystallizes rapidly in the so-called Great Divide. That said, there is nothing mysterious in the basic impulse of the nineteenth century left: democracy means just that, how to bring 'real democracy' into existence? Thus the rise of the left is simply an aspect of one and the same liberal revolution, a point often lost in the fractious dialectic it generated. By the time this impulse reaches the throes of Leninism the point has been lost totally, and the basics of liberal emergentism look to have been right from the beginning. The basic problem is that while the eonic sequence looks to be 'revolutionary' indeed, the series of eonic transitions are not the same as 'revolutions', which are particular historical episodes that occur in the context of eonic transformation, but don't represent its essential dynamics. Thus the specter of teleological revolutionism arose as a fallacy of eonic dynamics, and the result was a misconception of the case at hand.

Of essential interest is the now classic set of antitheses that emerge between the liberal and later leftist, especially Marxist, perspectives. It was Marx who first clearly outlined the issues of theory and ideology, in the context of revolutionary transformation and its dilemmas. And yet something has always seemed 'not right' about Marxist theory and the tremendous surging emergence of liberal civilization was never properly analyzed or resolved in the tenets of the suddenly-itself-an-ideology: the Marxist interpretation of historical dynamics.

The eonic model forces a kind of 'recompute' on these questions, since it makes a strong, and finally much better, claim on historical theory than the heavy-footed 'historical materialism', whose analyses have never been successful in their theoretical claims, what to say of their fallacious attempts to rationalize the phenomenon of revolution, witness the fiasco of the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath.

The eonic model, it must be admitted, with whatever bias, gives a much sounder analysis of so-called 'bourgeois modernity', but perhaps risks the danger of itself being ideological in this respect. In fact, the model is so comprehensive that it can table contradictions with ease, and its intent is reconstructive study, not ideological promotion. But the leftist rejection of bourgeois capitalism led to the rejection, in some respects, of the whole phenomenon of modernity itself, in the confusion of economic and cultural categories, thus ending in a kind of proto-postmodern muddle of trying to undo the very culture it was trying to promote. The crux of the confusion lies in the mis-analysis of the French Revolution, and the so-called 'economic interpretation of history' applied to the

dynamics of capitalism. The irony here is that by putting the prime emphasis on economic dynamics the Marxist left ended by strengthening the very process it attempted to critique. Whatever else is the case, and beyond the phantoms of theory, the left, the issue of revolution apart, provided an answer to the deficit of democracy in its successful practical realization of nineteenth century labor movements attempting to redress the imbalance not only in bourgeois democracy but in the whole history of exploitation visible since the emergence of the first states at the dawn of civilization. A world-historical first.

The eonic model approaches the whole question of the failed theses of historical materialism with a different construct and in a much simpler and more intuitive fashion, by distinguishing economic 'evolution' from the greater 'evolution' of culture, and demotes capitalism to economics, even as it promotes the more general phase of modernity to the level of a kind of macrohistorical dynamic. Demoting capitalism to 'mere economics' shouldn't be a controversial step! Cats belong in the feline category, nowhere else. And yet the mystique of capitalism seems to have bemused the Marxist to the point that universal history is seen as the product of economic interactions, and this is simply a fallacy.

1.1 Marx, Darwin, And Ideology The question of theory and ideology...

One of the great ironies of modern thought is the way that economic ideology came to influence biological theory, even as Marx was developing a critique of just such ideological confusion. As a final confusion, the left itself ended by embracing Darwinism, blunting the cogency of its assessment of the impact of economic ideology on culture. Part of the reason for this lies in the Feuerbachian agenda of secularist Marxism, and the challenge it brings to the reactionary character of religion. But as the history of Darwinism shows this secularist strain of modern thought has not produced a truly adequate understanding of the issues of religion.

As we examine the capitalist revolution in the context of the eonic effect we can see the rightness in Marx's instinctive sense, based for example on his thinking about Ricardo, that theories were adopting the stance of science even as they expressed a kind of bias about the systems they purported to analyze. The insight that Marx was groping toward arises all over again in the eonic model, but in a different way, and almost automatically from the way that model distinguishes the modern transformation from the elements, or 'eonic emergents', that constitute its action. Thus the Industrial Revolution becomes a characteristic emergent timed to the transition itself, but it is not itself open to equation with that process, save perhaps that it stole the show. It is a set of technical processes matched with a set of ideas about how economies should function. All well and

good, but the theoretical component of some economic determinism is off the mark here in a way the eonic model compensates for on the spot with its distinction of 'system action' and 'free action'. An economic system is thus not a pure system following some set of differential equations, but a dual combination of agents making economic policies and the system that arises from those decisions. The evidence is clear: a set of policies comes into existence to express market dynamics as a reform of policy, and from there a kind of bubble world of economic consequences comes to the fore as a world in itself, to which all are subject, soon with the claim that this is the 'way things are, and so must be'. That's the gist, or one way of stating Marx's challenge to ideology. That such a system is actually the creation of the agents themselves, or those agents in control of capital, is long forgotten in the stance of 'alienation' that arises.

In the eonic model the functioning of economic systems is segregated from the more general flux of eonic emergents, and it focuses directly on the moment that agents of philosophy bring to the point of system creation: Adam Smith is the all time classic example. This is expressed in the phrase econostream != eonic sequence in the material of eonic model. The appearance of Adam Smith is, or tokens, one of the classic emergent strains of the modern period, but the realization of his thinking becomes a dominant discourse on its own terms in a way that throws the diversified dialectic of modernist thought into an imbalance of economic philosophies whose potential cannot be generalized to the expression of universal histories. Suffice it to say, the thinking of Adam Smith becomes distorted as a kind of fetish of theory and is soon a format for 'reality dogmatism', claims about the way things are, and hence must be.

It is remarkable to note how this ideological flu is catching, and it seems to enter the stage of biological theory formation just in the generation of Darwin's production of his theory. Another component to this crystallizing set of fallacies springs from Malthus, and the debate over his ideas (even as his demographic contributions prove seminal abstractions in the creation of demographic science) had from the beginning an ideological focus.

The resulting theory of natural selection produced by Wallace and Darwin both proved a disguised version of this Smithian/Malthusian legacy, and the resemblance of selectionist theory to the strain of mantra-chanting on the subject of economic competition seems no accident. The fallacy arises from the failure to actually observe evolutionary dynamics in action. It is one thing to discover evolution as a set of facts, quite another to fully observe its dynamics, and here the Malthusian surface of the survival of the fittest scenes directly observed by naturalists, Wallace in his jungles, Darwin in his Galapagos, is actually misleading. They are observing 'evolution' of a sort, but never the real dynamics of evolution as such. This point is forever unclear until we

actually produce an example of evolutionary dynamics, at which point the vast complexity of its real action can be observed as if for the first time.

In any case, the resemblance of Smithian to Darwinian thinking is striking, down to the obsessive treatments of ethics seen in the almost willful attempts to promote 'selfishness' isms as the basis for evolutionary ethics, the reductionist scenarios essentially voiding ethical action as they ground altruism, for example, in a trick reversal of selectionist reasoning. A true tour de force of ideology, one they got away with because, just as Marx might have predicted, they made it look like science. The subtle trashing of altruism and the subtle promotion of selfishness, a qualitative switch so desirable for those promoting capitalist participation, is one of the most dangerous legacies of Darwinism, thence of the legacy of Adam Smith, whose thinking was not intended by him for these outcomes. To fritter away the immense potential of modernity on these mathematicized card tricks of scientism puts a whole civilization at risk, and Marx and his contemporaries in timely fashion sound the first warning.

1.2 A Revolution of the Ages

The preoccupation of the nineteenth century left was the issue of revolution, and especially the ambiguous outcome of the French Revolution. The question of counterrevolution and the sense of the 'revolution manqué' that arose in the wake of the French explosion generated what we know of as the modern 'far left'. The acute sense of the dynamics of class that haunted first the French, then the later July and '48 eruptions are what led Marx to his classic analyses of class struggle. The aftershocks of the French Revolution are strewn across the nineteenth century and we see especially in the generation of Marx the emergence of a 'diagnosis' of the outcome of modern revolutionary democracy in terms of an analysis of the class polarization of the new political systems attempting to be born, as often stillborn, beside the instant success of the relatively isolated American Revolution that had set the tone for the emergence of the wave of democratization associated with the Great Divide.

The point for us is to stand back and look at the modern transition itself, from the sixteenth century to the Enlightenment as the 'revolutionary' transformation it essentially was, without becoming fixated on the incidents of revolution themselves. If we do this we see that the Marxist analysis tends to miss the larger dynamics of modernism, which encompasses not only a remarkable string of actual revolutions, but an entire transformation of culture that is far larger than the politics of revolution as such. The explosion of the Reformation, its synchronous companion, the German social revolution

of 1615, the English Civil War, long precede, yet clearly prophecy what is to come in the
A m e r i c a n a n d F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n s .

The point for us is that the sense of a new era in history that so animates Marxist thought, and not only Marxist thought, is confirmed by the evidence given in the spectacle of the rise of modernity itself, at a level deeper than the incidents of actual revolution. This 'revolution of the ages' comprises much more than the confusing and contingent circumstance of the French Revolution, whose dynamics induced a schematism of thought leading to the fallacies of revolutionary adventurism. This schematism resulted in the dubious, if not fallacious, view that the explosive drama of revolution constituted the prima face evidence of historical dynamics, and that therefore the controlled induction of revolutions according to script would constitute a realization of that dynamic. Unfortunately, as the Bolshevik revolution shows, this line of thinking contains somewhere a set of false assumptions. The suddenly appearing ideology of revolution has been the object of multiple critiques, some of them quite cogent, others too ideologically biased to grasp the real issues. But the simplest first conclusion of our differing analysis would be to note that in one way Marx and his fellows got it right, in one way: the modern transition produced a spectrum of bourgeois economic societies, struggling toward democracy, at which point, and here Marxists tend to have gotten it wrong, the transition impetus waned and the system in question lapsed into a strange kind of equilibrium not easily induced to further revolutionary change. The false analysis of Fukuyama and his sausage of Hegel unwittingly gave expression to this view, in another way. This is the stuck in gear 'bourgeois world' of the Marxist critique. The problem here, and prolonged study of the eonic effect might bring the point home, is simple: there is no logical prohibition on revolution, but in practice no such venture can mimic the spectacular scale of the modern transition itself, whose emergentist character is almost mysterious in its depth. It seems so broad that in fact it is a poor description to reduce it to the categorization of 'bourgeois society'. The result of the modern transformation includes religious transformations, the rise of science, a definite set of philosophic innovations, and a broad cultural flowering encompassing all fields, including the artistic. The later left ended thus in a condition of jackknifing exception to the civilization coming into existence, thus condemning itself to bucking the larger momentum of modernity with an ambitious hope to produce an artificial course correction applied to that momentum. Marxists often said as much, in their own language, and their ambivalence toward the outcome of modernity is fairly well recorded in their literature. It is small wonder that the collision proved disastrous in its failure to grapple with the phenomenon it thought it had understood in purely economic terms. This then is the problem with revolutions: it is true that revolutions correlate with modernity, but they don't define it. To construct a new 'new society', a new variant of modernity, just after a new society has just come into existence creates a collision of

modernity with itself. And the logistics of social change required to do that are so far beyond the means of a cadre of revolutionaries as to constitute a practical, if not logical, fallacy. That is obvious if we look at the artificiality of Bolshevism: a group of agents who had lost perspective on what they were doing, and had an instant confrontation with a series of 'black boxes', social complexes hard to even describe let alone modify, whose correct grasp is not easy even for hordes of scientifically trained sociologists, what to say of 'movement enthusiasts' too often armed with little more than a set of eclectic clichés of social theory. And yet the mystery remains that the modern transformation does show clear evidence of the sudden (over several centuries, and relative to the scale of world history) transformation over this total spectrum of culture that revolutionaries observed after the fact but couldn't replicate. So, at least, it is not true necessarily that notions of 'revolution' are to be replaced by notions of 'slow evolutionary change'. It is simply that we don't understand and can't replicate what we see as the natural process of history, so far. The simplest resolution of all this would have been (and Marx all too often sensed this point himself) to have ridden the momentum of the bourgeois emergentism with a practical effort to produce a better version of democracy after the fashion of the cascade of such. In fact, a close look shows that this was essentially the real meaning of the whole 'socialist' conception, as this arose as a version of the attempt to define the term 'democracy', so recently reborn, and too swiftly compromised by the complexities of class dynamics, to the point that in the view of leftist hotheads the whole outcome was flawed or inadequate, or dominated by what turned out to be the prodigious momentum of the capitalist sideshow, soon the main event. Here Marx was a victim of his own Hegelian brilliance, with his classic critique of the doctrine of Right. That famous turning point in the Hegelian aftermath issued a challenge to the fundamentals of democratic constructivism in its experimental phases. But the point was lost that without a system of rights, the first born of the political transformation of modernity, all subsequent experiments in social tinkering were going to be orphans of the democratic emergentism of the whole transition. Here the later left, à la Marx, entered uncharted terrain, with the disastrous results we see in the contemptuous and totally eviscerating versions propounded by Leninists, whereby the great and historic victories of 'right' were discarded in the stages of the socialist parody.

The issue thus is posed: what is the modern transition, and how are we to understand it in larger terms against the backdrop of world history? For that we need to extend our analysis by looking at the whole evolution of civilization as such by moving backwards, there to find the first of a series of 'revolutions of the ages', the so-called Axial Age period.

None of this is a rejection of the idea of revolution, as such, however perilous such thinking now vitiated by false concepts, and the chronic and somehow terminally confused debate such as we see in the Second Internationale over the question, the

Bernsteins vs. the Leninists. Lest we lose perspective and take sides too easily in that prolonged fracas, they both seemed right and wrong at once, let us recall that the American Revolution was just that, a revolution, and that its success lay in its ability to reprogram something from scratch after a revolutionary interruption of continuity. How they brought it off remains one of the mysteries of world history, highlighted by its eonic bull's eye timing at the Great Divide, even as the facts are recorded in a transparent chronicle, but one thing is clear: they didn't waste time on theories. Their devices were practical nostrums of constructivist republicanism. What we see later is the concoctions of scientism concocted by cadres suffering Hegelian brain damage resulting in a tragicomedy of agents who had no idea of what they were doing. These tragedies of theory spring from the loss of a sense of universal history and the failure to grapple the idea of freedom in relation to those orphans of science we call (social) theories.

1.3 The Eonic Effect

Here we can connect our discussion with the larger issue of the eonic effect, and the historical dynamics discovered behind the emergence of civilization since the Neolithic. The core discovery here is of the so-called Axial Age, the phenomenon of synchronous emergentism we see in classical antiquity, including the five, or more, parallel emergentist zones of cultural transformation stretching across Eurasia. Here the Marxist theory of history confronts a wild exception to the claims of purely economic interpretations of the evolution of culture. In fact, we see prime examples of the transformational process connected with the broadest issues of culture, from religion to the political, from the philosophical to the aesthetic. The full description of the Axial period has been described in these blogbooks from several different aspects. Here we might note that Marx had a sense, which he misconceived, of a progression of ages, e.g. in his conception of the stage of development from feudalism to capitalism. The problem with his analysis is that the 'stage' of modernity does not exactly match the passage from feudalism to capitalism. Modernity is not described exactly as the 'stage' of capitalism, and the incidence of feudal situations is far-flung, that is, it appears, and recurs, at many times and places, throwing some doubt on the 'stage' aspect of its appearance.

In fact, as the example of Axial period shows, we find a pure 'stage' of something that is independent of its economic arrangements. The enigma of the Axial Age resolves itself into the need for a larger generalization, since its uniqueness as a period, indeed, a stage, suggests that it is only one in a series. With that insight we rapidly solve the puzzle of 'stages' as we move backwards and forwards from the Axial interval, suddenly to discover that a series of Axial intervals, the birth of civilization (so-called), the Axial period proper,

and the rise of modernity, fall into a sequential pattern of emergent acceleration. We have the clue to the rise of the modern, and an equal clue to where the Marxist analysis is off the mark. Our stages are real, as temporal phases of acceleration, but have no intrinsic content, or defining label. That is, there is one field of civilization, or Civilization differentiated as 'civilizations' (it comes to the same thing), and the stages are an 'intensification' of their inherent processes, cultural, religious, political. We must examine the content transformed in each case empirically. All at once, the simplicity of the situation is brought home by the comprehensive nature and visibility of this set of transitions, dubbed the 'eonic sequence'. The puzzle of capitalism confused with modernity clarifies at once. The economic stream, already semi-capitalist, enters the transitional zone and period interval, and we see a correlated transformation we call the 'industrial revolution', and the onset of modern capitalism. The revolutionary transformation of economic systems that we see in the modern transition has been confused with the transition itself. In fact, the question of capitalism has no intrinsic connection to modernity, for the very simple reason that it is present, in primitive forms, across the whole of history in the form of 'market behaviors' and 'market systems' (always present whatever the state of social interventionism cast out by the very late Adam Smith). Thus the issue of Marx can be simply restated very simply as a challenge to the question of markets and human rights, in the emergence of laissez-faire systems in the context of overall modernity. Nothing could be simpler in principle, nor as vexatious in practice, since the triggering process is one thing, the outcome highly rooted in its own circumstance, and not easily changed. The need to differentiate economic systems from the 'eonic system' lies in the fact that markets are omnipresent, and spread to all places at all times, while the eonic sequence is a localized intermittent sequence of isolated effects.

But in essence the point is clear, as noted already: as the forms of economic development emerge across world history, their actuality is independent of the eonic sequence itself, and thus require the deliberation of economic reasoning in each context where they occur. The notion of 'free markets' is thus an abstraction of later theorists who attempt to apply a canon of policy concepts to the prior stream of semi-capitalist perhaps semi-mercantilist or 'what have you' behaviors. All this means is that the outcome as capitalism that we see in modern times is distinct from the stage of modernity itself, logically speaking, notwithstanding its center-stage claim on the title of modern social s y s t e m s .

The question of theory then suddenly jumps to a new and different mode: that of the progression of accelerations or transitions so mysteriously present along a selective main line of universal cultural history .

It seems as if, so far from being a stage of history, the capitalist phase of modern history is a relatively contingent aspect of that modernity, suddenly amplified in the process of modernization and technological discovery, but not in and of itself an intrinsic stage of anything. We have simply restated a Marxist thesis in another form: we are not required to posit an inevitable stage of economic existence on the grounds that is connected to the larger eonic sequence of emerging civilization. There may be solid grounds for embracing a capitalist brand of economic organization, but that is not the point. There is no inherent historical inevitability to its appearance. And in fact its appearance is actually a relatively arbitrary set of variants decided on by historically given agents, often ideological agents at heart. There is hardly any way around this fact. Would we define modernity in terms of one capitalist system, as opposed to any number of easily conceived variants? What are we talking about?

It is almost as if Marx had been saying: we see the modern transition suddenly frozen in place and left incomplete as it is captured by the forms of a particular stage of 'capitalist' economic formation. There must be a completed form of modernity itself that is realizable as post-capitalist. That may be true or not, but we can see that the basic point is clear: the dynamics of world history we have found is compatible with multiple alternate forms of economic organization. Especially important to grasp is that the self-organization, so-called, visible in economic prosperity generation is a sui generis process. It only explains itself, and is not the right rubric of explanation/theory required to understand the larger dynamics of Civilization. Once we become familiar with this kind of analysis the point is almost obvious. And yet versions of the notion of economic self-organization have tended to sow tares across the board in all areas of social analysis, indeed, including the biological, notably the brand of evolutionism that emerged from the Darwinian phase. The idea, seen a figure such as Hayek, that social institutions in the manner of 'self-organization' in relation to economic systems, is certainly false. The evolution of social organizations springs from many sources, the generative action of the eonic sequence claiming by far the largest component of that action. And its relationship to economic systems is not intrinsic.

1.4 The Riddle of Evolution

One episode of the ideological drama of Marxism lay in its reckoning with the coming of Darwinism, especially in the formulations of Engels. Marxists seemed to think that while Darwinism gave an account of biological evolution, Marxism was better equipped to deal with the cultural. In fact, we have already seen the inadequacy of both approaches, and what is more we have discovered a form of historical dynamics on such a vast scale that its implications force us to reckon with the scale of general evolution itself. Thus, the

sense of leftist thinkers that they were grappling with evolution in some way is confirmed and yet we can see that a different formulation, such as we see in the eonic analysis, in fact foots the bill much better. We have essentially found one key to the dynamics of civilizations and their economies, and in the process, to what is at first our sense of puzzlement, we come to the realization that what we have found must impinge on the riddle of human evolution as such. We can hardly take Darwinian oversimplifications seriously if we have found 'evolution' in history itself, with a suspicion that what we see in some form that we do not yet understand must apply to the earlier stages of human evolution. That is to say, some form of 'macro' dynamics ought to have been present from the earliest phases of human emergence. We don't need to jump to conclusions here, but what we can say is that the misapplication of Darwinism to history is exposed for what it is, a kind of ideological manipulation of something we see to be far more complex. The relationship of evolution to history requires the mediation of a new kind of historical model, and this can help us to put the fallacies, not of Adam Smith, who was an honest economist, but of his biological successors, into context as inadequate to either historical or evolutionary theory.

1.5 An Eonic Model

Here we can inject a reference to the eonic model, as this formalizes in an elegant, and ultimately very simple, way the basic facts of the eonic effect, as a series of three (or more) transitions in a mainline called the eonic sequence. The model arises from a clear examination of the Axial Age and the requirements for an adequate analysis of its enigma. The resolution lies in the formulation of the idea of an eonic sequence, whose set of transitions, or accelerations, demands two levels of analysis. We derive the model from an interesting question: when did evolution stop and history begin? The answer to this paradox is that no instantaneous transition would be possible, instead nature would demand a Transition between the two. We can apply the same logic to that Transition: would one such transition do the job? No, in fact we see the form of the Transition would be a series of such transitions in a series in which the balance of evolutionary and history aspects would shift their mix. Most remarkably that is what we see in the eonic effect, and the result is a model on two levels, the macro and the micro. The macro shows 'high level' determination, and the micro is the realization aspect in its wake. This gives us a rough model of the Axial, and other, 'axial', transitions.

This analysis on two levels resolves at a stroke the confusions of the Axial period: we see the macro effect in the sudden eruption of effects, the micro aspect in the actual way each transitional area undergoes realization in a differentiated spectrum. The hopeless muddle of the Old Testament clarifies, since we can see the braided macro and micro

effects. The Axial component, as pure timing, indicates the macro, the actual form of the Old Testament myth representing the micro. That the Old Testament is a micro description of a macro process its observers did not properly understand at once clarifies t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e s u l t w e s e e .

In general the clearest picture of the process is to be had from its best documented instance, the Archaic/Classical phase of the Greek Axial interval, surely the most spectacular moment of civilizational acceleration given to us by historiography and archaeology. The diversity of the whole Axial spectrum requires emphasis. Two religions are born, in Israel, and India, a whole series of philosophical, political, artistic, and other innovations, appear as if like clockwork, and then the process subsides and goes into steady state, more or less. Our next realization is that the clue to the whole has fallen into our lap and we extend this analysis, using the discrete-continuous interpretation, to a plain vanilla cyclical analysis based on a sequence of transitions: the birth of civilization (actually the point of the emergence of Sumer and Dynastic Egypt), the Axial interval as such, and the suddenly emergent modernity we see as the modern transition. The idea of a model can allow us to realize, and get use to, such an outlandish, at first, form of analysis, by formalizing on a 'take it or leave it' basis: that is, we can simply try this approach as formal modeling, until such time as its basic rightness begins to sink in.

A considerable list of accessory concepts is required here, and we might note two: the idea of a frontier effect, and the idea of relative transforms, or the 'stream and sequence' concept. Our eonic sequence follows a simple logic: that of globalization, eonic globalization, and we see that our eonic sequence at each stage is moving to a new frontier zone of realization, in the oikoumene field of its prior manifestation. This resolves the puzzle of the sudden 'restart' in a minor Canaanite area on the boundaries of the Sumerian/Egyptian fields. This effect is essential for understanding the rise of modernity with its European polarization, and vulnerability to Eurocentric confusions, which are destined to be transient side effects of the larger eonic sequence, which proceeds independently of the individual civilizations it touches. The question of relative transforms is essential logic needed to grasp the way in which two levels operate in tandem. We see that the Axial interval seems to generate, e.g. monotheism, while at one and the same time 'monotheism' existed, or was developing, prior to the Axial interval This non-puzzle is instantly clarified by a version of a discrete-continuous model, in which we take the 'stream' of culture, or cultures, on one level, and the overlaid 'sequence' effect of the larger macro process together as two aspects of a master system. The rough elegance of this systematic braiding of the evolutionary and the historical is first seen in its prodigious glory in the earlier, especially Axial, periods, and gives a new perspective on the rise of the modern: it is a transition in a series, follows the logic of frontier effects, and shows one and the same 'stream and sequence' overlay found in the other cases. This

macro and micro aspect of the modern transition, with the consequent devolution to micro in the wake of the Great Divide, followed by the phase of globalization, allows us to see together the confusion of liberal and post-liberal systems that we have discussed from the start. It is very disconcerting to Eurocentric fans of the modern transition to watch this globalization of their transient localization start its prodigious globalization, almost like clockwork, in the wake of the eonic sequence. The timely appearance of the types such as Karl Marx is thus seen for what it is. Their ambivalence toward the basic liberal emergentism is suddenly understandable, and yet ominous in its potential for deviation from the suddenly crystallized version of the mainline.

The relationship of localization, as a set of transitions in the eonic sequence, and their contribution and subsequent globalization in a set of oikoumenes or diffusion fields, and globalization, is the most confusing aspect of the eonic effect (the modern transition is not a question of Europe!), and yet once mapped out the process is remarkably simple. And in that context we can come to an understanding of the emergent left of the nineteenth century. It is almost uncanny to see how a remorphing of liberalism, a prime emergent process of the modern transition, moves to respond to the process of economic globalization. Nothing in our eonic model says anything about what occurs outside of its mainline. Thus the moment of the divide, the termination of the eonic action, is open to deviation and chaotification, and the substitution of quite different processes for the general direction set by the eonic interval. This issue particularly clarifies the ambiguity of the globalization era of the modern post-transition, at once an active diffusionism of modernist elements, and a protest against Eurocentrism and imperialistic economism. The timely appearance of an agency of globalization, visible in the Marxist response to modernity and globalizing economism, is almost miraculous and the undoubted reason for the mystique of the left, whatever the confusions of its ideological crystallization.

But eonic analysis pushes us at once to compensate for the inadequacies of Marxist thinking. We should extend our analysis to the broadest categories, e.g. an idea of the 'eonic left', or the transformational character of the whole eonic series, beginning with the emergence of civilizations and states and the dramas and spectacles of equalization visible in the action of the eonic effect. Here the basic emphasis of the left shows its eonic character, but one shifted to the phase of globalization, hence with a sudden potential for direct opposition to the very transition that has generated the whole new era.

We have the clue to the spastic dialectic of the nineteenth century left. It is picture perfect in one way, and completely disorganized in another. It appears promptly to ride the wave of globalization, equalization, and de-Eurocentricization, as a 'helper' process in the degenerations of the post-transition. What might help (we hardly dare to pontificate) is a broader sense of the historical context of civilizations, diffusion fields,

globalization(s), and religions, along with a closer look at the emergent character of the democratic revolution. Such a left could be at once a fulfillment and a critique of 'bourgeois modernity', and be aware of its limits in the difficult effort to restage 'modernities' in the diffusion field arising after the Great Divide. Otherwise we should feel condemned to the sudden deviations from the general character of the modern transition, rather than to the fulfillment of its basic action. .

These remarks are very general. But they show the context of the paradox of the democratic revolution spawning its own antagonist so swiftly in the wake of the modern transition, and the need to thoroughly grasp the concealed eonic character of the modern democratic wave, thus correcting the too frequent blindness of the left to the nature of its own task, so perfectly in place, yet frittered away in confused theoretical formations unnecessary to that basic task .

Most of all our model is a reminder of the treacherous nature of teleological thinking. Our model gives us a handle on teleological thinking applied to history, even as it severely disciplines any such thinking with a reminder that teleological ideologies are not going to get it straight. The directionality seen in the eonic sequence gives a gift of insight into teleology even as it confiscates such a notion to a higher level, one that political movements in time cannot control. Their task is the realization of the basic tasks of the moment: the eonic emergentism set by the arising processes appearing in the wake of the transition's divide .

2. Modernity: Out of Revolution

The rise of the modern

2.1 A Great Transformation

We have enough to proceed, but let's start over, as it were, and go over the rise of the modern again very quickly in light of our depiction of the eonic model, to see the way that Marxism emerges very late in the process, after the Great Divide, with what is probably the first glimpse of the eonic effect, but one distorted by its wrong focus on economism, yet animated by the very democratic revolution that it ended by challenging. We can proceed with a series of stepping stone references to the phases of modernity, and then adjourn to a blog-like context, a blog perhaps, to review in more detail the elements seen in our bird's eye view .

Our context is that of the modern transition as the 'great transformation', and this in the context of the eonic sequence, a 'next axial interval', so to speak, with its characteristic

frontier effect, three century duration, divide, and aftermath. This frontier effect is completely insidious and bedevils all efforts at clarity as the red herring of Eurocentrism enters to confound what is a stage of globalization, eonic globalization, we must note at once. The localization via a narrow spectrum in a partition created by the Reformation, stretching along a band comprising, roughly, the brief Italian, then the German, Dutch, English, thence French, Spanish, etc, transition zones, confounds easy analysis as hopeless confusion emerges about 'European Western Civilization'. Crediting this 'frontier effect' seems an indulgence in the fantastic, and an uphill struggle of understanding unless we see its greater logic and the way it banishes all confusions, seen rightly. Localization and instant globalization are the elegant if rambunctious result. The spectrum of effects comprises, to be brief, the Protestant Reformation, the German social revolution, thence the rise of modern science, the phase liberal emergentism seen in the English Civil War, the sidewinder emergence of the North American system, suddenly triggered at the Great Divide as a parallel emergence zone (the first of the diffusion field offspring). The Enlightenment, Romantic reaction, great divide, and democratic and industrial revolutions cascade at the climax in a confusing interplay that can't be understood if they are too easily scrambled together as a causal series (the industrial revolution didn't cause democracy, or vice versa). We have independent emergentist processes compressed in a field of manifestation. We see that the modern transition in one of its climaxes in the earthquake of the French Revolution, but it should be noted that our transitions are 'shotgun' in their action, and the apparent failure of the French revolutionary instance might blind us to the overall success of the transition in generating a remarkable string of democratic revolutions, whose natural tendency toward equalization generates the action of radicalizing leftisms.

We have the spectacle of the discrete freedom sequence, in the larger eonic context: the realization that the periodization of democratic emergence is not random, but follows eonic logic. This demands a partition into macro and micro analyses, and the fact must be faced that the burden of realization will, and must, end in the field of the post-transition, the micro field. This rapid downshifting must be understood in any attempt to analyze the outcome of the modern transition and certainly the coming left(s). The danger of sudden appearance of idiocy squared is a liability of such a process, and more generally the integrated transformational character of the transition is not given to what follows in its wake. Subsequent movements might therefore be subject to the limitations of dialectical confusion and deviation from unknown or invisible premises latent in the larger action of the eonic sequence.

We might note in this regard that the fruits of the transition produce very quickly something not present in the transition itself, the rewriting of modernity as an economic civilization in the phase of industrial capitalism. All well and good, but the restriction of a

larger potential is, significantly, protested at once by the remnants of the French Revolutionary left, remorphing rapidly into challengers of that first born outcome of the m o d e r n t r a n s i t i o n .

1848 does indeed seem to be a critical moment as the flood tide of the modernist post-transition gets underway in the coming of globalization.

2.2 Revolutions per Second

We can restate our point: the modern transformation climaxes in the phase of the Enlightenment, which overflows into the period of the French Revolution, even as the Industrial Revolution, so-called, accompanies the passage into a new form of civilization, one soon dominated by the action of capitalist agents, an outcome intimated perhaps, but not legitimated, by the implications of our transition. The point is merely that this realization is seeded in the field of the macro but realizable only in the field of the micro, t h e r e a s o n f o r i t s a m b i g u o u s c h a r a c t e r .

The point to see here is that while the thrust of the modern transition is indeed revolutionary we could not easily mimic its action in a revolutionary gesture. The breadth of the transformation is beyond the simple action of revolutionary elites. This does not mean that it is therefore illegitimate or impossible, only that the result must show an understanding of what real historical evolution is about, and that is hard indeed.

Our transition produces an almost idyllic set of liberal breakthroughs, and then lapses into inaction after the Great Divide. The realization of that potential is left to the free field o f m i c r o a c t i o n .

Let's keep going...

2.3 Discrete Freedom Sequence

It can help to stand back and notice something extraordinary: in terms of our eonic sequence, the tide of democratic revolution, appearing at the Great Divide, is the second instance of this effect, visible in the emergence of democracy in the earlier phase of our eonic sequence. The spooky nature of this timing is something that defies easy understanding, but is a reminder that the name of the game is democratic freedom. Any leftist counterrevolution against that great experiment is likely to deviate at once from the eonic impetus. A point to keep clear in the subsequent chaotification of bolshevism. And

the reason many of the oddly conservatizing agents of the bourgeois sphere make themselves hoarse with libertarian denunciations of the deviated marxisms flooding the
g l o b a l i z a t i o n s p h e r e .

There we have it: the field of leftist globalization is prone, for theoretical reasons suddenly apparent, to deviations from what would seem (but haven't necessarily been so derived as) eonic teleological projections. Note that teleology is a property of the macro system, hence unknown to us, but as sheer guesswork we can see that its projections from the transition interval of democratic emergentism is somehow the 'name of the game'.
D e v i a t e f r o m t h a t a t y o u r o w n r i s k .

The prodigious emergence of the American sidewinder in the wake of the transition, exploding at the great divide, outflanks any of the humble efforts of the left trying to concoct outlandish fragments of democracy and socialism, while the first-born of the democratic revolution in America proceeds to such success that its fate could be to become the victim of that success as a degenerated imperialistic power thwarting the opportunities of subsequent globalization. Fair or not, the charge is soon so leveled.

It is important to see that this exemplar is not solely a democratic revolution, but a colonial rebellion that exploits its opportunity to stage a democracy. A point to keep in mind as the overwhelming momentum of this creature of the modern divide starts to find the spastic left barking at its heels. The attempts, thence failures, of democratic induction in the micro field, produce contradictory results, collapsing as crypto-capitalist imperialist conspiracies, and require understanding the reversal from macro to micro in the wake of the transition, and should remind the left of the left that the Bolshevik tragedy is both proof of their theoretical inadequacy, yet a reminder as it is packed off to the catacombs to stew over its inadequacies that a mideonic left is needed to challenge the
i m p e r i a l d e g e n e r a t i o n s o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n .

2.4 Class Struggles

The basic critique of Marx, and others of the generation of the 1840's (a context in which Marxist thought is instantly understandable), of the issue of democracy and class is suddenly transparent in our analysis: the democratic revolution seemed destined to become sluggishly imbalanced in the struggle toward equalization, and this is compounded by the class implications of the capitalist revolution. Much of the Marxist analysis is cogently adaptable as a plug-in component to our eonic post-transitional analysis, save only that the issue of the industrial proletariat is open to re-analysis as an abstraction invoking a macro dynamics that isn't there. That is, the action of the

proletariat is not the same as the action of the eonic sequence, although nothing in our analysis prevents it from becoming so in the future. Marx's formulation is another one of those bon idée's whose future realizations remain unknown and as yet unrealized. That free individuals should graduate to control their eonic destiny at the putative 'end of the eonic sequence' is an adventure yet to happen, one fraught with both logical inevitability and considerable peril as to the outcome. We can table Marx's idea then as a question about the end of the eonic sequence, and the danger of its cooptation still another time by elite subclasses of State domination, etc.. In a nutshell, Marx's idea is a first draft of something still to be realized. The Bolshevik revolution doesn't rate much mention on this account.

The basic action of the eonic sequence is that of state formation, counter state formation (and religion formation), i.e. equalization (the revolution of the state, the revolution against the state), followed by...anarchy?

Our analysis doesn't predict the future here.

2.5 Historical Inevitabilities

We should conclude this chapter with two citations relevant to the discussion: the critique of historical inevitability, and the question of the Hegelian 'end of history'.

The charges against Marxist theory found classic formats in the critiques of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper as to historical inevitability and historicism, respectively. A tendency toward deterministic analysis haunted marxist theories with the confused result we see in the wake of the Second Internationale and the Bolshevik episode: should agents stand back passively to allow the unfolding from teleological premises or should they actively work to bring about the result. This confused situation is a symptom of an inadequate theory and a false teleological projection against events. We can see that the eonic model more adequately reanalyzes this situation as the interplay of two levels. The only teleological anything we could glimpse here is that of the democratic revolution, and this is forced into the distinction of macro and micro phases. There is thus no teleological projection of a socialist future that is safe for us to endorse. The more likely result is simply a series of mal-formed experiments attempting to blend incoherent elements. This is not an argument against socialism, only a reminder that such a project would need to be constructivist as a gesture of free men. Historical inevitability thinking based on an undefined abstraction called 'socialism' distracted Marxist from the need to think practically about what they intended.

The distinction in our model between system action and free action suggests the nature of the problem confronting rigid theories. The result is simply, men become free to do as they please, but unless they can produce a democratic system, whether socialist or not, their efforts are likely to produce unstable results. We can't resolve this question fully, save to note that a careful study of the American revolution and subsequent democracy formation shows all the elements needed for the creation of a socialist democracy as a practical gesture of innovative politics. But we must consider that, for whatever reason, the success of this classic gesture put the emphasis on the formation of a republic first and foremost. Without a republican basis, a socialist gesture is going to end in the wreckage of a totalitarian resolution. Thus look closely at the stage of republican experimentations to find the lost vitamins of socialist theory, even as the class basis of much that is visible in the American experiment begins to stand out. Remorphable potential outcomes suggest themselves without limit, and free us of the Leninist temptation to forego this real complexity of democratic realization.

As to the 'end of history' question, we will refer the reader to the treatment in the text of *World History and the Eonic Effect*, noting that Hegel's and Fukuyama's version are hardly the same. The point for us is that our model suggests a much simpler rendering of the question, indeed the question, Have we reached the 'end of the eonic sequence'? If so the potential of free action in the wake of a prodigious system is open to the dangers and difficulties of free realizations that misinterpret the eonic sequence.

As to Hegel's idea, it is obvious that he seems to sense the eonic effect, and its 'freedom generation', and wishes to give a teleological basis for that. In our version, we see that the effort to maintain the achievements of democracy during the entry to the micro phase of the post-transition require understanding that the emergence of freedom has a macro aspect that is evolutionary, and that micro deviations from that will fritter away the gains of time in a new mediavalism. We thus echo Hegel's point: there's no going back. Unfortunately, we must realize that the brief emergence of Greek democracy was all too brief, and the action of mideonic elements is not controlled by the eonic sequence. Thus the vigilance required to stay on course, a vigilance present up to a point in the leftist discourse, but all too obvious itself subject to the post-transitional
c h a o t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e m a i n l i n e i n d u c t i o n .

3. 1848+: Ends and Beginnings

3.1 End of Eonic Sequence?

We can conclude our brief tour by laying down a few more rubrics of discussion, in the process connecting our discussion to the question of evolution.

We have already raised the issue of the Hegelian 'end of history', replacing that with a different analysis of our own. What Hegel was talking about is not always clear. In our version, the issues are crystal clear, without presuming to predict anything about a long range future we cannot control.

In our version we are left with a spectacle, looking backward, of an immense evolutionary process, the eonic sequence, whose character is both mysterious and yet transparent in its effects.

Here's the paradox: as we come to an awareness of this process we must suspect that its action will subside, not just in the near future, but for good. We have no final grounds for such a prediction, but we can see that the implications of our model are those of an 'evolution of freedom' and that its macro aspect must at some point subside and leave the field to the self-evolution as the self-realization of freedom of those men who have passed through its action. This puts a premium on the final autonomy and free action in the formal analysis so elegantly provided by the eonic pattern, and our model. That leaves a rather open-ended discussion, as it should, and also tokens the ominous possibility that the gains of freedom can be lost in the recurrence of history's curse, the domination of narrow elites. We see an eonic logic to the emergence of freedom and this historical data shows us the best of arguments against those who will stage the reactionary gestures so obvious from history of those whose ambitions are inadequate to the future potential of man.

3.2 A Liberal World

Our analysis has shown the eonic roots of the liberal emergentist world that arises with such momentum in the nineteenth century. We have produced without trying something leftists scorn, a theoretical legitimation of a political system in terms of an argument of historical dynamics. But, since we did it without trying, there might be something to it, and at least the result might be free of some bias for being a side effect of an analysis that began with the Pharaohs and passed through the multiple universes of the Axial Age. Our eonic sequence produces a series of self-enclosed worlds, and the liberal nexus seems to be another of them. Relative to the ages past, it can, and should, be seen as an immense achievement, and proof of some evolutionary claim of progress.

That a group of leftist hotheads saw fit to bicker over the result almost before it came into existence shows perhaps the justice in dialectics, and the claim one must grant that the eonic sequence having produced one world is potentially the source of an infinity of others. But at least we should consider that the replication of the action of the eonic sequence is a task not likely to succeed with eclectic innovations of theory. We see a world whose elements require thorough mastery and that in the larger context of world history a s a w h o l e .

Our eonic model is thus completely open to multiple perspectives on such questions and even opens a folder called 'TP4 exceptions', or the analysis, which the reader can pursue in the text of World History and the Eonic Effect, of general mideonic start up formations, whether these fulfill or deviate in our estimation from the eonic sequence. This involves among other tasks the study of the great religions and also the consideration, so deftly muzzled in the propaganda of that Hegelian rascal Fukuyama, of the, yes, Zoroastrian thunders latent in our eonic analysis. The beginnings we see in the eonic effect demand, if only by a process of logical inevitability, the query, woefully metaphysical, about the 'ends of things', thence the ministrations of mad prophets as to the 'end times'. To unsettle our quaintly foundationalist analysis of a liberal world with the pronunciamientos of the once and future Zarathustras is proper suspense in a tale left unfinished, but perhaps Fukuyama had a point. We can see that in a discrete-continuous system that outcomes tend to stabilize and endure, save only that that stabilization at its initial point could be flawed from the start, inducing the obsession to redo the beginnings t h a t w e s e e i n t h e M a r x i s t Z a r a t h u s t r a s .

We have to leave it there for the moment, having granted ample latitude for both, or many, perspectives, having achieved what any Marxist needs to have achieved, a basic clarification of liberalism in action, a gesture certainly present, most unclearly, in the f a m o u s m a n i f e s t o o f M a r x .

We should note in passing the structural resemblance of the left of the left to the situation spawned in the wake of the Axial Age, wherein the parallel emergentism of the Judaic and Greco-Roman transitions induced a collision of the two and a highly ambiguous 'revolution against Rome' resulting in a theocratic statism of equivocal status.

Anyone in the leftist catacomb would do well to ponder this outcome in all possible aspects, humble to the finitude of human aspiration dressed up in Zoroastrian finery confronted with the probable outcomes in frozen medievalism.

3.3 Rational the Real

Our analysis has passed quietly through that mysterious land first charted by the philosopher Hegel, but with a different model and result. We should pause to consider for a moment the legacy of that great figure and take note of the well-known history of the left on this issue, and the great confusion over Hegel that arose in Marxist theoretical gestures. That generation of Hegelianism, we should note, clusters near our Great Divide, and thus we can be sure, if not in theory, in a sort of 'eonic hunch', that it will prove important and recurring, whatever the verdict of transient scientism on its metaphysically outlandish demeanor. Fukuyama is proof of that. How on earth did a concoction of Hegelianism sneak its way back into the political discourse in an age of hard science and regimented scientism. How did he manage it?

Our eonic model can easily answer the question, and is robust enough to easily either 'sublate' and/or bypass the ruminations of Hegel, but we must insist that we have produced an historical analysis that stands on its own terms and borrows nothing from Hegelian dialectics, showing rather a Kantian emphasis on the issues of so-called transcendental idealism. Our solid model is thus potentially superior in practice to the dangerous gamble with dialectic that animated Hegel and haunted his followers. The question must be left to further research.

We need not come to any final decision on these issues, save to warn that the eonic sequence doesn't resolve as a dialectical process. And we should caution that the degenerations of dialectic in the promotion of revolution are one of the least rigorous, in fact, shallowest corners of Marxist theory. Our model enforces a discipline that a revolutionary might dislike: it grants no legitimation for future revolutionary trials as deterministic or teleological outcomes in theory, restricting such ventures to what they should be, the actions of free men, and no doubt hare-brained men, destined to miscalculate their situations. That said, with ominous precision, the eonic sequence generates not only a liberal world, but a potential failsafe protocol in the outcome of mid eonic confusion.

As to Hegel, it is hard to compete with the momentum and reputation of this classic, but we might note that our eonic model reissues the discourse that bedeviled Hegel, his discussion of the rational as the real, a pronouncement he lived to regret as his leftist followers proceeded to find the actual slightly less than rational.

Our eonic model resummons this issue in another terminology, without Hegel's faux pas, by making its gist an issue of two levels. And indeed in the eonic sequence we see the

way in which the ideal and the 'real' can intersect, leaving us with a sense of the rationality of history quite compatible with an evaluation of its irrationality.

So we can peddle our wares confident in a robust upgrade of Hegelian thinking on the mysteries of Reason in History.

3.4 From Kant to Feuerbach

Hegel can be a confusing thinker unless seen in the context of German classical philosophy as a whole. Then the appearance of Kant (and Rousseau) at the moment of the great divide stands out as the equal generator of leftist considerations. We have but to consider the implications of Kant's ethical deliberations on the categorical imperative in the sense of a 'kingdoms of ends' to find that stolid Protestant devotion a drastic revolutionary by the force of unwitting logic alone. In any case, his system of transcendental idealism is the right starting point for discussions of the enigma of the eonic effect and its operation on different levels of action. And unmatched is Kant's formulation of the riddle of human freedom in the context of Newtonian causal scientism. The subsequent episodes of Hegelianism are hard pressed to transcend the problems indicated in that starting point. Whatever the case, the rough and ready match of Newtonian foundations to a projected discourse on the noumenal character of freedom in relation to its temporal manifestation finds in the eonic model a match of dynamics to the facts that should lead us to reconsider the gyrations between idealism and materialism that tear apart the generation of the socialist birth which ends with the Marxist embrace of an inadequate Feuerbachian termination of Hegelianism. Kant is the classic liberal at his most classic and echoes a logic of republicanism that will surface in perfect concert at the Great Divide. Kant is also a reminder that the fate of modernity is bound up in the need to complete or transcend the initial phase of the Protestant Reformation, whose structural position in the modern transition gives it a sturdiness that will rival anything the left might hope to produce as it is allied with the late decay of modernist philosophy into technological scientism. Hegel well understood this crucial positioning of the Protestant Reformation, and its fulfillment in philosophical modernism is a fitting endgame to the convulsion of Axial religions confronting the modern transition. That the Reformation finds one completion in the wake of Hegel and another in the brilliant recasting of ancient sutras in Schopenhauer and still another in the wake of the left is a useful insight into the integrated nature of the modern transition, and we might consider the Kantian deliberations on the issues of 'religion in the light of reason' and see that its cascading exemplars must include the almost religious character of the arising left, bequeathed the tasks of equalization so evident in the momentum of the Axial religions, soon to become theocratic churches co-opting the basic thrust of religion formation with the religious ideologies of elite statism.

3.5 Last and First Men

We should conclude fast here, with a connection indicated to the idea of evolution, this time an idea of evolution quite different from that of Darwin, or for that matter that of Nietzsche, whose denunciation of the last man, that creature we have momentarily established rather as an eonic agent, the stolid bourgeois type about his business in the post-transition.

In fact, we have left this creature to his mideonic fate as our analysis jumps to a different level of macrohistory, indeed, nothing less than macroevolution.

Our connection between history and evolution can be pursued in additional blogbook series of this type, but the point for us here is that we have potentially reconciled the idea of evolution and history in a way that ironically wishes to redefine the irony latent in the scoffing Nietzsche's mockery of the 'last man'.

For us the relativity of first and last men can be seen in the transposition of the idea to that of the first and last of the apes, man, in the evolution of homo sapiens. We tend to focus on the early generation of history in the wake of some putative earlier evolution of man. But in our formulation the 'evolution' of man is on-going, reaching even into the present and future of civilization, with the counter-evolution of history from that evolution indicated in the relationship of the eonic sequence to the emerging self-consciousness of those destined to be left to their self-evolution.

So perhaps Nietzsche had a point, to wit, that man is destined to something more than the stabilization as a type in an economic fixation of bourgeois existence. Sounds like Marx. The human creature can or should or must in the end generate the true first from the last man, or better, the last man, evolved from the first. In the nonce the confusions of Nietzsche over the nature of the overman, perhaps as some Darwinian supermonster, are to be reminded of the considerations of those who got it right the first time, starting with Rousseau, who pointed to the necessity of equalization in the context of decayed nightmares called 'civilization', and the way in which our eonic sequence gives expression to that different concept of evolution seen in the evolution of freedom, a far cry from the degenerated fiasco of theory visible in the scientism of Darwinism, which so misled the genius of Nietzsche.

Conclusion

We have completed, or else begun, our consideration of the place of the classic left in relation to the eonic history generated by the eonic sequence, hopefully in the process showing both the significance, and yet limits, of conventional leftist (usually Marxist) discourse. In a way we need a dose of someone like Marx to properly evaluate our eonic sequence, for a simple reason: our model in general speaks of the 'eonic observer' attempting, despite his immersion in the history he wishes to recount, attempting to discover and describe the eonic effect, and this requires more than just the realization of the outcome of the modern transition, but more the amplification of self-consciousness to an objectivity about the circumstances of that sudden mechanization of outcomes in the wake of the greater action of the macro level. Notable is the sluggish undertow that we see in the sudden conservatizing of the realizations of modern freedom in the ideology of classical liberalism, no doubt due to the sudden gigantism of the grafting of capitalism onto liberalism. This realization might not do justice to the full potential of the transition, thence the demands from the left of critique. Here the attempt to both analyze and realize the outcomes of revolutionary modernity find their expression in the figures of the age of Marx's youth, in the confusions of the revolutions 1848. We can't exclude this consideration, even as we avail ourselves of a truly potent model for the explication of liberal emergentism. We have a true powerhouse of theory at our fingertips, but it comes with a price, that of a balanced assessment of the totality of modernist emergentism, and beyond that of the greater eonic sequence constituting evolutionary Civilization in the t h r o e s n o w o f p o s t - t r a n s i t i o n a l g l o b a l i z a t i o n .

Although the radical Marxist left can be seen via the basic matrix of eonic periodization as post-transitional operatives, they arise just at the boundary between the transition of macro to micro action and remain of intrinsic interest, and not just historically. Lest this be a designation of 'Johnny come latelies' we should demand a thorough study of first moments in the modern transition, and not just that of Lutheran Reformers, those prophetic anticipations of the bourgeoisie, but of Thomas Munzer, that Zoroastrian hothead about the business of class struggle, at the dawn of modernity. We are left with the endgame, and a Marxist question, did the modern transition fulfill its potential? Did the gestures toward the equalization of the whole result in a success, or, as with the fate of the Munzer himself, end in the restoration of the dominant classes? We have but to compare the English Civil War with the 'revolution' of 1688 to consider the difference and a possibly ominous answer to our question. In perfect symmetry, figures such as Munzer at the start and Marx and Engels at the end, induce a mysterious echo effect, and we should come to the conclusion with that question raised at the beginning, which leaves us with a need to challenge our depiction of evolutionary emergentism with its own implications, the possible deficit of macro and micro action.

2. WORLD HISTORY AND THE EONIC EFFECT

2.1 A Glimpse of Evolution

The legacy of modern historical research is an ambiguous one: the conductor's baton of the Universal Historian taps the podium, in a concert of art, science and philosophy, the theme of evolution rising aggressively to the fore, soon becoming the basis of all further secular generalization about human origins. Although evolutionary research has proved a success as a project of empirical discovery, beside its cousin, the archaeological uncovering of man's entry into civilization, the claims of evolutionary theory are much less certain than we might expect. Critics of Darwinism often point to the fossil record, upon which Darwin issued a claim of evidence to come, in favor of his thesis. This evidence would now seem less than clear.

But it is important to consider the ambiguity at the heart of evolutionary theory itself, where this pursues the timeless 'laws of nature' onto nature's stage of life where time is of the essence, and the timely arrival of an abundance of creatures finds no reckoning in the orbits of mass and force. As if by a new law, the era of life finds refuge in a global moment, hideaway to beasts of a small planet, making engines of machines to consume mass and force. At last we find man whose claim is to cut history from evolution, graduate from all laws into a domain of freedom, as a law unto himself, in the court of small kingdoms and the self-realization of his individuality. In this ambiguity of chance and necessity we might search for the deeper meaning behind our use of the term 'evolution'.

In parallel with the nineteenth century emergence of evolutionary research, the rise of archaeology has wrought a similar transformation of man's record of his past. This chronicle has often seemed a disparate sequence of cultures and civilizations without overall meaning or coherence. And the enigma of this history has always been the misplaced origin, in classical times, of so much that we see as the content of man's higher culture. This middle clustering of several civilizations in parallel is an entire mystery in itself, and it is no accident the heritage of the western field preserves its riddle in the haunting echoes of the Hebraic epic. One of the consequences of the archaeological revolution has been to suggest why this intermediate phasing is the case, for we had missed a similar generative period in the earlier interval. It is a phenomenon in sequence.

Now Gilgamesh speaks to us from the land of Ur and the chieftains of Upper and Lower Egypt are seen before their crowns are made one as the first Pharaohs. An age in itself has come and gone, glimpsed at its passing by the Prophets of Israel, witnesses to the vanishing Assyrians. A significant piece of a greater puzzle is joined to the form of perceived history, and the indirect signs of macrohistorical context suddenly show their presence. The elegant, yet fearsome, evolutionary unfolding of higher civilization in a cycling cone of ratchet progression all at once comes into view. As this veil is drawn, we get a glimpse, only that, of 'evolution in action', as if seen for the first time.

2.2 From Fisher's Lament to Kant's Challenge

If we enquire into 'what runs history', into the possibility of any pattern, structure or law, we are left to examine the rush of statistics and wonder if it is sufficient to account for the chronicles of kings and commoners, the flowering of civilizations, and the evolution of religious forms. We are entering the forbidden zone, large-scale historical patterns, and have to deal with a considerable dialectic. Thus, the historian H. A. L. Fisher, in one of the most quoted statements of modern historiography insists that there is no meaningful structure to be found in the randomness of historical process:

Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations; only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.⁶

Increased perspective in the rising tide of historical data forces us to consider the counter-evidence to Fisher's Lament. Undoubtedly the influence of Darwinism is at work in Fisher's despairing rejection of any 'idea of a universal history'. The exclamations from the 'iron cage' of scientism in the wake of the seeming triumph of universal causal science seem to conclude the matter. But the triumph would seem premature, and the reign of Darwinian assumptions short-lived. History remains to be discovered. We live in a unique period of history, one in which the record of archaeology has begun to speak. Foreshortened perspectives of the historical have proven misleading.

Even as Fisher wrote, the record of civilization was crossing a minimum threshold of five thousand years to show a pattern of the type Fisher could not find emerging in fixer. We find an answer to the issue of historical rhythm, answers, but what was the question? Confusion over the nature of historiography and historical theory makes the idea of a science of history or interpretation in terms of 'historical laws' uncertain.

Fisher's lament, with a tragic flourish, was perhaps a pessimistic or proto-postmodernist reaction to the horrors of the First World War, and the shock this created in the hopes of so many in automatic progress. His evocative statement was made in the wake of nineteenth century ideas of unlimited progress, and earlier ideas of universal history and is an indirect expression of the view that there is no discoverable historical pattern or direction. Beside it lie the many attempts to challenge the great philosophies of history that arose in the Enlightenment passing into the phase of German Idealism, then followed by efforts to approach its study scientifically, or the reaction to philosophies of history in the various forms of historicism, beginning with Herder. The current postmodern critique, the 'incredulity' toward metanarratives, joins the list of the skeptical judgments.

Fisher's lament bundles together four, or more, quite separate concepts, that of rhythm, plot, pattern, and predetermination that do not necessarily stand or fall together. That historical patterned emergence can also be a series of chaotic 'emergencies', such as the French Revolution, is still another crisscross of meaning. A rhythm need have no plot, and a dramatic improvisation might show little or no predetermination, and yet operate under the constraint of a conditioned future.

The hold of Fisher's lament on many quotation-mongers and historical handwringers, as the magic sword to slay the dragon of macrohistory, is also a testimony to the difficulties of the project of Universal History, and its cousin, the attempt to find laws of history. Although the trend of current historical thinking, in the afterglow of the 'positive challenges' of positivism, is against the perception of meaningful historical structure, the plain fact is that the rise of the philosophy of history is a foundational moment for secularism and the understanding of modernity. If anything the rise Darwinian scientism is regressive.

As we discover the data of the Axial Age we begin to see that the kind of pattern in question is actually quite visible to the naked eye in proximate antiquity (the period from the first millennium BCE). We can match Fisher's lament with a challenge from the philosopher Kant to find such a pattern of history. An additional clue to the whole question lies in a simple question and a paradox that it creates: Is there a science of history? This forces the simplest dilemma: if there is such a science, there can be no freedom. We might seek the resolution by asking if there is some 'causality' of freedom that should accompany its appearance. If so we must find some evidence of its evolution. The study of history theoretically has proven intractable but world history must somewhere show at least some hint of resolving this field of contradictions. In fact, as we examine world history once again with this in mind, we suddenly discover that theoretical derivation matches the empirical record. This question was the object of Karl Popper's strictures on what he called 'historicism', and Isaiah Berlin's discourse on 'historical inevitability'. But the original version of this thinking appears in the philosopher Kant, who proposes it as the gateway to the philosophy of history.

One of the deepest currents of modern thought, beside the rise of theories of evolution, lies in the heritage of the philosophy of history, whose existence is justified by default in the failure to find a 'science of history'. No use complaining that science has replaced philosophy or that Darwin explains everything. Our simple model with its discoverable mainline stages a lightweight transition through this terrain. Strictly speaking our model based on a stream and sequence contrast, but then in this chapter has annexed the ideas of 'causality and freedom' as an adjunct, which requires explanation in the imperfect match. It is also empirical and can't be used for complex secondary deductions, but we can manage a few hunches with our historical black box, and the embedded freedom sequence tweaks the issues very directly.

We have found a solution to the paradox of causal determinism and the emergence of freedom in history: we see a macro oscillator shifting gears in its dialectic of 'degrees of freedom'. Beautiful. Our analysis blends in with a classic theme of the philosophy of history seen in the Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with its discussion of the various antinomies of reason, the so-called Third Antinomy being the key to our historical logic.

As we move to examine theories of evolution we find the philosophy of history's seemingly outdated, almost archaic, charm resurfacing as a renewed challenge, and an obstacle to their completion. If a theory of evolution moves to enlarge its domain to include the whole, then it is forced to reckon with the self-reference of the thinker pondering his own evolution. No other grounds are required for the persistence of this mode. The idea of evolution is a feckless giant, and we should propose, in a gesture more than humor, a comeback of philosophical history, a nimble rascal, to leap and ride piggyback, wishing to direct traffic, to the consternation of proponents of post-philosophical science. Indeed, we should notice at once that the philosophy of history is itself a part of our universal evolution, as is the idea of evolution, that is, the evolution of the idea of evolution.

Displaced in the rise of the positive sciences by the idea of evolution, the philosophy of history becomes one of its first passengers. For the philosophy of history is the history of philosophy, and this shows the signature of its own (eonic) evolution. We can offer no real differentiation, then, of the two subjects, or any decisive means of marking the transition between boundaries of rival disciplines. If Darwinism is free of metaphysics, then let it be science. But we have seen that it fails three times, in the classic antinomies given from Kantian Dialectic.

The philosophy of history is born, reborn, at the dawn of modernity as a fellow traveler, becoming visible as early as the sixteenth century and finds its classic realization in the writings of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his essay *Idea For A Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*:

Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view, concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like every other natural event, are determined by universal laws. However obscure their causes, history, which is concerned with narrating these appearances, permits us to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it, and that what seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and progressive though slow evolution of its original endowment.⁸

This hope is confirmed by the pattern we can exhibit, and we can derive the result from this paragraph. The inherent contradiction in this paragraph does indeed generate its own historical dynamic.

To preview our results we can note that the solution to the enigma of the Axial Age and to Kant's Challenge will turn out to be the same problem!

And the eonic effect answers at once to the question asked. Kant's essay is constructed around a classic ambiguity on the one hand it seems to propose a solution to his own question and at the same time throw the question into the future, for an historian with greater perspective to discover an aim of nature in the chaos of historical happenstance. This is strangely apt: archaeology has begun to provide answers here in the wake of his query.

Kant's essay is one of the few that have stumbled on the key concept of the 'causality of freedom'. This constellation of ideas is very hard to analyze but is useful in forcing us to bypass debates over free will by seeing it in the context of a larger system. And the 'evolution of free will' needs to be seen in the context of human evolution.

Beside this projection into the future of this wish to discover 'nature's secret plan', Kant also relates the issue to the idea of progress toward a 'perfect civil constitution'. Kant's essay seems almost perfectly tuned to our study, without realizing it, for our discovery of 'historical evolution', as we will see, throws light directly on both of these issues, exhibiting the reality of 'nature's secret plan' behind the emergence of civilization and more specifically the directionality in the development of civil government. As we proceed we will see the remarkable way that the eonic sequence demonstrates a law of progress, and of the concealed teleology behind the evolution of culture in world history. And the particular pattern of political development inside this progression will exhibit the way in which emergent democracy is bound up in the eonic effect itself.

Kant's essay invokes issues beyond its cogent insight into free will: nature's secret plan, and the creation of a 'perfect civil constitution'. These questions are directly relevant to the issue of the Axial Age, but only in the larger system of such 'ages' or axis points. Our model scores a homerun on all these questions.

As we examine world history the data emerges clearly to resolve Kant's Challenge in unexpected fashion. We have the framework to proceed with an outline of history as the 'evolution of freedom', starting in the next chapter. The great irony here is that we will see Kant caught up most beguilingly in the very turning point that constitutes one aspect of his problem's solution. The answer needs just a bit more time and perspective. It is a beautiful prophecy and proof of the power of his system of critiques.

Within two centuries the necessary data is emerging for the first time to resolve Kant's Challenge in unexpected fashion. We can easily resolve the question of directionality, but not fully that of teleology. Directionality, seen in the evidence of past times, expresses the phenomenal representation of some inferred teleological process, whose outcome, or telos, however, is beyond observation and in any case a timeless unknown with its foot in the future. Of this we can know nothing as our eonic system is seen, looking backwards, to have proceeded toward the present in the recursive approximations we see in the eonic sequence. And we

isolated one theme of that progression as an 'evolution of freedom', as an empirical study, without committing ourselves to any generalization beyond our present. Our approach is indirect, and the reason is the danger of premature teleological metaphysics, which ends in limbo if we give it an answer without an ending, which requires some statement about the future and/or the eonic sequence. But that very caution is implied by Kant's essay.

The pattern of the eonic effect is not a philosophic solution to a problem, but an archaeological finding, partial in the sense that a shard of some lost whole is discovered empirically. Our pattern for all intents and purposes answers the quest initiated by Kant, seen in the subtle wording of his remarkable formulation, *itself correlated with the pattern*, that we should *attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, to discern a regular movement in it*.

2.3 Universal Histories: The Old Testament Enigma

As we enter on the artificially created moment of the new Millennium set by the Christian calendar, an observer skeptical of the eschatological visions of doomsday apocalypics might yet consider that mankind is passing through a crisis in human history as a whole, the end of a long beginning since the passing of the last Ice Age. Globalization and economic interpenetration, the onrush of technology, political cyclone, ecological and demographic alarm, coexist with futurist expectation, and the hopes of temporal salvation rendered over to providential certainties. Ideas of progress and decline seem finally to blend in the antique hope of 'end-time' redemption, to pass as the ultimate 'quick fix' uttered in slogans. Some see the end of the 'modern age', and in a postmodernist mood, survey twentieth century as the close of an era. At least, the expectation of millennial completion seems a desperate impatience in a vault of centuries and a progression of epochs barely underway, barely able to begin. The nature of futurist beliefs, themselves the source of endless confusion, generate historical misperception in the traffic between archetypal 'crisis' and the console red-warning lights of real issues.

It is interesting that the roots of millennial conceptions in their current form emerged from the ideas of Zarathustra, in the second Millennium BC, passed through the vehicle of the Persian Empire into the parallel world of emerging Judaism during the period of the Exile and thence into Christianity and Islam. By this reckoning our crisis is quite ancient indeed, as recycled eschatology. It is difficult to reconstruct the exact relationship of Zoroastrianism and the Hebraic monotheism, although the *Book of Daniel* shows the clear footprints leading back to the era of the Persian Empire in the time of Cyrus the Great.¹

¹ Norman Cohn, *Cosmos and Chaos and the World to Come* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), *In Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York: Oxford, 1970), Theodore Olson, *Millennialism, Utopianism, and Progress* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1982). Peter Clark, *Zoroastrianism*, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998. Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus* (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

Our sense of universal history springs from the Old Testament epic. But this is a complex hybrid of multiple origins. The blend of indigenous Judaic monotheism, as it emerged from its Canaanite, thence Egyptian and Mesopotamian traditions, along with the themes of Iranian dualism and eschatological messianism during the period of the Exile and after, resurfacing strongly during the Qumranic period near the birth of Christianity, is one of the most confusing overlays of the period of cultural advance and integration that occurred with a center of gravity ca. -600, thence to generate the pillars of a great constellation of traditions. This complex parallel emergence and interactive blending constitutes one of the central mysteries of the western religious tradition.

That the record of the period of Exile given in the Old Testament should have preserved the forgotten connection of eschatological ideas with the parallel Zoroastrianism in the world of the Persian Empire is a piece of a greater puzzle. It is the period ca. -600, plus and minus, that is in fact our subject, for it is this era that is the rough center of gravity of a great transformation, known as the Axial Age.

It is the era of the birth of the great religions *in concert* at the fountainhead of the traditions of classical antiquity. The process transcends the phenomenon of religion and we see that the synchronous effect applies as well to the polytheistic Greece in the period of the Ionian Enlightenment. The seeds of modern secular culture are there sown at the same time, there is no clear differentiation. The Old Testament conceals a riddle, but cannot do justice to its own discovery of the Axial Age. Its perspective is too localized.

The Birth of Universal History The Biblical tradition gives testimony to the birth of ideas of universal, or progressive history, against the backdrop of cyclical myths, and this was influenced by Zoroastrianism. The irony that this linear, eschatological view of history should emerge in the mysterious moment of the so-called Axial Age, whose cyclical interpretation we will discover, and which will drive us to see their synthesis, the cyclical driving the linear, in the eonic effect.²

The myths of the Old Testament require a new understanding in the wake of the findings of Biblical Criticism, and the phenomenon of the Axial Age. We need to recast our understanding of the remarkable significance and context of the Old Testament. It is pointing indirectly to a great historical transition, in the evolution of religion itself toward a new form of monotheism. But that transformation is larger than the phenomenon of religion.

² As Norman Cohn notes in *Cosmos, Chaos, and The World To Come* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 227), "Until around 1500 BC peoples as diverse as Egyptians, Sumerians, Babylonians, Indo-Iranians, and their Indian and Iranian descendants, Canaanites, pre-exilic Israelites, were all agreed that in the beginning the world had been organized, set in order, by a god or by several gods, and that in essentials it was immutable...Some time around 1500 and 1200 BC Zoroaster broke out of that static yet anxious world-view. He did so by reinterpreting, radically, the Iranian version of the combat myth."

Even secular philosophy finds itself unable to do justice to this seminal epic at the dawn of middle antiquity. It is important to consider how little accurate information we have for this period. By comparison the histories of the Greek period are rich in data. We could not reliably speak of the historical existence of Abraham, Moses, the Exodus, or any of the other details of a history rendered into an ideological collation in the generation before the Exile.

The Bible Unearthed A renewed sense of the extraordinary significance of the Old Testament leaves us with a question, What is the Bible recording? Theistic historicism or an Axial transformation? The natural division into three sections, the Torah, the Prophets, and the post-exilic writings of the period Ezra and Nehemiah, gives the clue: the prophetic period straddles the Axial interval and this, as we will see, is period of transition to a new era, leading to its conclusion at a point of 'divide', ca. -600, in its enigmatic synchrony with Greek, Indian, Chinese, and other parallels. We can decipher this transition by comparison with its isomorphic instances, as in the emergence of Classical Greece from the Greek Archaic. The Bible comes into existence and begins to crystallize in the generation of the Great Reformation of Josiah at the conclusion of its Axial transition.³

Seen rightly, the Old Testament's *core account*, the rough interval from -900 to the Exile, unwittingly records an incident in the Axial Age. The puzzle of continuity and discontinuity perplexed the redactors of the Judaic corpus who attempted to seek the sources of their suddenly appearing tradition in earlier figures. Yet the sagas of Abraham and Moses, if historical, clearly precede the crucial phase. One irony of our enquiry will be to inherit the true beauty of the Old Testament in a secular interpretation.⁴

This period seems the source, as an age of 'revelation', of our sense of the sacred. Yet we can now see that the Zoroastrian, Abrahamitic, and other sources *precede* this period, whose relative transformation of outstanding cultural streams seems to generate the illusion of an absolute or transcendental source. This is a challenge to our idea of an age of Revelation. Further, Christianity and Islam arise much later, but seem to look backward to this period, whose actual core shows something quite different, the history of a Canaanite culture zone, 'Israel/Judah', whose religious traditions suddenly transform into a monotheistic vehicle, as it sows the seeds of the religions to come. An almost

³ Israel Finkelstein & Neil Silberman, *The Bible Unearthed* (New York: The Free Press, 2001), William Dever, *Who Were The Israelites and Where Did They Come From?* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2003).

⁴ As Wellhausen suspected, it would seem that it was the period of the prophets that represents the real transformation that generates the emergence of monotheism. Cf. also, Giovanni Garbini, *History and Ideology in Ancient Israel* (London: SCM, 1988).

identical phenomenon, at this high level of abstraction, is visible in India, and in a comparable time frame. In fact this entire period was extraordinary in its generation, and all at once, of new cultural traditions. The complexity of this picture requires a new type of historical model.

The Evolution of Religion? The Old Testament records a paradox: monotheism seems to begin with an 'Abraham', yet also seems to come into existence in the Axial interval. This problem of relative transformation is a prime candidate for analysis using our eonic model. The 'evolution' of religion in the emergence of civilization is a complex overlay of two processes, macro and micro. The micro aspect develops at all times, while the macro is expressed in a larger discontinuous series. The intersection of the two is what leads to the remarkable florescence we see in the Israelite monotheism that surges outward, like an amplified signal, in the wake of the Axial interval. One and the same effect, and one and the same timing, is visible in the emergence of the parallel Axial Buddhism in India.

With the increase of modern historical knowledge this strange phenomenon of synchronous parallelism has become an enigma replacing a myth, in the process casting the Occidental myths of revelation in a most ironic light. This constellation of creative individuals generates a new age of history, and leads us into causal perplexity before such a complex temporal correlation over independent regions of so many effects. It is a phenomenon of Gaian proportions, yet we see only a series of outcomes, never the dynamic behind them. There is nothing simple about it, for while it is true that the Old Testament demonstrates the appearance of Biblical prophets in this period, the effect has nothing as such to do with prophets. Prophets existed before, but none quite like this unique series in their anticipations of a new world to come.

From its archetypal roots, the eschatological idea forever resurfaces, as evidenced in the versions of early modernism, as they influenced, for example, the German and English Civil Wars, Hegel, and Marx. The eschatological nexus moves between its twin realizations, the slow, and the fast, the one conservative dangling the carrot of hope, the other radical, pedal to the floor acceleration and social tumult. The 'end times' are the grounds for the last revolution, or else the 'end of history' is the rationale for the end of revolutions. It is no accident that much contemporary social criticism attempted to expose the fast version embedded in leftist communism, looking the other way at the slow version granted the weight of religious tradition.

The eschatological idea echoes throughout history, reaching the modern world in its inverted secular forms, such as the Hegelian 'end of history' showing the connection between state and transcendence in direct fashion. This thinking echoes the question posed by the philosopher Kant in his classic essay *Idea for a Universal History*. Our secular Zarathustras live in the acceleration of history, the exponential curve as myth. Francis Fukuyama finds, in *The End of History and the Last Man*, that we have reached a

political final state, the end of world-historical political evolution in the form of the liberal state. If this is true, it should better be called the Beginning of History, the real New Age, if its creature could reach future history as a New Man. But the point is rather that in the perception of Hegel the evolution of freedom visible in the realizations of modern democracy tokens a New Axial transformation of the worlds inherited from antiquity. Finally, in the vault of time, the scale of the historical passes to the moment of Earth time and the evolution of life, thence to embrace the Big Bang and even, in new crypto-Zoroastrian theories of physics, a final relativistic Omega Point of converging world-lines at the “end of time”.⁵

2.3.1 Decoding Modernity: In Search of Evolution

Against the backdrop of world history the rise of the modern must constitute one of the most explosive turning points since the beginning of higher civilization, or even the onset of the Neolithic. In the three centuries after 1500 beginning with the Protestant Reformation and the parallel Scientific Revolution an entirely new form of civilization has arisen, set to transform the entire planet via globalization. Such a massive transformation demands an explanation on the scale of evolution itself, and shows a remarkable discontinuity against the backdrop of medievalism. But this issue has been confused by debates over traditionalism or medievalism. It requires a larger context for a solution to the riddle.⁶

The sudden explosion of modernity is an empirical given of world history. And yet a sense of crisis now haunts the idea of the modern. Indeed, a renewed challenge to the meaning of secularism in a resurgence of religious traditionalism seems to threaten the legacy of the Enlightenment. There is even the invention of a spurious ‘postmodern’ age to replace the modern. These gestures might betray the agenda of reactionaries, but demand a reckoning of modernity in terms of world history as a whole. There can be no replacement of modernity with an ad hoc postmodern concoction. The result would be decline, not advance. The sudden explosion of the modern might well show ‘action and reaction’, with a waning of the original impulse. Yet defenders of modernity seem ill-equipped for the task of defending its significance against its critics, or meeting the crisis that threatens its realization and future. What is the source of this sudden chaotification?

The question confronts us, What is the significance of modernity, and how can we understand its sudden transformation of world history?

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

⁶ Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000).

What is modernity? We are left with the ambiguity of what we call the modern, next to the equal confusion over the meaning of secularism.

Is there a postmodern age? One of the most radical attacks on modernity is the gesture to posit a 'postmodern' age. But this idea suffers a curious contradiction, and expresses an agenda that is ambiguously reactionary. Postmodernists have wished to 'deconstruct' grand narratives, but we might as well wish to deconstruct the flat histories that are the result.

In one sense, the crisis is real enough. Environmental catastrophe looms, as the Age of Oil seems destined to a swift conclusion. As if to summon the specter of Marx all over again, the Industrial Revolution itself seems under siege as a Faustian gamble, the automatic dynamism of modern capitalism looms as a monster out of control. A postmodern gloom seems to have settled on the prospects of the new age spawned in the centuries from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. But the modern is far larger than its economic contradictions, which have no pre-modern solutions. We seem to confuse economic dynamics with the fact of modernity as an already irreversible stage of history.

Ecological Reductionism One source of our environmental crisis lies in confusion of universal history with economic history and/or Darwinian evolution. This results in an ecological reductionism that makes wrong assumptions about environmental dynamics. In a period of mass extinctions the domination of Darwinian thinking makes us think speciation is purely an effect of survival of the fittest. But ecological environments show a Gaian aspect, and a balance upset by reductionist assumptions.

Our situation is not helped by the incoherence in our views of history. Here the influence of evolutionary thinking next to the economic interpretation of history has blinded us to any sense of universal history. The result is a kind of Darwinian economic fundamentalism resulting in a reductionist inability to grasp even the significance of secularism, or to see the complexity of innovations to which we cannot do justice beyond the questions of technology and the Industrial Revolution. The rise of the modern is a puzzle in itself, an almost evolutionary break in the continuity of world history. Exploding in the sixteenth century with the Reformation and the incipient rebirth of the Scientific Revolution, the early modern ignited a transition to a new phase of human culture, and by the eighteenth century the foundations of an entire new era in world history had been laid, graduating in the climactic moment of the Enlightenment, the French and American Revolutions, and the onset of the Industrial era. And this is the historical transformation that has produced so-called secularism, and its collision with religious traditionalism.

There is an irony here: this phenomenon of sudden discontinuity is not unique and resembles the seminal moment of the foundation of our traditions. We can see clearly that a moment of great discontinuity, the onset of classical antiquity, was the source of the great religions as we know them now. But also, ironically, of the very secularism that now

seems to challenge these traditions. It is altogether strange, and yet surely significant, that the age of the *Upanishads*, and that of the Israelites in the period of the Prophets, should occur in rough simultaneity, and gestate from the Indic direction the great religion of Buddhism, while in the case of Israel a reaction to polytheism should generate a new type of monotheism destined to characterize three subsequent religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. We must pursue the investigation to the end, to find in the parallel age of Greece the seeds of modernity itself.

It is an odd pairing of opposites to see the parallel emergence of two world religions, of such different character. It is obvious that what we consider to be a secular age is a reaction to this legacy of the religions inherited from antiquity. But it is a reaction to their medieval construction. The period of their birth was something quite different. And these religious formations in turn were a reaction to the religions of their time. We should note that the rise of the secular is not so much a reaction against religion, as its transformation, visible in the Protestant Reformation. The distinction between 'sacred' and 'secular' is misleading. We seem to detect a cyclical phenomenon. And, the enlarging scope of our historical vista is starting to show us eras of religion far earlier than what we take as religious tradition. Beyond even the world of Egypt and Sumer we can observe the archaeological remains of temples already ancient by the time of the first Sumerian cities. We can begin to see that organized religion was already ancient by the time of the first Pharaohs, and that temple complexes were already in existence in the millennia before the rise of the first great technological civilizations of Sumer and Egypt.

It is more than whimsical to cite a cyclical metaphor in a progression of epochs, for it will challenge us to consider the history of the many mythologies of cyclical history, and this in counterpoint to some reckoning of the idea of progress, the clue in fact to its reality. The trick is to reconcile so-called linear and cyclical views of history into a higher unity. The idea of progress has fallen on hard times, and in a postmodern period it is almost an idea in exile, and yet its significance for the rise of modernity is crucial, and its emergence in the early modern was as a challenge to the dominance of antiquity in the minds of those who began to see that what they called the 'modern' period was starting to outstrip the achievements of Greece and Rome. The ideological character of the idea of progress, and its degeneration into a form of economic propaganda, is a later development. The idea of progress was a great challenge to the myths of cyclical history, but there is an irony here, that the cyclical and progressive views of history might be reconciled in a fashion that actually demonstrates the progressive character of world history. Already as a first impression we have seen a series of discontinuities express the timing of a series of advances or reborn eras in world history, among them the rise of modernity. The riddle of linear progress is ironically resolved by seeing its cyclical aspect, an idea to confound cyclical myth-mongers.

The idea of progress is rejected by biologists in the discussion of evolution, and this has become one of the central dogmas of Darwinism, but at the very least the idea serves an essential function in our understanding of history, whatever the case with biology. Can we really look at the spectacle of emerging civilizations as a stasis of undeveloping entities? Clearly the notion that things are somehow in a process of development and complexification is indispensable in the attempt to chronicle man's historical emergence from the Paleolithic. We need a new way to look at the idea of progress, to see at once its ideological abuses, and its essential rightness or inevitability in any understanding of evolution. Part of the confusion lies in the obvious way in which what might be seen as periods of advance, are in clear contrast to the longer intervals, all too visible in history, of what might almost seem retrograde motion.

In fact, prior to the archaeological revolution of the nineteenth century, the Western view of world history consisted of the tale of classical civilizations beginning with the Classical Greeks, and the saga of the Old Testament, followed by the story of Roman turning into an empire, which endured for many centuries and then declined into a medievalism whose total historical interval outstripped all else, and dominated the historical portrait until the quite recent rise of the modern. This overall perspective was not conducive to clarifying the demonstration of progress in history. As we move backwards, a strange perception arises. The same constellation of advance, then a 'medieval' stasis, is visible in an earlier cycle, beginning with the surge of higher civilization at the end of the fourth millennium, in Sumer and Egypt, followed by the less seminal centuries enclosed by its beginning, that finally fades away into the decline preceding the rise of a new era at the time of the classical Greeks.

2.3.2 Decline and Fall

This brings us to the dynamical mystery of civilizations, their apparent rise and decline, and the misleading way in which a postmodern perspective has become a version of declinism. Modernity is barely underway, and yet a version of leftist or religious ideology has declared the 'age of modernity' to be finished. It is significant that the term 'postmodern' appears, before its appropriation by a cultic wing of the modern left, in the historian Toynbee. And next to Toynbee we have the figure of Spengler whose 'postmodernism before the fact' defines very clearly the genesis of the postmodern reaction to modernism. This in turn shows the clear influence of the philosopher Nietzsche whose attack on modern liberal civilization is one of the pivot points of the anti-modern reaction. The thinking of Toynbee and Spengler has proven strangely influential despite the many critical exposés of the limitations of their historical models.⁷

⁷ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Knopf, 1926), Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford, 1957), abridgement by D.C. Somervell.

The idea of the 'civilization' is central to the thinking of Toynbee and Spengler whose works constructed a kind of botanical classification of the various specimens of such, and the result has been a rigidification of the concept as some kind of dynamical entity, or even as an expression of the organismic. And this in turn leads to some notion of the lifespan of a civilization, resulting in the predictable onset of its decline. The great exemplar is the 'decline and fall of the Roman Empire', which becomes by analogy the misleading template for editorializing the fall of modernity. And this declinism has become the warning cry of many 'spenglerians in spite of themselves' who are nervous that the 'modern civilization' is about to enter the final stages of Rome's later empire. There is something amiss in this reasoning. The modern world is a mere centuries from its dramatic initial incidents, such as the Enlightenment. It would seem a desperate shortening of a potential future for this to be already in decline. Between the onset of the Roman Republic and the final decline of its empire is an interval of a thousand years.

Toynbee seems to wish for a new manifestation of traditionalism, Spengler a renewed barbarism in the aesthetics of Nietzsche. There is something confused about this legacy of Toynbee and Spengler, and it becomes important to try and come to an understanding of the limits of their analyses of world history, with their concealed cyclical perspective. The rise and fall of civilizations is not a difficult concept to document, up to a point, in the chronicle of civilization, but something is awry in the methodology of these two thinkers. We can see the problem perhaps in the way Spengler concocts a 'Faustian civilization' for the West, beginning in the year 1000, and now reaching its final stages. Can this be right? The arbitrary start at the moment of the first millennium, the depiction of the rise of the modern period and the Enlightenment as somehow the approaching decline, and the final 'decline of the West' trumpeted at the beginning of the twentieth century leaves one to ask if the concept of 'civilization' is really the right one for the study of the historical dynamics of the modern 'west'. The civilization, as a rubric is directly intuitive as a descriptive device, but the moment we begin to make assumptions about its 'evolution' in some fashion, we seem to be on less certain grounds. There is a much simpler pattern of civilizations than that of their rise and fall. We see a progression of eras beginning with the rise of higher civilization in a system that transcends civilizations and seems to generate Civilization, in a process of localization and globalization.

The gloom of Spengler is in one way understandable, composing the elements of his immense tome against the backdrop of the First World War whose unexpected savagery left the idea of progress shattered in the minds of a whole generation. It seemed as if the hopes and expectations of modernity had been betrayed by a regression. And there was worse to come. The unimaginable, like a cusp in history, was soon to emerge in the convulsion of Nazism and the Holocaust. It was, and is, hard for many to even consider

the idea of progress again after such an unprecedented outbreak of the demonic. And yet the very tone of Spengler's perspective, with its implicit Nietzschean embrace of wars to come and to be unparalleled in their virulence, is itself the self-destructive omen, the curious prophecy of the psychosis that seemed to overtake the 'West'.

And yet the intervening years did not really show the decline of the West. Perhaps it has demonstrated globalization beyond the vehicles of the early modern, or the limits of imperialism in these incipient champions of the modern. But this might be progress, not decline. From the First to the even more cataclysmic Second World War and beyond the fate of this 'west' was one of triumph and recovery, and a second act of the realization of modernity. And the very notion of the 'West' began to yield to the globalization of its idea, and the creation of a new and larger oikoumene. For the idea of the modern competes with the idea of the civilization, as a term of periodization, and has no geographical or cultural bounds. We become suspicious that the idea of some 'western civilization', with its inherent Eurocentrism, has missed the point. There is a flaw therefore in the idea of the 'civilization' as the basic unit of analysis, in some organismic metaphor of its life. For the larger direction of history has shown the supposed civilization of the 'west' to be an appropriate stepping stone toward a larger sphere of modernity, which is more than a civilization.

The American Empire? The theme of leftist critique of American imperialism has recently seen a revival of the declinist genre applied to the United States of America. In *Nemesis*, for example, the author sees the analog of the lost of the Roman Republic in the American democratic system. This is a somewhat more relevant comparison than to the fall of the Roman Empire, but the very nature of this periodization could be misleading. In any case, the challenge to imperialism is not the same as the decline and fall of a civilization.⁸

The study of history would seem to require a larger concept than that of the civilization. The issue appears to be not the lifetime of a culture, but the interval of transition to a new era, and the spread by diffusion of its idea, in the creation of an oikoumene. Once we adopt this altered perspective, many examples come to light. The lifespan of Greek civilization is very long, stretching from almost the Neolithic to modernity, and undergoes many changes in the form of its culture. But this is not necessarily the right concept of its history. Rather we see that this stream of historical culture has given birth to a whole series of significant moments, of lesser duration. The great classical era of Greece, which produced a turning point in world history, was merely an interval of short duration, several centuries, in a mysterious flowering of culture, one

⁸ Chalmers Johnson, *Nemesis: The Last Days Of The American Republic* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006).

that, just as with modernity, produced by diffusion a new and larger oikoumene in a process of incipient globalization.

The brief era of the flowering of Classical Greece is one of the most remarkable in world history, and behind a disguise closely resembles the rise of the modern. It is in fact the birthplace, however inchoate, of the secular. The remarkable thing about this was the speed, and brevity, of the transformation. Between the eighth and fourth century BCE the entire spectacle of the Classical Greeks opens and closes, leaving behind an achievement whose immensity remains with us to this day as one of the foundational moments of Western, we should say, world civilization. We cast about for some means to explain this apparition in world history, but are left with an absence of clues of the sociological variety. We assign causes to antecedents, but if we examine early Greece emerging from its Dark Age we are left empty-handed as to causal explanation. What sociological factors could we list that might explicate this spectacular phenomenon? Probably none. We need a new perspective altogether.

In our search for the causes of the Greek achievement, sometimes called the 'Greek Miracle', we are left with the impression of something uncaused in its suddenness of emergence, and also with the unsettling data of synchronous phenomena in several places at the same time. Even as the Greeks in a strange spontaneity emerged from their Archaic period to a moment of greatness, nearby, and in a strange simultaneity, the drama of the Israelites was playing itself out, as the epic of a Canaanite people, again almost a frontier culture, who inexplicably entered the world stage with the creation of a new monotheistic conception of religion, and a great literature, parallel to the Greek, documenting the stages of the emergence of this challenge to polytheism, and the religious heritage of civilization, outstanding since the Neolithic. We are coming to one of the most significant discoveries of modern historiography, that of the Axial Age.

2.2.4 Discovery of the Axial Age

Our search for causes is confronted with the phenomenon of the so-called Axial Age, a term invented by the philosopher Karl Jaspers who collated a whole series of observations of this phenomenon, as it came to be discovered in the nineteenth century. The discovery of the Axial Age is one of the great episodes in the more general drama of the archaeological revolution, whose most notable incident is perhaps the discovery of the Rosetta stone by the army of Napoleon in its invasion of Egypt. The sudden opening to the mystery of ancient Egypt in the decipherment of its ancient hieroglyphics heralded the massive new findings of the nineteenth century. The at first less spectacular but in many ways as significant discovery of the Axial Age did not impinge on public consciousness until much later, and in fact has still not done so. From his *The Origin and Goal of History*, we have Karl Jaspers' observation:

The most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confucius and Lao-tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese philosophy came into being, including those of Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu and a host of others; India produced the Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to skepticism, to materialism, sophism and nihilism; in Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine the prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance of Homer, of the Philosophers—Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato—of the tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes. Everything implied by these names developed during these few centuries almost simultaneously in China, India, and the West, without any one of these regions knowing of the others.⁹

Our perception of the suddenness of the Greek transformation, and the parallel emergence of the prophetic age of the Israelites now finds its explanation, or rather a larger question in search of an explanation, in the realization that an entire spectrum of cultures across Eurasia in the period, as Jaspers depicts it, from -800 to -200.

Here simple periodization uncovers something spectacular, however we are to interpret the result. And yet this discovery has been almost orphaned by an inability to properly grasp what the evidence shows. Jaspers is not alone in his observations, which collate a whole series of such. Joseph Needham, in *Science and Civilization in China*,
n o t e s :

The close coincidence in date between the appearance of many of the great ethical and religious leaders has often been remarked upon: Confucius, c. -550; Gautama (Buddhism), c. -560; Zoroaster (if a historical personage), c. -600; Mahavira (Jainism), c. -560, and so on. But the Chhun Chhiu period was also contemporary with many important political events, such as the taking of Nineveh by the Medes in -612, the fall of Babylon to Cyrus in -538, and the invasion of the Punjab by Darius in -512, all examples of Iranian expansion. At the beginning of the Warring States period, the Greeks checked Iranian expansion westwards (-480), and the middle of the -5th century saw the erection of the Athenian Parthenon. The concluding stages of the Warring States time are contemporary with many outstanding events, such as the conquest of Alexander the Great (c. -327), the foundation of the Maurya dynasty in India and the beginning of the reign of Asoka (-300 and -274 respectively), and the Punic Wars in the Mediterranean (-250 to -150) which overlap with the first

⁹ From Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), Part I, Ch. 1.

unification China under Chhin Shih Huang Ti. But the beginning of the Roman Empire (-31) does not take place until well into the Han dynasty.¹⁰

These observations began earlier in the nineteenth century as global historiography began to force the issue of a multicultural perspective, and this entailing the need for synchronous study. The first philosopher of history to mention the Axial phenomenon would appear to be the little known Lasaulx (1856), who observes,

It cannot possibly be an accident that, six hundred years before Christ, Zarathustra in Persia, Gautama Buddha in India, Confucius in China, the prophets in Israel, King Numa in Rome and the first philosophers—Ionians, Dorians, Eleatics—in Hellas, all made their appearance pretty well simultaneously as reformers of the national religion.

A sense of something defying probability arises spontaneously as we notice this phenomenon. Victor Von Strauss (1870) notes,

During the centuries when Lao-tse and Confucius were living in China, a strange movement of the spirit passed through all civilized peoples. In Israel Jeremiaah, Habakkuk, Daniel and Ezekiel were prophesying and in a renewed generation (521-516) the second temple was erected in Jerusalem. Among the Greeks Thales was still living, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Xenophanes appeared and Parmenides was born. In Persia an important reformation of Zarathustra's ancient teaching seems to have been carried through, and India produced S a k y a m u n i , t h e f o u n d e r o f B u d d h i s m .¹¹

We can now return to consider the Greeks, and note that many observations of the type collected by Jaspers exist for isolated instances of what we can see is connected to this 'Axial Age' phenomenon. Thus the philosopher Bertrand Russell opens his *A History of Western Philosophy* with an exclamation of wonder at this generative era:

In all history, nothing is so surprising or difficult to account for as the sudden rise of civilization in Greece. Much of what makes civilization had already existed in Egypt and Mesopotamia, and spread thence to neighboring countries. But certain elements had been lacking until the Greeks supplied them...What occurred was so astonishing that, until very recent times, men were content to gape and talk mystically about the Greek genius. It is possible, however, to

¹⁰ Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 99.

¹¹ From Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), Part I, Chapter I, "The Axial Age".

understand the development of Greece in scientific terms, and it is well worth while doing so.¹²

We suddenly see the question of Greece in the larger context of the Axial Age, and to understand the question in scientific terms requires an objective look at a phenomenon that we had not suspected, where the occurrence of so many novelties in parallel seems at first inexplicable. In any case we are left with a question, is there a science of history?

The implications of the Axial Age have thus left its study stranded in a kind of limbo, as the phenomenon has tended to drift into misinterpretation. Karl Jaspers, in a curious blend of the religious and the secular, brought a carefully balanced sense of the philosophy of history to his depiction of the question, but many in his wake have tended to see a kind of generalized 'age of revelation' in which the issue of religion is given center stage. And this has tended to scare away serious students of the subject. But if we examine the data of the Axial Age more closely we discover to our surprise that it is more than just an historical garlanding of sages and prophets. If we zoom in more closely we discover to our astonishment that these sages and prophets are merely the tip of an iceberg, that the Axial phenomenon encompasses an entire social transformation in place of an entire stream of culture. And we soon see that the question of religion is only one aspect of the mystery. For as the remark of Bertrand Russell suggests the case of Greece comes to the fore in the synchronous emergence in parallel of multiple Axial exemplars, and leaves as its clearest case the spectacle of secularism at the point of its birth in world history.

As we examine the Axial Age in its breadth we are confronted with the difficult question of arriving at the history behind each of its exemplars. Thus the history of India behind and leading up to the remarkable era from the appearance of the Upanishads to the birth of Buddhism is difficult to reconstruct. And yet the basic outline of the Axial phenomenon is clear. And the question of what is historical in the Old Testament at first bedevils any simple account of the birth of that remarkable document. China, in turn, while it clearly echoes its parallel cousins, confronts us again with a confusing picture of the period in question. Ironically, then, despite the hopes of religionists for some secular version of the idea of an 'age of revelation', the clearest example given to us, the period of the Greek Archaic onward, shows us in detail something quite different, and in many ways far more remarkable: a kind of evolutionary leap or jump to a higher level of civilization, one very well balanced between all the categories of culture.

The notion of the era of Classical Greece as the birth of the secular would at first seem paradoxical. We need not press the point save to note that the birth of philosophy as a critical consciousness sows the seeds of rationalism for the first time. In fact, a balanced

¹² Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 3.

view is essential, for the essence of the Greek phenomenon could as well be argued as the last flowering of a strange form of political polytheism, and we should be wary of assigning a modernist label to what we see. But the gestation of philosophical tradition in Greece shows us the first birth of the Enlightenment, as it were, along with the first birth of science, the first Scientific Revolution millennia before the one that centers the transformation to the modern world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The point here is that the Axial phenomenon is clearly connected to a larger set of categories than the merely religious, a point that is clearly indicated in Jaspers' original description, although he is struggling in the text of his work on the subject to remain without his theological boundaries, and yet to see that something larger is at work than the legacy of Christian historicism. Axial Age Greece was a multidimensional masterpiece whose legacy has ultimately transformed world civilization.

As we look beyond the pointillistic sprinkling of great minds in the Axial interval and examine the question of what happened to the culture as a whole we begin to see that there is a kind of transition in a cultural totality leading to a new and more advanced stage of civilization. The Greek phenomenon thus crystallizes as new cultural substrate in its Dark Age, then begins a kind of take-off in the Archaic period beginning in the eighth and ninth centuries. We see a field of city-states emerge in a spectrum of political experiments, as dramas of class struggle and republicanism yield finally to the first great democracy in world history in the case of Athens. Pervading this general tide of sociological rebirth is the manifold of cultural achievements that we associate with the classical era, from the creation of the Homeric epics from an oral tradition, with a great flowering of poetic art climaxing in the birth of the Greek tragic genre. We see the birth of philosophy, and science, and, indeed, the birth of historiography in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides, and others. The entire account of the Greek achievement here is then something far larger than the individuals that make it up and constitutes a kind of eerie time-slice of creative upheaval, one as remarkable in swiftly coming to a close as in the suddenness of its arising.

In fact the dates suggested by Jaspers for his 'Axial Age', -800 to -200 seem overly generous, for we can see, if we take the example of Greece as a defining instance, that the interval of great innovations is essentially over by -400, and that the onset of the Hellenistic period is of a quite different character. This is clear from the way the great experiment in democracy yields to the resurgence of empire in the conquests of Alexander the Great whose legacy is to create a larger oikoumene into which the achievements of Greek civilization diffuse. We thus are confronted with an interval of the Greek Axial Age that almost suggests a kind of 'punctuated equilibrium', to use the phrase of the evolutionists, for we can almost clock the 'punctuation' in the brief period from the late ninth century to the generation of Plato and Aristotle, followed swiftly by

the seeming 'equilibrium' period in its wake as history seems to resume its less
s p e c t a c u l a r c o u r s e .

While many who have attempted to grapple with Jaspers' framework of an Axial Age have narrowed their focus to the issue of religion, we can begin to suspect, to the contrary, that the case of Greece suggests something broader. And if we take to heart the case of Archaic Greece, and look at the emergence of Israel, we begin to see an analogous period of social transformation that just so happened to produce the seeds of what was later to become a series of monotheistic religions. It is important to see that the history of Israel in the Axial period at least is that of a Canaanite culture and its passage through an age of empires, as it creates an epic literature of itself, and leaves this in its wake, as a set of seeds that will, as with the case of Greece, diffuse into a larger oikoumene. We can begin to see the structural similarity between the two histories, and to notice what is most surprising, the way in which whole literatures seem to come into existence in a strange
t i m i n g , t h a t o f t h e A x i a l A g e i t s e l f .

Later we can attempt to grapple with the parallel histories in India and China, but already we seem to have a basic clue: the general stream of historical emergence is punctuated with a set of innovations that pass into the larger field of history to influence a later oikoumene. The effect is obvious in both China and India, where a close look might also resolve the two harsh contrast between the religious and the secular. For the effect as a whole shows clearly the way in which categories are fluid, as philosophy becomes religion, and religion becomes politics, and politics becomes 'sacred'. From Confucius to the prophets of Israel, to the philosophers of Greece and India, we sense of continuous spectrum of realization that is in a most spectacular display of historical dynamics producing a new whole new epoch of civilization in its wake, as this takes the form of a
s e r i e s o f r e b o r n ' c i v i l i z a t i o n s ' .

2.2.5 The Rise of the Modern: A Second Axial Age?

Almost as remarkable as the sudden onset of the Axial Age is its sudden waning and the return of what we should almost call 'history as usual'. There is something odd about it. The world against which the Axial phenomenon reacts was itself a kind of middle age. And the succession to the Axial period is another. We are left to wonder what the significance of the Axial Age might be. And most of all we are confronted with a question of dynamics. And we are confronted with something unlikely: the uniqueness of this period. Jaspers' use of the term 'axial' is ambiguous in that respect. It seems to point to a unique period in history, a pivot point. But a larger look at world history suggests something quite different, a succession of 'axial' periods. We have but to zoom out to see

that a very simple pattern is at work in the progression of civilizations since the Neolithic. Jaspers himself attempts to generalize his finding, but is obstructed by the issue of 'civilizations'. And his examination of modernity is on the threshold of discovering a 'second axial age', but is thrown off the scent by the confusions of secularism.

It is odd at first to consider the solution to be a frequency hypothesis, but, whatever the case, the basic facts speak for themselves: the Axial Age is part of a larger sequential structure. We should start moving in two directions, backward toward the Neolithic and forward toward the present. The 'axial' character of modernity is often noticed. Thus Bruce Mazlish observes, "The German philosopher Karl Jaspers has spoken of the periods when the great religions arose as 'axial periods'. At such times, there is a 'revolution' in the conditions of human existence and society turns on its axis."¹³

Postmodern riddle explained? All at once, if we can trust the analogy, we see why the sense of a 'postmodern' age arises: it is not the decline of a civilization, but the waning of an impetus, clearly visible after the Axial interval, that mimics 'decline'. Out postmodern confusion is a similar reaction to the immense
i m p e t u s o f t h e r i s e o f t h e m o d e r n .

We should begin to backtrack to find the 'axial' before the 'Axial'. Joseph Campbell finds an axial period at the dawn of Sumer. The Sumerian source is easy to underestimate. It looks primitive to us now, but its immediacy of creative surging gives birth to 'real civilization' in the odd 'early hybrid modern' where the village passes to the large city-complex. Its effect must have been as seminal as the later Greek transitional era to those who received its influences. It is as if everything was invented all at once, in embryo, to
c o n s t i t u t e t h e r o o t - i d e a s o f c o m i n g c i v i l i z a t i o n . T h u s ,

In the epoch of the hieratic city-state (3500-2500 B.C.), the basic cultural traits of all the high civilizations that have flourished since (writing, the wheel, the calendar, mathematics, royalty, priest craft, a system of taxation, bookkeeping, etc.) suddenly appear, prehistory ends, and the literate era dawns. The whole city now, and not simply the temple compound, is conceived of as an imitation on earth of the cosmic order, while a highly differentiated, complexly organized society of specialist, comprising priestly, warrior, merchant, and peasant classes, is found governing all its secular as well as specifically religious affairs according to an astronomically inspired mathematical conception of a sort of magical
c o n s o n a n c e u n i t i n g i n p e r f e c t h a r m o n y t h e u n i v e r s e .¹⁴

¹³ Bruce Mazlish, *The Meaning of Karl Marx* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 8.

¹⁴ Joseph Campbell, *Primitive Mythology, Masks of God*, (New York: Penguin, 1959), p. 404

We note the obvious similarity of this statement to Jaspers' observation of the later 'Axial' Age. Describing the swift transition from the era of earliest Egypt, Michael Hoffman, in *Predynastic Egypt*, is driven in some puzzlement to adopt the economic take-off idea of the economist W. W. Rostow as a metaphor to account for the sudden change that produces the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt under the Pharaoh Menes:

The immediate archaeological problem in explaining the cultural identity of Menes and his state is to account for the sudden embarrassment of riches that characterizes the material culture of Egypt between the Late Gerzean (ca. 3300 BC) and Archaic period (ca. 3100-2700 BC) in terms of a sophisticated, multifaceted explanation. Professor Renfrew borrows the term 'take-off point' from the economist Walter Rostow to characterize the rise of civilization and the proliferation of certain types of artifacts. Over the years a number of propensities develop within a social system, which predisposes it to a really major transformation. When that transformation does occur, it is so thorough as to convey the impression of crossing a critical threshold.¹⁵

Remarkable, to say the least. What about Mesopotamia? In *Prehistoric Europe*, Philip Van Doren Stern wrestles explicitly with the evolution/revolution paradox and observes the sudden jump to the first level of civilization in the first hydraulic world of Mesopotamia as it emerged from its mysterious roots of it in the era of the so-called U b a i d a n d b e f o r e :

Something happened in Sumer during the fifth millennium B.C., when all the rest of the world was still so primitive that the Sumerians had to make their own way. The initial stages proceeded slowly for a thousand years or more, and then, during the five centuries between 3300 and 2800 B.C., culture accelerated so rapidly that in this brief time villages became cities and cities grew into city-states...Roux[Georges Roux, *Ancient Iraq*, London. 1964,] merely says of this extraordinarily rapid cultural development in Sumer that 'a close examination reveals no drastic changes in social organization, no real break in architectural or in religious traditions. We are confronted here, not with sudden revolution, but with the final term of an evolution which had started in Mesopotamia itself several centuries before.' Perhaps. But perhaps he is applying our modern time scale to an age when centuries were equivalent to our decades. For a village to become a city in a few hundred years when there had never been a city anywhere before, is, to put it mildly, something more than ordinary evolution.¹⁶

¹⁵ Michael Hoffman, *Predynastic Egypt*, "In Search of Menes".

¹⁶ Philip Van Doren Stern, *Prehistoric Europe* (New York: Norton, 1969)

Again, remarkable. And this statement suggests we can keep on going backward to find a still earlier case, but for the moment we have discovered something very simple, and a resolution, to some extent, of the riddle of the Axial Age, it is but one in a series. There is one last piece to our puzzle, the rise of the modern. Having moved backwards toward the beginning of civilization, we can move forward from the Axial period.

The sudden waning of the Axial effect, as we have noted, is dramatic. By -200 the Axial phenomenon is clearly over, and the onset of empire seems like a rush into a vacuum, to replace a brief period of republican experiments. The onset of the Hellenistic world of empire is almost a return to the world whence the Greek experiment hopes to escape. In the case of Greece the period of spectacular achievements is over as the Hellenistic, soon yielding to the Roman world ushers in the age of great empires. It is interesting to consider the cognate relation of the Greeks and the Romans, and to consider that the early appearance of Rome and its republic is really a part of the Greek phenomenon. As we study the Greeks we note the way in which their common culture was a function of language and custom, and that this was in turn a medium binding a set of city states and their colonies across the Mediterranean, including the southern part of Italy. Was not Rome, in a sense, a child of that nexus of all things Greek, as the diffusion of ideas and the vague sense of a new age animated those in the immediate field of H e l l e n i c i n f l u e n c e ?

Thus, the emergence of Republican Rome is really still another branch of our far-flung Axial Age, and the appearance of the Roman Republic is the cousin to the surge of republican experiments in the age of Greek political innovations, and the uniquely prophetic creation of the world's first democracy in Greece. There is something significant in the brevity of the Athenian experiment, and the endurance of the Roman. The Athenians will leave a hope for the future, not to be realized until millennia later, in the rise of the modern world. The Romans will carry the issue in its sturdy republican form until the onset of its imperial phases precipitates finally the breakdown of its phase in Axial swaddling clothes and the age of the Caesars begins, enduring all the way into the m e d i e v a l p e r i o d .

There is something odd about our use of the term 'middle ages'. We spontaneously consider that the era after the fall of Rome is the middle of something. In fact, it is in the middle between the Axial Age, as a boundary point, with its associated Roman continuation, and the rise of the modern world millennia later. This 'medieval period' suffers a charge against its reputation in our minds, then, one frequently protested by various parties to its defense, in the way we see it as in some fashion not up to the standard of either its Axial beginning point or its modern recurrence. Whether this downplaying of the medieval interval is fair or not, the fact remains that our very terminology reflects a larger pattern of history, and on a scale that goes far toward explaining why a pattern of overall coherence is hard for us to detect. For until the rise of

modern archaeology the beginnings of our traditions seemed to be those visible in the Axial period. The intimations of unknown earlier acts of the play are seen in the unexplained appearance in Biblical history of the Egyptians, or Assyrians, lurking in the background as remnants of some unknown world thought to be passing away.

This effect of relative beginning in what we have dubbed the 'Axial Age' seems then to suggest a complete unit, of 'punctuation' and the 'equilibrium' that follows in its middle period, until what is apparently another punctuation occurs, and this we call the rise of the modern world. We are getting suspicious. If the Axial Age is a kind of new beginning inside a larger history, its uniqueness would seem to have been the result of our lack of knowledge of earlier civilizations. But this lack of knowledge about the earlier stages of civilization is no longer the case: the rise of archaeology has shown us the antecedents for the mysterious Assyrians and Egyptians who appear in the Biblical text. And as we proceed backwards we are left to wonder if some antecedent 'Axial' period is not visible in the historical image crystallizing in archaeological fixer. We already know the answer, if indeed we are aware of any of the findings of modern archaeology, which show us the so-called rise of civilization at the end of the fourth millennium in strangely synchronous emergence of Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations. Strange to say, we can even produce a rough interval between these moments, of just over two millennia.

The dynamism of the Axial period, its seminal creativity, seems to fret an entire an entire cycle of civilizations, and is unmatched by anything until the rise of the modern world. What is remarkable is the loss of so many of the innovations of the Axial period, a notable example being the birth of science, and its slow passing away with time, such that by time of the medieval period, in the Christian West, its birth among the Greeks is almost a forgotten memory. Its partial survival in the world of Islam is like an ember fire
c a r r i e d a c r o s s t i m e .

And then suddenly in the sixteenth century we see once again, almost like a timed renewal, what is in many ways a recursion of many of the innovations of the Axial period, with some important differences. The parallel transformations of the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution, Copernicus and Luther, stand at the threshold of the modern transformation leading to the rough point, around 1800, when a transition to a new era seems complete, and a new age begins, at the threshold of globalization. The phenomenon of the rise of modernity is the object of many theories and controversies, but the basic observations of the phenomenon resemble the exclamations we find with
t h e A x i a l A g e .

There is a mysterious seminal generation springing from the period ca. 1500, indicated by the onset of the Reformation. Over and over our sense of historical modernism draws us to this point of the so-called 'early modern', and into a controversy or equivocation over its significance as one of the great turning points of history. Relative

to world history, progress explodes in the sixteenth century, despite the puzzle over the Renaissance. The abrupt start after 1500 is constantly suggested and then challenged or retracted because its proponents cannot account for it, or sort out the fact that a discontinuity might interrupt prior continuity.

This sudden change in direction is reflected in the puzzled observations of a host of historians. J. M. Roberts in his *History of the World* opens by noting, “After 1500 or so, there are many signs that a new age of world history is beginning...”. William MacNeill, in his *The Rise of the West*, calls the career of Western civilization since 1500 a vast explosion. Geoffrey Barraclough, in *Turning Points in World History*, notes the remark of Paul Valery that Europe is a ‘peninsula of Asia’, a western appendix of the Eurasian land mass, and asks, “How was it that this western appendix came to be in a position to exercise this power, this domination over the greater part of the world?” He cites the factors of technological and scientific proficiency, the revolution in transport and communications, that ‘caused’ this brief hegemony, but in a manner typical of historians stumbling over the eonic effect is driven to note, “So much, I think, is obvious; but it tells us very little”.¹⁷

Marshall Hodgson, in *The Venture of Islam*, speaks of the Western Transmutation, 1600 to 1800, and sees the connection with the earlier period, generated from Sumer, but his analysis focuses on the history of technology, and fast-forwards to exclude the
R e f o r m a t i o n .

What happened can be compared with the first advent several thousand years BC of that combination, among the dominant elements of certain societies, of

¹⁷ J. M. Roberts, *The Penguin History of the World* (New York: Penguin, 1990), p. 526. Cf. also, p. 529, for a discussion of the relativity of the term ‘modern’, which was once inclusive of the medieval, then distinguished from it, and now might be distinguished from the contemporary by a new term, the ‘early modern’. L. S. Stavrianos, in *The World Since 1500* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), “Why should world history begin with the year 1500?”

It is significant the term ‘medieval’ was itself a child of this period, or that just after, when the German scholar Kellarius coined the term ‘Medium Aevum’ to distinguish the suddenly apparent new ‘modernity’ from the ‘middle period’ after the fall of the Roman Empire. This fact is another caution to those who use the term ‘Renaissance’, a concept created in the nineteenth century. Men of the sixteenth century did not use it, but were stunned by the sudden changes before them, as they expressed, not a rebirth, but the rise to an entirely new form of complex civilization.

William MacNeill, *The Rise of the West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 567. William A. Green, *History, Historians, and the Dynamics of Change* (Westport: Praeger, 1993). Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn to Decadence*, New York: HarperCollins, 2000, p. xvii. Geoffrey Barraclough, *Turning points in World History* (Great Britain: Thames and Hudson, 1979), p. 3.

urban living, literacy, and generally complex social and cultural organization, which we call civilization.¹⁸

Jacques Barzun in *From Dawn to Decadence* asks, “Granted for the sake of argument that ‘our culture’ may be ending, why the slice of 500 years [from 1500 to the present]? What makes it a unity? The starting date 1500 follows usage: textbooks from time immemorial have called it the beginning of the Modern Era.” There is no implication of decline or decadence after the interval of transition, since a new era has come into being. The conclusion of the eonic sequence should be great new beginning.¹⁹

This sudden take-off (relative to world history) has always been intractable for students of the question, and driven historical sociology into a frenzy of Renaissance resurrections, dialectical Big Bumps, Marxist social stages, Weberian econo-religious explanations, or the ‘European Miracle of the historian E. L. Jones.’²⁰

As noted, the periodization question of the ‘rise of modern’ has many casualties in the realm of theories. Three sets of failed theories deal with these eras in isolation, those of the rise of the modern, the birth of civilization, and, to the extent they exist at all, efforts to explain the Axial period, along with the whole spectrum of interpretations of the classical civilizations, to say nothing of explaining the history indicated in the Old Testament. Without exception these theories have all failed. Suddenly we realize they are really all asking a similar set of questions about an invariant puzzle. The question of the ‘modern’ remains baffling until we see it in its greater context. Then the remarkable resemblance of the rise of the modern to the Axial interval, and especially Greek Archaic

a p p e a r s .

We are closing in on a pattern of universal history, at once simple, and mysterious, and clearly showing us the principle of coherence we were seeking in our perception of world history. And we are close to the resolution of the riddle of modernity, and to a perspective on the way it might suddenly show chaotification. We seem to be, not in the stages of the postmodern, but in the early stages of a great new era of world history, after passing through the transitional period of its onset. And as we explore this larger framework we can attempt to redefine the modern in a fashion more conducive to the needs of our future, beyond the domination of economic fundamentalism, or the

¹⁸ Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974, 179. See also, *Rethinking World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Marshall Hodgson, Edmund Burke III (ed.) (1993), Ch. 4, “The Great Western Transmutation”.

¹⁹ Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn To Decadence* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. xvii.

²⁰ E. L. Jones, *The European Miracle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961).

imposition of false views of evolution on the outcome of something larger than Social Darwinist paranoia and environmental degradation. We begin to see the clue to better resolution than the return to traditionalism.

Democratic Revolutions One of the most mysterious aspects of our new perspective is the double birth of democracy, in classical Greece and the modern transition. This exact correlation is one of the most remarkable discoveries of careful periodization, and leaves us to wonder what it means.

As we examine this 'ratchet effect', the pattern confuses us because it does not follow the course of a single civilization, but jumps between civilizations as it proceeds. The question of the rise of the modern world also shows the displacement of change beyond the frontiers of the old Roman Empire into those parts of Europe that were only marginally a part of the ancient Roman system. We observe the Reformation, and see a religious phenomenon, but we might look beyond religion to see the opening of a new field of culture free from and at the exterior to the system of antiquity. In fact, we begin to sense another instance of the frontier phenomenon that we noted in the Greek Axial Age. This is in many ways the signature of this age of renewal, as it expands beyond the framework of antiquity, first to Northern Europe, thence to the Americas, and beyond. We must begin to wonder if the phenomenon we are trying to understand is not a globalization process more than a phenomenon of civilizations.

Our sense of modernity has been confounded by a false Eurocentrism, but we can begin to see beyond that. The constant references to 'Western Civilization', or the 'West', or the Judaeo-Christian heritage, in a series of Eurocentric terms, blinds us to the reality, which is that the rise of the modern is not a European phenomenon, as such, and finds its field of realization almost sooner in its exterior than in its homeland. The obvious picture left by history here is the temporal correlation of the spread of European, we should rather say, Eurasian, civilization to the Americas. It is hardly accidental that the North American colonies beginning in the seventeenth century already show the seeds sown by the English Civil War that will grow later in the classic harbinger of a new era dawning, the American Revolution.

There is obvious something larger than Europe then in the modern transformation and the result is the birth as much of a new global civilization as the passage of a cultural particularity called the European. The same interval of sudden change, followed by the creation of an oikoumene in the diffusion from a source, is visible in the modern world as it was in the Axial Age of Greeks. And a comparison of the two leaves us with a set of unanswered questions about the nature of historical change, and the more general issue of slow or fast evolution. We seem to see, or think we see, the slow evolution of modernity from a medieval world. But it resembles very closely the Greek Axial interval, and there we were left hanging with such explanations. There wasn't anything at all slow

about the Greek Miracle. In a few centuries it emerged from nothing, flowered in spectacular fashion, and was done. The sense of a resemblance with the modern transformation begins to suggest a new and different kind of explanation for the rise of the world we have inherited from the early moderns.

2.3 A Riddle Resolved: The Eonic Effect

Our snapshot of world history has uncovered almost without trying the presence of a non-random pattern of universal history by simple inspection. This pattern of self-organization can give us an empirical basis for considering the questions of human evolution. Instead of speculative theories like Darwinism we can discover a sense of universal history, thence evolution, purely empirically. To sure, 'facts' are seen from a particular perspective, but this doesn't alter the basic finding.

Our suspicion is confirmed that high-speed change can occur on the scale of just a few centuries, witness the Axial Age. And this effect shows us that evolution is hiding behind history in the form of a series of intervals of rapid emergence. World history yields its secret to simple periodization and shows from the invention of writing a clear developmental sequence, with a question mark about its probable source in the period of the Neolithic, the natural starting point for the rise of civilization. The great clue of the Axial Age suddenly provided the gestalt of a larger system at work. The Israelites were right, there is a process of greater evolutionary dynamism that frets the universal history of

The Eonic Effect: the hidden structure in world history We can call that sequence of three transitions and the epochs in between them the 'eonic effect', as a sequence of three epochs, and note the way that this pattern suggests 'evolution' at work, 'evolution of some kind'. It is at first illogical, it seems, to confound evolution and history. But with a little reflection we will see, first, that the two must be logically connected, and, second, that the data we are discovering directly confirms that logic. This evolutionary sequence is a robust empirical foundation for understanding world history, in the context of evolution.

The relationship of evolution to history must resolve a paradox. The passage between the two could not take place instantaneously. It might show a series of transitional intervals that are evolutionary from one perspective and historical from another. But that is just what we are seeing: a series of 'axial intervals' or transitions that express a kind of evolutionary advance, and the epochs in between them that seem to express the historical carrying out or fulfillment of those transitions. What is remarkable is that we see this in

historical times, and in a fashion documented by the rise of the technology of writing. It is futile to say that evolution must be purely genetic, since we can see that the 'evolution' of civilization is something more.

We have the first glimpse into the nature of human evolution: it is a larger process than the purely genetic development of the human organism. And we can see its last stages in the emergence of civilization. There are many more things to consider here as we proceed, but we have the basic insight into how we can revise our views of the meaning of evolution.

CONCLUSION...AND A CORE DRAFT MANIFESTO

Having explored a new model of history we must ask, what is its status? We should operate very cautiously and distinguish minimal and maximal versions of such a model. The status here is thus, minimally, a contrast of random and non-random claims/patterns: at a minimum we have detected derandomization and this reaches a stalemate against claims of randomness and then begins to pull ahead on other grounds detectable in the 'meaningfulness' of the overall structure. A little systems analysis rapidly closes the case, not in the sense of a theory, but in the sense of a terrain survey as in a battlefield blur situation. We can infer informally that we are in the presence of a directional system, which seems to imply teleology. If we are free agents here that seems a contradiction. But in practice it is not so. There are many varieties of teleology. A system can reach an end, and stop, or it can get half way there and stop, leaving the embedded agents to complete the task.

We have reached the stage of PowerPoint bullets for a core draft of a new manifesto, unembarrassed our codification falls short of the classic eloquence of Marx/Engels, if only it achieves a practical result. We leave the draft as is, better crude than newly dogmatic. Achieve the first stage of the abolition of private property and the result follows. The full text is available in the Amazon text, or online at Dropbox.com.

We can leave the manner of a stirring Manifesto in a virtual mode, but alert to the terror of the end times of the capital zone, in the realization of the coming steps to a new great transition. The hand is dealt. The future is open to a path beyond the era of the capitalist nightmare.

The incomplete list of propositions asserted by this can be yeasted from an ersatz list as below, to be formalized by a version of the Red Forty-eight Group (R48) Group.

The New Communism spawns a new political formation, the R48 Group, this an algebraic x for entities to be created by the Universal Class

The cultural and economic crisis of later capitalism has left an entire planetary apocalypse. We must take up the prophetic warnings of the dangerous futures of capitalism, and fulfill the injunction to foreclose on capital maniacs out of a horror novel. Are we too late? In a final swindle the capitalist powers have finessed a climate treaty that was bogus, and destined to non-passage by the truly terminal cases in the American Congress. We must point to the core issue and not succumb to social democratic illusions, our 'market' communism suggesting a way to do 'new dealism' right on the way to a full communism.

We focus on the core theme

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property. *From the Communist Manifesto*

Done

We must distinguish return of property to the Commons from state socialism.

Our manifesto is therefore about a form of (market) neo-communism in which the ownership of capital reverts to the commons. This is not the same as state socialism or the control of economies by a 'bourgeoisie' of revolutionary one-party professionals. This core axiom is related to the classic discourse of primitive accumulation.

Despite the problems, the core analysis of Marx/Engels created a revolution in thought that exposed the issues of class and class struggle, theory and ideology, and the potential of the working class.

We can propose a focus on the Universal Class as the set complement of the 'bourgeoisie' to ensure the working class reality of many not as such a part of that class.

We need a new congressional body or bodies to mediate economic issues detached from the instant 'communist bourgeoisie' of a one party state.

We must replace the one party state with a set of revolutionary guardians with full powers to protect the stage of communism, but without totalitarian powers or temptations as to social domination

The foundation of market communism is thus a constitutional starting point, not an economic map.

The creation of a viable 'market communism' is thus a different task from the stage of foundational transformation.

This economic potential must confront and surpass the calculation debate that emerged in such a timely manner to confuse the Bolsheviks.

A market communism could adopt many of the formats of capitalism, from semi-autonomous corporations, socialist entrepreneurs, non-profits, cooperatives, and spaces for innovation in the context of enterprises in the commons subject to viability if not profit.

The system should have an indifference level below which a semi-anarchist culture can function independently in a range of small-scale light industrial/agricultural and petit bourgeois cultural mix.

The larger system must support a robust populism that solves the issues of poverty, education, medical care, etc, with a strategy for full employment within the limits of the indifference zone.

There should be a progression toward a global federation of socialist republics, but the isolated units in this system must be able to function in isolation.

We have achieved in principle a 'dialectical balance' of opposites, communist with markets, communist with democratic aspects, strong authority to guard the revolution, but with an anarchist subcore. This system echoes the original ambiguity of the manifesto of Marx and Engels and can be extended to great length. An electoral path here would be ideal, but as the example of the American system shows, the 'so-called democracy' is so corrupted that no democracy is actually offered in order to reform the system.

But the overall project is not some utopian fantasy: it is essential a two stage process or evolution after the model of the American Revolution: a phase of rebellion against US/global imperialism and capitalism, and a foundational stage setting the axioms of a new Communism. The result is not mystical dreaming but a practical result that should have been accomplished long ago, as the era of 1848 proclaimed from the start.

The Crisis of Capitalist Globalization

At a time of social crisis, the classic Manifesto of Marx and Engels in the era of the 1848 revolutions resonates with an eerie relevance for the age of neoliberalism and dangerous climate change. The clever fiction of the end of history is exposed as an artifice of philosophic legerdemain, Hegel from the bottom of the deck. The original tour de

force would be a hard act to follow, but in reality our 'new' manifesto is a studied echo of the old brought to its real future, via the prophetic desperation of two revolutionaries before their time. The era of the 1848 upheavals, in the last tremors of the mighty French Revolution, has been called a turning point in world history, but one which failed to turn. It is an ironic aspect of our current era that this 'revolution manqué' is an apt metaphor for our own predicament. It threw down the gage to the future of the whole of indusreality. That remarkable period of revolt was a shot over the bows of the capitalist revolution unfolding toward its long march to globalization, with the problematical outcome of its success beset once again with the haunting realization the failure to turn is a world of markets going mad. A rational limit or else overthrow of the new capitalist affair might have spared the planetary community much suffering, but now the issue goes into the critical zone, as the crisis reaches a point of no return. And that moment has a symbolic significance in terms of a larger view of world history.

The status of late capitalism is desperate:

As the planet nears the point of no-return at the threshold of climate criticality, the conservative sector of the American congress threatens to veto the US treaty obligation with respect to the recent Paris climate conference: this example typifies the extreme terminal ideological seizure of consciousness by capitalist ideology and tokens a recompute of the American system of government...

The crisis of capitalism is the crisis of planetary destruction in the onset of catastrophic climate change. And this is becoming a crisis of modernity itself. The inability of the powers of government to mediate the capitalist process condemns both and asks for a program of (new) communism to bring sanity to a body politic mesmerized by the ideology of economic illusion. The tenets of free market economics have been exposed to stark falsification in the inability of the system to respond to the disaster of climate change. This extreme example leads to a second look at much of the rest of the ideology of random economic activity. Self-regulating markets are shown to be a myth. The effect of ideology blinding agents to their situation is clearly prophesied by the earliest observers of capitalism.

Marx/Engels correctly saw the crisis of globalization and deserve to speak for our present in the rough outline of their remarkable Manifesto. We must try to 'throughpass' their classic while creating a more flexible superset of that classic as a venue to practical realization. We will concretize the result with a gesture to define 'market neo-communism' as one realization of the original proclamations. We must emphasize the prefix 'neo' and move to a discussion of a New Communism as if encountering the idea for the first time.

Marxist shibboleths It is a spectacular effect to see the period of the passing of the Hegelian school proceed to the era of Feuerbach and the many associated figures of that period, including Marx and Engels who spawn the new vision of economic history just at the point of the failed revolutions of 1848. Those revolutions failed, but they prophesied

the future of a 'last revolution' that would set the true fate of modernity. Clearly they were premature, as Marx/Engels sensed... Those two went on to create a remarkable canon to codify a new view of society, economics, and revolution, one that would nearly overtake the twentieth century, despite what we see now is still another version of the failed revolutions of 1848, and the roll back after 1989. Marxism produces a powerful basic corpus, but, as noted, it has elements of distortion, or so we suspect.... We should note that it was beset with the difficulty of analyzing economic systems, the debates over the labor theory of value, as one example, and the sudden onset of marginalist economics in one of the spookiest of capitalism dead bed survivals. Beyond this we see also the appearance of Kantian ethical socialism in an attempt to critique the reductionist positivism of the marxists. Beyond this the proliferation of social democratic substitutes for the full transition beyond capitalism.

Leninist interlude The first aftershock of the 1848 'failed revolutions' was the great Russian Revolution, which was both a standard democratic revolution of the classic type attempting to overthrow the medieval Tsarist phantom, and a first attempt to bring about the final revolution against capitalism. The question of Leninism arises in this context as a hard to evaluate circumstance that carries a flawed ideological complex but which probably prophesies the future of 'chase plane' communism to come.... Lenin is not a transparent figure who belongs to his followers, but a mysterious agent of revolution in a prefiguration of the coming of postcapitalism. The core issues are the ethical perspectives of the agent of change, and the need for an economic solution to the operation of markets. We can and should argue the 'dialectic' of these two questions, and see the way an ethical nihilism, foreseen by the Kantian socialists, can enter like bilge water into the good ship Communism, and the way that the cunning capitalists with tricks of phantom calculus outplayed Marxist rendering of Adam Smith, and how figures like the market evangelist Mises, etc., performed the feat of turning the idea of freedom into a libertarian finesse, along with a valid challenge to socialist planning on the grounds of the dynamic of markets.

Last Men and their Smartphones The passing of the Leninist Interlude has given the appearance of final sanction to the capitalist future, but already by the end of the twentieth century the reality would seem that a flawed socialism was abandoned to search for the real thing, even as the so-called neoliberal age began a rapid conquest of globalization, economy, and government. The fall of the original Leninist interlude begins even to seem a mistake, despite its massively flawed outcomes.

The basic development of communism is and remains nonetheless a world historical outcome to the modern transition, in ambiguous relation to democracy, and will spawn sooner or later a new version in the wake of the failure of bolshevism... At the moment of climate crisis, we sense the desperation of the euphoria over the capitalist miracle with its final gesture of planetary destruction. The debate over the last man, which started with Nietzsche takes an ominous leftist form as the ideological rigor mortis of capitalist

ideological in its final symptoms produces a social nexus completely bemused to the point of blindness to the destruction of environment, and the final carbon destiny of the capitalist industrial revolution. Nietzsche was a distortion of the early modern, but had a point about the 'last man': the participants in the modern experiment are moving toward the completion of the 'great transition' or the evolution of man, and this requires that 'free agency' come to an understanding and self-replication of the macrosequence.... But the downside is the commodity fetishism so visible in the Smartphone mania outbreak at the point of atmospheric breakdown.

Last Phase of Capitalism We can conclude by pointing to the eerie downfall of the capitalist Faust in the pact with the logic of derivatives and catastrophic margin calls. We refer the reader to the Hollywood movie.... the profits in downfall. The last phases of capitalism show the capitalist axioms proceeding toward the destruction of the world system in an orgy of financialization... The period 2008 made plain a new form of capitalist finance: the bet against the system, an omen of the self-destructive character of the capitalist lunacy syndrome...

Drafting a New Manifesto...

Our stance must reckon with the difficulty of even listing all the issues relevant to the case. We start with a stripped down simplification:

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property. From the Communist Manifesto

We take one key paragraph from the Manifesto and then move to create a larger domain of discourse for its realization, including a discussion of history in a book as appendix. This selection of one key idea can lead to a path that can both extend and leave alone the original legacy. We might think in terms of a dialectical review or negation of the original tradition, and a final reaffirmation of the core. But we will also be critical of dialectics.

We come to a simple resolution of the issues in crisis: the core of the Manifesto of Marx and Engels, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie: we must propose the return of the property wrested from the Commons to the Commons. We are done.

The legacy of marxism can pass into an appendix mediating its classic themes with a strong dialectical negation, and reconstruction. But an elaborate theory is not needed. The original critique was of 'theory and ideology': rival theories have obscured the original cogency of the critical expose.

We can create a virtual manifesto based on the original's key idea: the abolition of private property and review the whole legacy emerging from that. Our aim here is a kind of generalized manifesto generator as a series of proposals for an historical review of the classic of Marx/ Engels, next to the legacies of nineteenth century revolutionaries. At the forefront is the question of postcapitalism and the defining histories, and futurism, of the communist project, here to be dubbed 'neo-communism'. We can put this in the context of a larger perspective based on a universal history of man in the context of evolution.

Our manifesto is therefore about a form of (market) neo-communism in which the ownership of capital reverts to the commons. This is not the same as state socialism or the control of economies by a 'bourgeoisie' of revolutionary one-party professionals. This core axiom is related to the classic discourse of primitive accumulation.

Despite the problems, the core analysis of Marx/Engels created a revolution in thought that exposed the issues of class and class struggle, theory and ideology, and the potential of the working class. Much of this should animate the manifestos of the future.

The definition of the 'working class' is often ambiguous and the concept might imply the persistence of class and class ideology/domination by one class persisting into communism. Our manifesto will propose a generalization of the working class: The Universal Class.

Challenging the legacy of marxism would create a lot of resistance and in many ways it is fine the way it is, taken as the Old Testament to a New. Simple demesmerization is enough. But the legacy's theoretical add-ons create unnecessary resistance in many who would otherwise support a postcapitalist option. We can suggest a larger framework than that of Feuerbach, historical materialism, and dialectical materialism. These subjects are not necessary for a movement toward a New Communism. Having used an idea of the dialectic we should also move to critique the legacy of dialectical thinking and the way it has produced a set of confusions based on logical superstition. An avenue to a New Communism cannot successfully foreclose on religious issues using historical materialism. A new movement in this cast must become cognizant of the place of religion in world history, the interior content of such legacies as Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and redefine the secular in terms more adequate than the humanism cultism of the era of reductionist scientism. Strangely, aggressive 'secularists' have tried to redefine modernity by ignoring the work of figures such as Kant in mediating the issues of metaphysics shared by both religion and scientism. Our appendix offers an empirical chronology able to reconcile multiple contradictory viewpoints, as an encyclopedia of civilizations.

This early period of Marx/Engels was prior to the emergence of the now dogmatic canon of marxism whose overall format is classic, but may be inadequate to the task of a transition to postcapitalism: it was outflanked very early by neo-classical economics. and the communist idea was merely packaged by marxism. Its source is prior to the onset of the marxist legacy. The canon of Marx/Engels has become dogmatic and is further

entangled with the legacy of the Second and subsequent Internationales, including the entire episode of the Bolshevik revolution. The roots of modern communism predate the coming of marxism and we are under no hard and fast obligation to honor the capture of the idea in the era of scientism.

We might consider the figures of Lenin and Stalin red herrings that do not indicate an experiment toward communism. Despite the cogency of many aspects of Lenin's remarkable coup d'état the Bolshevik experiment is an immense distraction. The left needs to start from scratch with the real components of the question.

The context of modern economies is confronted with the idea of a New Communism with the potential of electoral to revolutionary challenge. We know such a revolution is possible because all of our modern states began with revolutions, and the core issue of marxism was to create a form of communism in order to save the bourgeois revolution for 'real democracy'. We are beset with many more issues than were discussed in the classic of Marx and Engels, the most critical being the world of strategic nuclear war and deterrence. We will adopt a perspective of universal nuclear disarmament as appropriate to the mood of communist internationalism.

We confront the intractable question of peace in a global system of states as we attempt a federation of socialist republics. But our more general matrix may well provide the clue to the solution of this complex issue.

This in turn raises the question of our focus on the US system and its history and liabilities: we can envision a national version of neo-communism in an international context. We have three or more situations: an international movement of the working classes (or our Universal Class)

locally and globally as a colonial revolt against American imperialism the same as a revolt against a global system of neoliberal domination itself internationalizing and attempting a radical transnationalism (e.g. the TPP conventions making national governments subject to secret tribunals) national movements of communist revolution in isolation or tandem internationally joker in the deck transformation of the 'empire' candidate via Napoleonic expansion of an imperial postcapitalism.

The latter is preposterous but can focus thought with a reminder of the way democratic and communist ideas can fail.

The question of communism has been suffered the extremes of its proponents and critics, and worst of all, in spite of the cycle of realization given by the Bolshevik era, a failure to define its canon in a fashion that is fully coherent. Despite the illusory discourse of the 'end of history' it remains true that there is a consistent tension between the realizations of democracy and socialism or communism. We should be careful to qualify the term as New Communism.

The 'end of history' meme has been extremely destructive. We can replace this mystification with a new model of history showing the relationship of freedom, free agency, revolution, democratic emergence, historical dynamics, and historical

directionality or teleology. Hegelian mystification has muddled both capitalist ideology and marxist scientism.

We might forget that one of the first revolutionary movements of the modern era, that of Thomas Münzer and the Peasants Revolt of 1625 sounded a communist note and this in a religious context, long before the tide of democratic revolution cresting at the end of the eighteenth century and beyond. This should warn us again of what many latter radical students have diagnosed: the democracy manqué of the many bourgeois revolutions that arose. This phenomenon is visible in the counterrevolution that emerged in the wake of the English Civil War. This kind of criticism animated the profound analyses of such as Marx and Engels, and the issue was finally the great puzzle of how to really stage a democratic revolution if this was always the frustrated outcome as capitalocracy.

The classic legacy attempts to impose the theory of historical materialism, but this is a luxury a new movement should do without. That legacy became mired in the confusion of evolutionary theories, although Marx saw the problem at once.

The revolutionary movement of the modern transition was a protocommunist formation. The progression toward democratic revolution, e.g. the English Civil War, and abolitionism, was clearly associated with Protestant versions of the Reformation. The sudden alternate track in the wake of figures such as Feuerbach has its own logic but threw the legacy of communism out of kilter by alienating religious sectors with reductionist ideologies such as historical materialism.

Historical materialism is a curiously apt depiction of economic ideology, but as a theory it fails, and critics seem to know this better than marxists. But all theories of society in the cast of scientism are destined to fail. We can take the module as an ideological flourish, or philosophic experiment, a creature of its time, with a point, one we should not forget, recasting it in a new and more cogent format. That format should fail-safe with a recursion of the entire dialectical spectrum of the modern transition, electing to proceed with renewable interpretative subjects.

This legacy suggests that the early marxist formulation became an excessively narrow perspective colored by the post-Hegelian reaction and the onset of positivistic scientism. The reality of modernism is clearly something much broader and a New Communism must refound modernity as a whole in a new constellation of economic postcapitalism. It needs a generalized systems view of history, rather than a dialectical contraction around dogmatic materialism. It must find a true dialectic in the counterpoint of opposites given by the early modern, between religion, science, philosophy, and the arts.

The era of scientism that absorbed marxism also produced the reign of Darwinism and this was exposed many times as an ideology of social Darwinism. The left needs to assist the progress of science in exposing this pseudo-science without getting entangled in the field of religious reaction based on creationist thinking.

The many studies of the Iron Cage effect of the nineteenth century expose the plight of cultic marxism and its problems with theories soon the object of multiple refutations and critical attacks.

The legacy enforces a now dated materialism which is beside the point. A communist society of the future needs a broad spectrum of philosophy. That was provided from the start by German Classical philosophy, which was rejected in the phase of the post-Hegelian reaction.

The core issue of the revolutionary age of the early modern, a query we inherit, is the nature of modernity itself. In many ways the modern has been hijacked by the capitalist transition at the end of the eighteenth century, granting that the larger history of capitalism stretches over history since the Neolithic in its primordial versions. And yet the early modern shows a far different character beyond the gestating economic format that so soon overtook its future.

The secular equivalent of religion In many ways the nature of modernity remains an enigma: its sudden contraction in the nineteenth century has been observed by many. Perhaps this is the reason that the early modern transition seems to generate a dual personality, between religious reformation and scientific revolution, as if the latter as it bootstraps toward higher levels of complexity is constantly stalled in a reductionist scenario. The companion in parallel of religious continuation of retrograde antiquity carries the remainder not covered by science. This situation was partially mediated by Kant, but the larger picture of secular era must be seen to include 'religion' in transition.

Examples of the discrepancy between the two systems in parallel modernity are beliefs about free will or agency, the reality of the soul, issues of immortality, the ethics of social action, and much else. Modernity is an incomplete study thus. Questions of religion, evolution, and idealism versus materialism are routinely botched in the secular sphere. The religions of the Reformation, now followed by the flood of New Age movements attempting to exploit the 'crisis of modernity' for religious reaction. A New Communism should be dialectically 'rich' and thus beyond theism/atheism, propose or accept beliefs in homo sapiens as a superstitious ape with a soul, a will, a psychology of complex consciousness, an aesthetic/ethical sense, with a Kantian propensity without limits to metaphysics. The soul/self seems to border on a noumenal/phenomenal distinction.

Such formulations are numerous, dime a dozen, but they warn us not to foreclose on the complexity of man with simplistic reductionism, or futile collisions of materialism and idealism.

The sudden replacement of the emergence of ethical modernism as a philosophical successor to religion was suddenly replaced with the card tricks of figures such as Adam Smith unwitting proposing a 'transvaluation of values' long before Nietzsche, and this has destabilized the philosophic, cultural, what to say economic outcome of an instantly distorted modernity (taken as the successor to conventional religious ethics). Figures such as Marx moved at once in a kind of instant feedback to challenge this sudden blight on

the 'modern question'. Smith himself is misunderstood and that figure was quite aware of the dangers of his 'fix' in the nature of ethical reasoning. Unfortunately, the scientism of the early marxists crippled their ethical reasoning, a factor subject to attempted correction by the appearance of the Kantian ethical socialists.

That modernity began we often forget with a Reformation, and was counterpoint in a dialectical spectrum of immense richness, between science, religion, philosophy, political science, art, and, indeed, economics. There was never a stable outcome in the economic fundamentalism that became the social matrix for such an abundance of innovations. And just as the capitalist phenomenon became the hidden lever of state it was also to condition all other aspects of modern culture. It is not surprising therefore that emerging from the radical protests of the age of democratic revolution was a protest against the revolution itself as an ambiguous empowerment of a new class, the bourgeoisie.

The generation of Feuerbach attempted a radical caesura with the legacy of religion, as a final stage of the Reformation. But in the era of scientism this backfired. A New Communism must fulfill this gesture in any case, but should review its early modern potential and try again via the secular equivalent of religion

This nexus of core ideas was the source of the classic rendering of Marx and Engels starting in the 1840's when a whole series of radical thinkers produced a first realization of the core symphonic of the early modern. This period remains ambiguous and its secular humanism seems now a contracted version of a legacy it could barely master, but this was the period of the first high tide of secularism, capitalism, and evolutionism, soon to become the dominant paradigm of Darwinism. But a reasonable strategy must be wary of ill-considered negations of these legacies: it is necessary to create a superset of the originals.

The parallel, almost ominous, appearance of a chase plane antagonist seemed unable at first to justify its prophecy of postcapitalism, but the two centuries since that forward pass into our future shows the mysterious coordination of opposites that constitute the early modern. We see now the prescience of the whole period in the way it spawns the track of globalization via the phenomenon of the market and the future resolution of its concealed contradictions in the gestation of revolutionary communism, so eloquently foretold in the famous manifesto of the year 1848.

The question of communism is the question of democracy itself, and the totalitarian outcome of the Bolshevik revolution requires a double critique of state socialisms and the nexus of capitalist domination of the bourgeois state, And the totalitarian drift of the American juggernaut must expose the full story of the hidden coup d'état created by the emergence of covert agencies. The record of conspiracy is barely told even on the left, and the climactic moment of the record of imperialism, manufactured war and covert action must focus on the extravagant turn of events in the documented 9/11 conspiracy whose implications stretch from the question of who controls the American system to the place of Israel in the control of its politics. The 9/11 conspiracy The shocking discovery of a

hidden cabal behind the events of 9/11 has exposed a deep vein of criminality behind the current US government. This a revelation of a secret government invisible to the public, and its neutralization is essential for any real change. A revolutionary government is at severe risk of being taken over by such entities.

In relation to this a leftist perspective confronts the stark reality of the history of modern Israel and its indirect influence on American politics. A coherent stance against this apartheid system enters inevitably into any discussion of transformation of American politics.

The left has defaulted to its anarchist and Gandhian pacifist modes as the full complement of revolutionary action is excised from the definitions of activist radicalism.

The emphasis of Marx and Engels on the working class was a classic of strategy but one that confronts a shift in the nature of sociological realities and the ambiguity of class in the generation of a Universal Class. The working class is often the object of rightist manipulations giving it a reactionary character. And the working class in an international constellation of outsourced work zones beyond the reach of a national entity. Our new manifesto might posit the action of the Universal Class in the context of the abolition of private property and the restoration of industrial ownership to the Commons as a legal entity with constitutional independence from communist elites emerging in a one party state solution of the type that confounded the Russian revolution. The issue is simple: we cannot really hypostatize an abstraction such as the 'working class' as an agent of history.

The legacy of marxism is ambiguous: it is stuck in another century. The gist of our manifesto is to take the core paragraph of the original: the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, and set the rest to one side. We don't need a theory of historical materialism, dialectical materialism, such a strong prejudice against idealism. We need simple praxis not trying to convert everyone to a new philosophy.

We need a core movement that has some marxist dna, but which operates with its own version of a new communism, able to decipher the neo-classical economic illusion, ready to fight for control of the industrial apparatus in motion, and ready to create a market communism, possibly on its way to full communism. A market communism with a Commons, as opposed to state control by a one party bourgeoisie calling itself radical, with a cutoff point below which some forms of commerce, industry, and agriculture operate independently would be nice. Issues of constitutional balance of powers, core rights (without liberal economic rights of capital), newly defined democracy, national/transnational action to create a global federation....

The issue of free agency, choice, with or without claims about free will haunts the regime of scientism emerging from the New Physics, a point clearly analyzed by Kant. The idea of freedom ended up being orphaned in the emergence of marxist scientism. But that issue is the key to exposing the theoretical ideology of classical and neo-classical

economics. The latter is clearly based on questions of consumer choice in economic free agents, and his contradicted by the outlandish abuse of the classic differential calculus.

Marxists tend to lose their grip over their own critique of 'theory and ideology':

Neo-classical economics is buttressed by an immense amount of mathematical theory justifying things as they are, but there is a stark antinomy at the core of this orgy of calculus: theories invented for physics cannot be transferred to social situations involving free agency. We can 'luke-skywalker' the entire death star with this antinomy in one heroic flourish, one that marxists put beyond their 'theory' with the theses of historical materialism. The models of neo-classical economics do not and cannot apply to reality.

A New Communism should eschew premature theories to expose the flaws in the neo-classical brand. It is thus easy to 'luke skywalker' the core flaw in the whole game with a one-shot demolition exposing the contradiction at the core of modern economics: no set of differential equations constitute a theory of economic action. The 'science' of economics is thus exposed as a preposterous 'damned new thing', mathematical ideology.

Feminism A streamlined Manifesto must not exclude issues of feminism and the challenge to the family.

The Family Will neo-communism embrace the Communist Manifesto's critique of the family?

Racism A recent movement called #BlackLivesMatter reminds us of the many parallel tracks of radical activism that a single focus can forget. We certainly won't forget: our monofocus on the issue of communism will actually end up more comprehensive...

Our model of history shows clearly the multitasking character of historical realization, and the clearest example is:

Abolitionism Our world histories will show clearly that parallel tracks emerge on the left: the classic cases are early Münzerian Christianity, Diggers to Levelers, and most of all the abolitionists whose work arose independently of leftist marxism and generated the lead up to the Civil War.

Nuclear Proliferation/Disarmament Any serious discussion of postcapitalism must take a stand on the question of nuclear technology, nuclear energy industries, and nuclear disarmament.

Radical Ecology Attempts to backdate ecological thinking to the marxist canon are of interest, but in the final analysis, using our new model of history, the left can correct the one-sided Enlightenment perspective (next to the six or more 'enlightenments' of the early modern) with the clear dialectical complement: the Romantic movement, rich in resources for an ecological neo-communism.

Israel Neo-communism in the US must vigorously expose the coup d'état of American politics by the Israeli lobbies, covert agencies, and Jewish public. The status of Israel in the wars of the Middle East must be assessed with a platform position on its gross rights violations constituting apartheid.

Non-violence A radical revolutionary movement is not required to embrace Gandhian non-violence, and should follow the standard of the early democratic revolutions. The American Revolutionary War was not a pacifist movement, but a war of liberation.

9/11 Conspiracy The failure of the current lefts to expose the covert action behind the 9/11 false flag black op connected with a 'deep state' phenomenon threatens to indict them as accessories to state criminality. The whole set of issues going back to the onset of the CIA must be rigorously pursued.

Covert Agencies Modern government has been hijacked by the immense underworld of covert ops and their agents, now licensed by the state itself. This cancer must be brought into the open and rigorously controlled with the ideological cover of 'state secularity' and 'top secrecy' brought under control: the deep state must be exposed and eliminated...

A Core Draft of Our Manifesto

We have reached the stage of PowerPoint bullets for a core draft of a new manifesto, unembarrassed our codification falls short of the classic eloquence of Marx/Engels, if only it achieves a practical result. We leave the draft as is, better crude than newly dogmatic. Achieve the first stage of the abolition of private property and the result follows.

We can leave the manner of a stirring Manifesto in a virtual mode, but alert to the terror of the end times of the capital zone, in the realization of the coming steps to a new great transition. The hand is dealt. The future is open to a path beyond the era of the capitalist nightmare.

The incomplete list of propositions asserted by this can be yeasted from an ersatz list as below, to be formalized by a version of the Red Forty-eight Group (R48) Group.

The New Communism spawns a new political formation, the R48 Group, this an algebraic x for entities to be created by the Universal Class

The cultural and economic crisis of later capitalism has left an entire planetary system close to apocalypse.

We face the real question of whether not the Faustian pact with capitalism will end in species extinction. the pious sophistries of the denunciations of communism and the paeans to free market self-bankrupt in the timely resolution of the prophetic starting point. But we should note the ambivalence of our two prophets, Marx/Engels: they saw the cogency of an interval of capitalist globalization, but they attempt via 1848 to act at once without delay to the new foundation of communism. Our delays here may prove fatal.

We must therefore take up the prophetic warnings of the dangerous future train wreck of capitalism, now present, and fulfill the injunction to foreclose on capital maniacs out of a horror novel. Are we too late? In a final swindle the capitalist powers have

finessed a climate treaty that was bogus, and destined to non-passage by the truly terminal cases in the American Congress. We must point to the core issue and not succumb to social democratic illusions, our 'market' communism suggesting a way to do 'new dealism' right on the way to a full communism.

We have achieved in principle a 'dialectical balance' of opposites, communist with markets, communist with democratic aspects, strong authority to guard the revolution, but with an anarchist subcore. This system echoes the original ambiguity of the manifesto of Marx and Engels and can be extended to great length. An electoral path here would be ideal, but as the example of the American system shows, the 'so-called democracy' is so corrupted that no democracy is actually offered in order to reform the system.

But the overall project is not some utopian fantasy: it is essential a two stage process or evolution after the model of the American Revolution: a phase of rebellion against US/global imperialism and capitalism, and a foundational stage setting the axioms of a new Communism. The result is not mystical dreaming but a practical result that should have been accomplished long ago, as the era of 1848 proclaimed from the start.

Our Manifesto confronts first the climate emergency with a streamlined and minimalist version of the original vision of the year 1848. This takes from Marx and Engels the prophesied endgame of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. The rush of calamity forces the hand of the futurists of communism. The time for that great revolution, the last, is here, now or never. The bourgeoisie in scofflaw indifference to so much as a minor mediation of its destructive ecological insanity has lost its right to the social predominance of unregulated markets. From the classic Manifesto:

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

With an eye to the failure of the Bolshevik episode, a New Communism might straddle of 'end of history' theme with a democratic revolution after the model of the American remorphed to a form of communism as democracy. The context is a global revolution against (American) imperialism next to the larger capitalist globalization, on the analog to the American rebellion against British colonialism, informed by the lessons of the failures of Bolshevism. The basic framework is that of the revolution of the early modern bringing communism to democracy, and democracy to communism.

Required is a passage a New Communism as the realization of a postcapitalist modernity. The outcome will be a globalizing version in two possible modes, as a full communism or as a transitional market neo-communism with a foundational abolition of private property, but an open question on planning/markets. If markets are socially owned, or if they are simply abolished at the end, the point is that this transitional

framework can be to simply jettison the whole round of harebrained marxism, and yet able to use that and other resources as references.

The resulting political revolution moves to a global stage as a federation of socialist republics/democracies with separations of powers between the political and economic administration of state, a robust set of human rights given the subtraction of the classic liberal license as to markets. Planetary destruction in the free field of markets is not a right.

The social sphere might well set an indifference level of semi-anarchist culture at the low end with communal, agricultural and microeconomic particulars left to itself.

The New Communism should adopt a robust praxis freed from the obsession with theory that tended to stall the classic marxist legacy.

This format requires a new model of history, a new perspective on historical materialism, a discussion of the infatuation with dialectics, and the secular equivalent of religion in the recognition of homo sapiens as superstitious ape with soul, will, ethical nature, complex consciousness, language and creative powers.

This project will deal with a superset of the working class as the Universal Class and mediate vanguardism and one party neo-bourgeois elitism with a conception of the Universal Class as the set of all classes, including all subsets of the universal set of classes, with singleton sets of individuals, each a class to himself, mediating individualism and group psychologies.

Although its trend toward the secular remains central, this is not a form of dogmatic materialism, atheism, or prejudice against the dialectic of idealism. Such a left might tip its hat to the first communists of the early modern, in the Peasant's Revolt of Münzer. The stance of the New Communists is to realize the full program of the modern transition in a complex dialectical spectrum as the realization of a new modernity beyond capitalism.

The basis for action is praxis in a reserve against theory, the bane of the elder marxism. We can model the path of this movement as either electoral or revolutionary with a model that remorphs the classic American revolution, with its two stages, a declaration and revolution, and a transition to constitutional foundations.

Note again that the American Rebs were not subject to any requirements of theory, belief, or religion. They didn't have to be idealists or materialists, theists or atheists. The action of revolution is not the application of theory to history, but the free agency of individuals who create economies, and who are free to replace them.

We suspect the whole apparatus of marxism is stalling any praxis at this point. Some of that legacy can be carried by the new group, and we can expect to inherit much of older cadre. The whole marxist canon is simple the Old Testament, an historical backdrop with its classic prophets, Marx and Engels. The new phase of global action needs a New Testament able to break the mechanics of frozen habit and robotic consciousness that overtakes all cultic forms of thought.

Our Manifesto is for a New Communism, and the qualification will serve to create a caesura with previous Internationales (all permutations of the Second) to recast the core paragraph we have cited from the original classic of Marx/Engels: the project of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and capital in the creation of a new global federation of socialist republics able to rescue the world system from the runaway train of free markets in a terminal phase of social canceration.

There could be a dialectical negation of capitalism vs. communism, and a further negation of communism via new third construct, neo-communism: itself a negation of both capitalist and communism... This action will pass as with Leninism via a vanguard from the Universal Class, itself a superset of the working class. This Universal Class must seek to create a global movement stirring the working classes of a whole planet: we may start with the Coltan miners of the Congo, to be positive definite...

We can leave the eloquence of a stirring Manifesto in a virtual mode to suggest the terror of the end times of the capital zone, in the realization of the coming steps to a new great transition. The hand is dealt. The future is open to a path beyond the era of the capitalist nightmare. The list of propositions asserted by this can be yeasted from an ersatz list as below, to be formalized by a version of the Red Forty-eight Group (R48) Group.

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This formation uses a broader understanding of history beyond the economic and creates a superset of the path of marxism as a version of modernity and its revolutionary legacy, to become a floating fourth turning point, that is a new civilization created to succeed capitalism.

It seeks the electoral or revolutionary expropriation of the bourgeoisie/ capital

The result can be a form of market communism on its way to a full neo-communist system

The result to become a national/international federation, but may certainly operate as one national unit]

Needed are a position on nuclear questions (disarmament), and a willingness to try and control population

It must deal with a no growth economy that is able to provide a basic income an indifference level below which people can live in a hybrid non-totalitarian mode with respect to the state

Market communism would surpass social democratic illusions by the abolition of private property, at the scale of the industrial level. This would be a constitutional question.

Market communism can have forms of publicly owned by private operated transitional structures that can operate in a mediated economy of regulated industries

Market communism must resolve the old (and often bogus) market calculation debates and rescue public thought from the sophisticated ideologies of mathematical neo-classical economics

Market communism can pass to a full communism based on a discovered form of realizable planning

The New Communism can allow a threshold level of small scale, petit bourgeoisie, and other residual formations to operate below a defined indifference point. Farms, communes (regional, urban, industrial ...), etc. can evade totalization in a larger system.

The New Communism will be an ecological revolution

The New Communism must examine the legacy of covert ops, the destruction of democracy by the intelligence agencies of the previous era, and any successor strictly regulated in a public forum.

The format of revolution should remorph the double phases of any political transition, e.g. the model of the American Revolution: a revolt against an established power, and a constitutional phase moving to create the needed balance of democracy and republic, with a full and explicit set of rights.

APPENDIX 1: A NEW MODEL OF HISTORY

History and Evolution

The rise of science has seen the extension of its methods and perspectives into all fields of human knowledge, and yet it is significant that no science of history has ever been successfully created. In part this is due to its complexity, and more fundamentally due to the failure of the assumptions of universal reductionism. The reasons for the confrontation with this limit are not mysterious and were clearly outlined by the philosopher Kant, whose system of critiques sounded a master chord in the discourse on causality and freedom. In a nutshell, the science of history must confront the reality and significance of the idea of freedom. But if we adopt the perspective of freedom can we create a science at all? This issue is the object of multiple insights by a host of students of history and theory, among them Isaiah Berlin with his critique of the idea of historical inevitability, and Karl Popper with his attack on what he called 'historicism', a term with a long history, but one to which he gave an idiosyncratic, but useful, definition, putting it in close concordance with the issue of historical inevitability.

As we discover the eonic effect, we enter at once into this terrain, and a remarkable paradox arises. We find the secret to the long lost science of history, at least on one level, and even as we do that we are forced, quite correctly, to confront the issue of freedom. That is, we find in practice the need

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to apply the theme of causality, and at one and the same time this demands reckoning with the idea of freedom. This approach has a sense of rightness to it, if we can see the way to handle what seems like a stark contradiction. In fact, we undergo a sense of recognition: we realize that this perspective is something that we deal with every day, it is part of our tacit repertory of concepts that we subliminally invoke in the most common situations, from driving in traffic, to playing in games, to participating in organizational structures, to using a computer mouse. We confront situations where a given causal structure is confronted by a 'system' of agents who have, if not free will (a very metaphysical concept), then a set of options and the ability to select from those options. This hybrid situation of causal mechanics and free activity is the simplest, and once seen, obvious, solution to the outstanding paradox of historical determinism misapplied. The eonic effect yields to this kind of analysis: there is a factor of macro dynamics and micro free action.

More, the eonic effect suggests how to apply the idea of a science of history by directly looking at the idea of the 'causality of freedom', an idea whose instantaneous short-circuit leads us to its resolution in the empirical facts of the eonic effect, and a judicious look at the work of Kant. And to the need for a new type of model to deal with this fascinating paradox, one that stands between the demands of science, which it fulfills, and the philosophy of history. The eonic effect, in fact, shows in plain sight the properties of particular type of model, one operating at a high degree of abstraction, yet very simple in its basic dynamics. This model, what we call the 'eonic model', is a kind 'system by default', and allows us apply simultaneously a consideration of causality and freedom. The facts speak for themselves, and all we have to do is construct a matrix of periodization that will garland the data we associate with the dynamics of the eonic effect.

There is thus something utterly simple and practical about the eonic model, despite its outward indications of something much deeper. We can approach this mystery in stages even as we become immersed in the fascinating details of the eonic phenomenon. In many ways the eonic model is, remarkably, and at first almost outlandishly, a way to deal with what we perceive as a cyclical phenomenon. In fact, the model will rescue us from the confusions of such thinking, which has a long history, and a record of thorough confusion. At first, the eonic effect can seem a very strange way to approach the issue of history, but with a little experience we can see that resolves our perplexities

as to the question of history even as it enters finally into the difficult and mysterious domain of what we should call 'Big History', or 'macro-history'.

The question of the eonic effect highlights the crisis of theory that haunts the outcome of scientism in the emergence of modern science, and demands that we understand theories as embedded historical phenomena themselves, whose non-linear effects on historical outcomes itself requires study and analysis. This issue was in fact an emerging concern in Karl Popper's treatment of historicism, where he pointed to what he called the Oedipus paradox, where predictions about the future themselves can alter that future. Given this the status of a theory of history, or evolution, might be challenged on the grounds of its pseudo-objectivity. One task of the eonic model, therefore, is an effort to produce a new kind of theory that can handle this self-interaction of theory, theorist and historical agents.

As we proceed it will slowly dawn on us that our historical analysis is impinging on the question of evolution itself, and we can braid our discussion together with a new perspective on the meaning of evolution.

1. History and Evolution

1.1 Beyond Natural Selection

The Darwin debate is misleading in the sense that two issues are constantly scrambled together: the fact of evolution in deep time, which is well-established, and the claims for the mechanism of natural selection, which are less clear, and the source of much of the contention.

There is a frequent distinction between microevolution and a purported 'macroevolution', with Darwinists generally claiming that the latter can be accounted for by a universal generalization using natural selection. Whatever the case about earlier evolution in deep time, the theory of natural selection tends to sow tares in the perception and understanding of history, producing the classic fallacies of Social Darwinism. And yet students of history experience a difficulty in extricating its study from such fallacies, for the simple reason that natural selection is taken as the sole and universal mechanism of evolution. This point is sometimes denied by biologists, but without a genuine demonstration of some other form of evolutionary mechanism, possibly some form of macroevolution, the thesis of selectionism becomes a tacit assumption that overrides all other perceptions.

One aspect of this is what we can call the Oedipus paradox. This phrase arises from the work of Karl Popper who cited the ancient myth of Oedipus, and the way his expectations about the future became the object of his action in the present, thus precipitating his tragic outcome. In general, the assumptions about natural selection, seen as a process that occurred in the past, generate a sense of its operation as a universal law, one that will therefore apply to the future. This expectation in turn becomes the basis for a strategy of action, e.g. survival of the fittest routines, and induced competition as an expression of this 'law'. But a fallacy has entered here. Natural selection is supposed to be a blind process operating on unconscious organisms over immense periods of time. To say that a conscious agent can or should apply this as a procedure of action in his present or future because it so happened in the past is simply not a valid deduction from the facts of the case. T. H. Huxley noted the oddity of this situation, and also noted that in practice we tend to contradict the premise of natural selection in our present, for ethical or other reasons. Some other source of action has entered the picture, and we are not agents of natural selection. Something has entered our thinking, a theory, that distorts our sense of how we should conduct historical outcomes. Thus the confusion of Social Darwinist misapplication of theory. We should note in addition that we have stumbled indirectly on one of the possible candidates for 'some other process of evolution' just here: our cultural context has emerged to be something other than the play of natural selection. If we trace this cultural history we should sooner or later detect the suspected macroevolutionary processes, we sense as the missing clue to the inadequacies of selectionist theories.

1.2 Non-random Evolution: The Eonic Effect

One of basic claims of the proponents of natural selection lies in the reality of random evolution. The biologist Richard Dawkins has attempted to deny this fact, by claiming that natural selection is somehow a nonrandom process. But this has changed the context of the discussion and nothing he has claimed really changes the issue: that there is no long-range, directional, or independent macroevolutionary process that can redirect evolutionary outcomes, which, in fact, occur at random. Selectionist theories have always been about random evolution. Thus the question arises: what do we mean by non-random evolution, and how can we detect it if it exists?

The surprising answer comes from the discovery and perception of the eonic effect. At first we simply examine this as a non-random pattern in world history, leaving aside its connection, if any, to evolution in general. One of the problems with Darwinian theory lies in the difficulty of observing evolution, hence natural selection, at close range. We are lucky indeed if we can zoom in on continuous records shorter than ten thousand years. What if the crucial issues of the suspected macroevolution occur at high speed inside such short intervals? We would miss them completely. Do we have any data at such close range? Actually, the only such data lies in the record of world history, which provides a rough, almost adequate, ten-thousand-year interval since the Neolithic, and a better record at five thousand years since the invention of writing.

If we systematically examine this record, using various experiments in periodization, we discover to our surprise that this immense data set simply doesn't conform to our assumptions about randomness. It shows distinct clustering in the form of advancing zones of action, and this once detected, causes us to suddenly perceive a larger gestalt, whatever it means, in the form of a set of transition-like intervals that show very rapid emergentist phenomena.

Perhaps the clearest example is the data of the so-called Axial Age. Within the space of a few centuries an immense change in cultures occurs synchronously in multiple separate locations across the length of the Eurasian landmass. This symphony of sudden effects shows us there is a 'macro something' that can operate on a whole stream of culture, and not only this, but simultaneously in many difficult locations at once. This mindboggling possibility lies directly in our 'recent' past, and shows us that our standard of ten thousand years even is far too coarse-grained: our 'macro' factor requires centuries level observations!

The so-called 'eonic effect' is a name we give to this pattern of effects: there are several ways to see it. We can generalize from the example of the Axial Age, since its uniqueness seems unlikely. Or we can (could have) simply examine (examined) world history for deviations from the norm of randomness. Once we suspect what's afoot, we close in rapidly on the result: a distinct form of alternating sequencing (a better phrase than the contentious 'cyclical' terminology), almost like a feedback device, but timed to switch on at regular intervals. The whole five-thousand-year period since the invention of writing suddenly stands out as a coherent whole, with a directed mainline, a clear non-random pattern, and a whopper at that.

But what is the connection to 'evolution'?

1.3 A Glimpse of Evolution

As we proceed to examine the eonic effect we begin to get a reality check about what we mean by 'evolution'. The eonic effect represents 'evolution of some kind' by default, and almost by definition: any process of 'rolling out in time' that shows systematic properties is 'evolution'. We don't need to use this term to describe our findings, which also have an equally good

description as a 'universal history' or some kind of long-sought, but suddenly discovered, factor of Big History, or 'macrohistory'. It is useful to study the phenomenon as is, on its own terms.

But finally the implications begin to dawn on us: we are being given a glimpse of 'evolution' in action, albeit one that seems at first focused on purely cultural factors. The problem is that the effects are so vast and comprehensive that we begin to suspect that whatever the case with purely genetic evolution, here we have something that operates beyond the reductionist level. And we can't avoid this conclusion save by playing ostrich to the results obtained by nothing more than systematic periodization.

This reality check induces a sense that we might have discovered something that ought to apply to earlier stages of human evolution at least. We can't be making statements about a strange new discovery of 'macrohistory' and then simply go back to our previous Darwinian assumptions about earlier man. If this is the way civilizations 'evolve', then... We suspect that the descent is likely to all of a piece, and that evolving civilizations, and evolving proto-cultures, will share a common evolutionary matrix.

We have, unexpectedly, stumbled on the 'how' of some kind of 'macrohistory' now a candidate for 'macroevolution'.

We have had a glimpse of evolution, in fact.

1.4 Descent of Man Revisited

Our perception of the eonic effect suddenly shows us a stark contradiction between the way we understand world history and the way we take the earlier evolution of man, from a Darwinian perspective. But in fact we begin to suspect that our historical understanding is the right one, and that our observations of world history must call for a reexamination of the usual scenarios of earlier human evolution. What's more the claims for Darwinian processes to explain that evolution have never been properly documented, while our perspective has a unique, hence overriding, data set, one that sets a higher standard. Hence our sense of the usual account of the descent of humans collapses due to an unnerving suspicion that we have missed the main event, so to speak.

Further, we encounter just this kind of dilemma, and attendant debate, in the scientific literature itself, with its ambiguous statements about the so-called 'Great Explosion', the sudden crossing of a threshold toward 'modern man'. These accounts, never quite satisfactory, nonetheless induce a sense of recognition: we may be missing precisely the kind of high-speed 'evolution' at the level of centuries, or something related, in the earlier stages of human evolution. We won't make any definite claims in that regard, save that the stock of the Darwinian account starts to plummet, because we have a new and different insight in the 'how' of evolution, as a macroevolutionary process clearly detectable in history itself.

But what is the relationship of history and evolution? Haven't we confused two things?

1.5 History and Evolution

The relationship of history and evolution seems to be a problem; how can we make statements about evolution in the context of world history. Actually the answer to that is simple: we have defined it that way. And that definition is not arbitrary. The question remains, what does this have to do with earlier 'evolution'? The answer is that, while we can't be sure, we suspect that something like the 'evolution' we see in the eonic effect was also present in the earlier period. But, whatever the case, our perception of a new form of evolution puts a block in the way of applying Darwinian evolution to history.

One way to see the issue is to ask a question: when did evolution stop and history begin? We can see the paradox involved in this question. Obviously it couldn't have occurred instantaneously. There must have been something kind of intermediate condition of transition between the two. But wait, that is the evolution itself that we have seen in the eonic effect, a series of transitions making up a transition. Transition to what? There are a number of answers to that suggested by the eonic effect: one answer is that we see increasing degrees of freedom in human action. We are moving from passive organisms to active individuals, relatively autonomously, and free from the evolution that characterized their beginnings. But what we have discovered is that that evolutionary process still accompanies man at the stage of civilization itself. There we see a series of transitions whose effect is to increase human potentiality in the context of civilization.

So we can recalibrate our definitions of history and evolution so that they fit together: evolution is a macro process, history a micro process, associated with increasing degrees of freedom. With this approach we can bring a two level analysis to world history, evolution and history, the one emerging from the other, both applying at once, each showing a different aspect of one process, the emergence of man. The advantage of this approach is that we can develop a new kind of theory, one that won't suffer the flaws we saw in the Darwinian confusions of Social Darwinism.

It helps to look at the Axial Age (and then the full eonic effect) in this light: we see the braiding of macro and micro directly in that phenomenon. Men were proceeding about their business of history, their free action doing that, but a sudden macro factor enters into that equation and transforms the context of their free action. There is a braided macro and micro process, connecting a larger process of evolution in our sense to the historical component of proceeding on its own level.

Perhaps we can get a sense of the reason the Old Testament confuses us now in a secular age: it is a classic document describing just this: it is the (mythological) account, micro, of an historical people passing through the Axial Age, inside the eonic effect (macro)!

2. An Eonic Model

2.1 A Science of History?

We have the gist of the eonic model at hand, and can quickly map out some basic terminology, and a few further areas of study, adjourning to the text of World History and The Eonic Effect itself. We can return to our question of a science of history in light of what we have discovered, and the beginnings of the model we have set up. We are a long way from a complete science of history, but we have discovered where least expected what must almost by definition be taken as the main construct in any such question of a science of history. The reason is that our gesture has applied, at least in principle, the concept of causality to world history as a system, and the result was to see the question resolved in the eonic effect, as an 'eonic sequence' of transitions, the Axial Age between one such. This is a loose kind of macro factor, one that is braided with the cultural streams of freely created historical situations. These situations are driven by a mainline of driving macro evolution that is intermittent in its action, leaving the form of the realization very often to the field of free activity.

Thus instead of deterministic explanation we have something more complex and far more interesting: a system braided with the free activity of those inside that system, and this 'science' has suddenly turned into an 'evolution of freedom'.

2.2 Macro/Micro

Let us reiterate that we have discovered a candidate for the elusive 'macroevolution' that is always suspected, but never found, in the study of evolution via Darwinian perspectives. We are strictly speaking talking about the evolution of man, but it would not be hard to apply this basic reasoning to all stages of evolution, save that we simply don't have the data required that is visible in the closely tracked version seen in the eonic effect. Looking at the confusions over the Cambrian, for example, we can easily see in principle at least why so much ambiguity is being generated by the Darwinian perspective. We can hazard a guess that the characteristic two levels are being missed, as the whole sequence is collapsed into one form of explanation, natural selection. Clearly some unknown macro process is braided with the selectionist process. But more we cannot say, and it is not our subject. It could not be anything like what we see later in human evolution, save for the overall rubric of macro and micro processes operating on different levels.

In history it is a surprise indeed to find this double action, and yet the facts speak for themselves. It is important to develop a method to properly use this insight, since we can't directly invoke a macro explanation for anything pertaining to our present or future. We see this macro factor in the past, more we do not know. We can arrive at no real understanding of the Axial Age, for example, without this kind of two level analysis, but it does not follow that we can expect to produce such a macro factor in our microaction, that is in our ordinary history. This welcome complication to standard theories completely transforms our way of understanding both history and (human) evolution, and gives us a way to bring the discourse of evolution into historical analysis without its interfering with the basic necessity of chronicle the saga of human freedom.

The intersection of the two processes is visible in the Axial Age: we see that the direct flowering of human self-consciousness and creativity is the medium of evolution, while its realization in time is what we call history. The elegant interaction of the two produces the innovations that we see and which form a settled part of our traditions. But as 'evolve' in this context, we must learn to see the limits of previous realizations. Thus we must graduate to a higher understanding of, for example, the Old Testament, to see that while its realization in history suffers from elements that have declined into mythology its basic framework, beyond the text, is something far larger, the context of the evolutionary process we see in the 'eonic effect'.

2.3 Historical Directionality

Our model enters a completely new terrain, for we have discovered something always suspected, but always rejected, a teleological factor in human evolution. What's more we can see the ingenious way in which this factor can coexist with its opposite, the undoubted reason for the chronic confusions of the question. But we should be clear that we have discovered only historical, or rather, evolutionary directionality, not teleology. We are still immersed in the process we are describing, and can make no statements, as yet, about its future end point, hence we can't confirm the teleological factor in detail. But this should not prevent us from seeing a definite macro factor generating historical direction, this whether or not the factor of free action truly realizes its potential. This new type of system is a vivid, yet still unfamiliar, kind of system, however, whose properties don't match typically metaphysical discussions of teleology, which are usually misleading, if not incorrect. We see a nudging-forward system, not unlike (at least in broad principle) a feedback device, that interrupts a continuous stream to reset direction.

2.4 Eonic Evolution

We can pause briefly to specify a terminology for our 'evolution of some kind' seen in the eonic effect, to prevent confusion with other usages. We will call the action of the macro factor seen in the eonic effect 'eonic evolution', or the 'eonic evolution of civilization', with an associated 'evolution of freedom' emerging from that matrix (note that we have two processes now, the macroevolution of the eonic series, and the microevolution of human realization. The latter we have labeled 'history'.

2.5 Kant's Challenge

One elegant and useful property of our model is the way it connects to the classic issues of the philosophy of history, particularly as seen in the reflections of the philosopher Kant. We can link this account here with the parallel series *Kant and The Philosophy of History*, and especially the section on Kant's Challenge,

We can see that our considerations of causality and freedom provide a solution to the implicit question in Kant's essay on history. And we can switch between modes in our model, between the evolutionary, and the historical.

3. Ends and Beginnings

3.1 Transition and Divide

Our eonic model is of a particular type, what we can call a discrete/continuous model, that is, a series of discrete transitions in the middle of a continuous history. This approach resolves the discontinuity between evolution and history as a series of such transitions, visible as finite intervals as seen in the Axial Age. And these transitions, being short acting, are characterized by a kind of 'divide' point at their conclusion: we can see very clearly that the Axial period suddenly wanes and is over, even as a series of realization processes come into being carrying out the implications of the new evolutionary productions. Easier to see in the past, these simple properties of the eonic sequence suddenly become visible by inspection as we examine the third and so far last in our series of transitions, the rise of the modern period. We must therefore keep in mind that our sense of modernity must distinguish the modern transition from the realization period that ensues in its wake. This property of our model finds an unexpected confirmation in the data of modern history, and we can see the characteristic termination of the transition, its divide, in the period after the Enlightenment, one of the most innovative periods in world history, and one that sets the tone for the still young period of realization that followed.

The point for us is to see that we have at hand a very close look, in the early modern, at the way in which a transition 'works', so to speak, but it is important to see that we are in fact outside the last of the transitions in our series. Thus our status as observers puts us beyond the eonic effect. This, in many ways, is inevitable: we couldn't observe the process if we were still inside it. And yet we inherit the manifold of emergent innovations that characterize our modern, rapidly globalizing, culture. This effect is very simply described with the concepts our model provides: the evolutionary process comes to stop and the historical process takes the helm: the macro factor subsides and the micro process, our free realizations of the eonic sequence, take effect. This offers us a new and beautifully elegant way to describe modern history, one that accounts for many of its puzzling characteristics, and missteps.

3.2 Modern/Postmodern

In passing let us clarify the confusion over postmodernism that tends to haunt current efforts to defend modernity. The postmodern phase of modern thought is a confusing one, but it does accurately reflect the sudden sense of many that there is a change in the character of modernity. Actually, there is no such change in the basic elements, but as we have seen there is a difference between the elements generating modernity in the eonic sequence, and modern transition, and the nature of the realization that occurs in its wake. The students of postmodernism are perhaps detecting merely that the modern transition has long since been over, and that the realization of its potential may be open so some criticism. No problem with that, but our point is merely that there is no 'postmodern' period, as such, only a possible change of qualitative realization. Our model brings home the fact that our evolutionary process

doesn't control its short term future, and lapses into inaction beyond the series of transitions it generates.

3.3 Discrete Freedom Sequence

One of the advantages of a model is the way it can organize our data into a coherent whole, and the result might be the discovery of unexpected properties in the system being modeled. That is certainly the case with the eonic model, which uncovers a strange result concerning the emergence of democracy in world history: we see the double emergence of democracy timed exactly with the eonic sequence. This remarkable aspect of the eonic sequence tells us something important about what we have called the 'evolution of freedom'. This is not some abstraction but a process directly matched by the outcomes of the successive transitions. And it suggests a macro component to the emergence of particular political systems, in this case democratic experiments. The full significance of this is explored in the series on the philosophy of history. But let us note that we have suddenly produced an enriched means of analysis for the study of modern democracy: a macro aspect and the micro aspect of its realization. We should recall the difficulties that beset Greek democracy and the brevity of its appearance.

Our eonic evolution must be telling us something: a jumpstart process seems to lurk behind the temporal realizations as history that we take for granted and which we have thought the results of merely contingent circumstance.

We ought to be mindful of the sudden deviations that might occur in the wake of the eonic sequence and, armed with the perception of the eonic effect, move to preserve the action of the macro sequence in our micro response!!

3.4 Theory and Ideology

We can the dangers of evolutionary theories! A theory is an emergent process in history like any other historical process. And the question arises as to its lineage in the eonic sequence, and as to its objectivity if it is taken to apply as a universal generalization applicable to history. We now see the confusing danger in Darwinian theory (which arises as an oversimplification of the original insights of evolution that appear in the modern transition). We can see that 'evolution' in our sense, eonic evolution, is a highly complex function of all the factors of culture, a comprehensive spectrum, and is closely adapted to the facts of human history, including its ethical action inside that history. To suddenly inject the Darwinian thesis of natural selection into the mix is highly misleading and produces wrong action from the word go. History doesn't work that way and it is a misapplication of theory to inflict the pretense of natural selection on such a complex system. We can see that major evolutionary advances proceed by a different process altogether!

It is significant that Lamarck, the real founder of evolutionary theory, saw fit to posit two levels to evolution. However inchoate his result, it corresponds correctly to the real needs of a true theory of evolution. Let us not that he was one of the first fruits of the modern transition-divide

and preceded the instant confusion created by Darwin's degenerate form of that theory. One factor in that confusion was Darwin's unconscious confusion between Adam Smith and the population theory of Malthus. These are important theories in their own right, but they don't constitute a basis for explaining the issue of evolution in the large. The ideological component in the misapplication of these theories to evolution should suddenly be obvious.

3.5 Last and First Men

Let us conclude with the observation that in our framework we have brought 'evolution' into our present, but in a carefully guarded form, in which our free activity as historical agents is moving to replace the factor of evolution. That was actually always the case. But the point is that the 'first man' and the 'last man' (to invoke a new usage of a Nietzschean term) are now somewhat ambiguous. The first man, as the creature emerging as 'homo sapiens' is in reality, perhaps, a creature in transition, and his present and future evolution, emerging into history, may or may not be completed, leaving us both with a sense of our community with earliest men, and mindful of the future evolution, and our own self-evolution into history that awaits us a task as yet incomplete.

Conclusion

We have discovered a remarkable fact: work history shows a non-random pattern in the emergence of civilization, and this pattern falls naturally into an interpretation as a special kind of dynamic model. This model is basically a very simple schema of periodization, and yet gives us a strong sense of the coherence of history and also harmonizes the relationship between theory and practice. We can proceed in the next set of essays to explore the relation to the philosophy of history and the clearest resolution of history as both an avenue to the science of history and at the same time a demonstration of the meaning of evolution, the evolution of freedom.

APPENDIX 2: KANT AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

One of the ironies of modern thought is the way it generates a secular perspective that is unable to explain either modernity or religion. The reason is fairly clear: the modern transition is so complex we tend to adopt a one-sided view based on 'scientism'. It is useful in this context to take a look at the era at the closing of the Enlightenment of German Classical philosophy beginning with Kant. And the philosopher Kant gives us a good introduction to our study of world history....

Kant and the Philosophy of History: 1. The Eonic Effect The nature of history theory shows theory orphaned in an age of scientism as determinism assumed and applied generate a critical exception to the project of physical science and the assumptions of universal causality. We don't actually have to prove the existence of free will in any classic sense to see that free agency is real. The example of a computer with or without a mouse is an example. In the first case we see no free agency while in the second it is implicit in the choice of input, irregardless of our views of freedom. The term 'eonic' means 'epochal' in the sense of an age period, and the 'eonic effect' an historical pattern resolving what we call 'Kant's Challenge'.

As we move to study the world history and construct a model of its mysterious dynamic we make a strange discovery: the relationship to the philosophy of history. We take this to mean a consideration of free agency in the context of whatever dynamic we can find. The conventional distinctions of critical and speculative history (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_history) are misleading. Our stance is 'critical' in the sense of exposing the fallacy of 'flat history', and showing how directionality is clearly demonstrable in even the short span since the invention of writing. It is hard to determine which is more 'speculative', a claim to introduce free agency in theory (in practice all historians quietly assume it) or some putative causal analysis of a historical machine.

The idea of a model, which is finally unveiled as a simplified 'theoretical' metanarrative, is to bring home the project of science applied to history, but on the way we are forced to consider the issue of freedom in the context of causality and this summons up the classic discourse of the philosophers of history, most especially that of the philosopher Kant whose sudden, almost mysterious, appearance at the climax of the Enlightenment both fulfilled and challenged or deepened that movement. The irony, and

strange secret uncovered, is that the philosophy of history shows strong correlation with the pattern explored. This point is elusive and will dawn on one gradually, to show an extraordinarily deep side to the pattern of universal history the eonic sequence uncovers. The larger question is the nature of modernity.

The question of a science of history is paradoxical, it won't go away, and yet we can't resolve its basic contradiction. There must be such a science, since we attempt to apply causal analysis to the whole of reality, and have the spectacular successes of physics to show for this, and yet there can't be such a science, since the issue of freedom must exempt itself from causal analysis. Standard scientism is either oblivious or indifferent to this eternal paradox and wishes to produce a causal account of the factor of freedom. That's a bold step, but success has proven elusive. As has the effort to model the idea of freedom within science. In many ways the latter is precisely what Kant did, with brilliant, if controversial, and still debatable, effects. The result is the discovery of so-called 'transcendental idealism' which is a dubious candidate for an idealism and not 'transcendental' in the usual sense (i.e. transcendent). Be that as it may as to the misleading character of the terminology the apparatus of transcendental idealism is a uniquely powerful way to model our basic philosophical perplexities.

The remarkable thing is that as we stumble on the eonic effect, we discover in the process nature's way of resolving the paradox, in the context of 'universal history'. And in the process we are able to harmonize our concepts of historical dynamics with those of evolution, an elegant solution to our demand for a science of history.

This discussion will preface our treatment of the two following netbooks, and will try to survey the pieces of the puzzle without too much detail. The result will be a useful tool for understanding our model in a deeper way. We will see the dilemma behind evolutionary theories if these attempt to describe the 'evolution of freedom', and the way in which the eonic model, with a touch of Kant, can elucidate the mystery.

There have been essentially two discoveries and examinations of transcendental idealism, that of Kant, and then Schopenhauer. The discovery of the macro dynamic and its model gives us a third, a fast and elegant backdoor entrance, and it does this by indirection, in a streamlined fashion that can bypass the complexities of Kantian discourse to show us the whole issue in a unified gestalt.

1.1 Kant's Challenge Our starting point is a classic essay by the philosopher Kant written in the wake of his famous first Critique of Reason, and we might consider our task that of a preamble to a Critique of Historical Reason. The challenge indicated springs from the first paragraph of his essay and this remarkable piece is almost a symbology of method in the sense of putting causality and freedom in conjunction.

In a famous essay on history the philosopher Kant, in the wake of the appearance of his famous *Critique of Pure Reason*, gave birth to a new perspective on the philosophy of history. This essay, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*, opens with the following implicit question:

Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view, concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like every other natural event, are determined by universal laws. However obscure their causes, history, which is concerned with narrating these appearances, permits us to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it, and that what seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and progressive though slow evolution of its original endowment.

Kant's significance lies in the way he responds to and yet challenges the new physics and the legacy of Newton. This essay is the grandfather to much later discussion of the question of historical laws, from Isaiah Berlin and his discussion of historical inevitability to Karl Popper and his critique of historicism. His classic discourse on the limits of metaphysics balanced with the forced march passage through the metaphysics of free will constituted a revolution in philosophy and a practical effort to consider the implications of science just short of the crystallization into scientism that will come to be such a notable feature of the modern scientific continuation of the seventeenth century 'Scientific Revolution'. Kant's essay after proposing brilliantly in this paragraph the crux of the question of history, in the search for a science of its 'laws', moves uncertainly into a discussion of what Kant calls 'asocial sociability' and the nature of conflict in the generation of historical forms. Thus, in a canonical example, the legacy of warfare might sustain nonetheless the uncertain hope that initiatives of peace might be generated from the extremes of historical warfare itself. This perspective on historical dynamics is a close cousin to many other such themes, e.g. the tenets of Adam Smith as to the relationship of altruism to economic development, to say nothing of the soon to arrive bastard child of Adam Smith, the 'naked conflict' theory of Charles Darwin.

But a close look at Kant's essay shows that he is moving uncertainly in this direction, and that he is really proposing a question, and a challenge to the future. In fact, the first paragraph of his essay actually stumbles on the answer in the form of a question. Can we detect a play of the human will in the large to discern a regular movement in it?

In fact, we can. And we can examine world history 'in the large' to show the exact correspondence of a pattern of universal history to this rumination on freedom and causality.

Note that, as it were, Kant stumbles on the answer, too inchoately in probing vagueness, by considering the terms as if some a priori derivation. But this can tell us nothing until we examine empirically the facts of the case, here 'world history', whatever

that is. The point is that this unwitting deduction leaves us with the question as to how nature will satisfy or compute the dialectic of freedom and causality.

Kant's own attempts to solve the problem were not so cogent, for as he sensed he lived too early to be able to answer his own question. He threw the question into the future. And modern archaeological research has proceeded apace to vastly increase our data on the emergence of civilization. We find ourselves only within the last century with a reasonable minimum chronicle of world history to be able to really apply his implicit question to the facts that we have.

1. The Solution to Kant's Challenge: A Preview

The result is a remarkable discovery that echoes Kant's unwitting anticipatory solution to the problem that flows spontaneously from his pen in the wisp of opening rhetoric of his classic essay.

1.2 The Pattern of History, a summary The search for patterns of history has gone on and on with not result, but the answer, which depends on the new data available on world history, results from the plainest attempt via systems analysis: does our system show a cyclical character. It is almost embarrassingly easy to show a partial solution to the pattern mystery with this question.

As we move to discover and map out the basic pattern we notice the strange way in which it fulfills the requirement, made almost in passing, embedded in the introduction to Kant's essay. As we examine world history we discover, if we attend to the play of human freedom in the large, a regular movement in it.

Our pattern itself is simply the realization that there is a non-random pattern embedded in recorded history, that this pattern is one of discrete alternation (cyclical), in a sequence of transitional periods operating in a definite mainline. The whole and part are connected via an 'epochal sequence' whose action gives the indication of a dynamic driving a series of major turning points in a series, the birth of civilization, the Axial Age, and the rise of modernity.

Described in more detail in the netbooks to follow, these transitions map out an organized evolutionary grid whose action is visible in the sudden breaking fronts of cultural renewal that fret virtually the whole of the large-scale emergence of world civilization. And this dynamic shows evidence of definite regularity, that is, a kind of cyclical interpretation is called for. Strange as this is, the evidence speaks for itself, and, especially, in the second or Axial phase of this sequence, we see the clear indications of a 'universal history' coherent in its outline and explicit in its directional impetus applied to the stream of world history.

The connection to the idea of freedom appears on several levels, but at the most basic level, we can note that the question of 'causality' is by definition bound up with the question of the free activity that generates historical fact. That is, our large-scale driving motion is a 'causal' factor in the emergence of civilizations. Another way of putting it lies in the seemingly paradoxical question, what 'causes the Axial Age?', or any of the other stages of the eonic sequence. This question arises spontaneously as we posit by definition some explanation for any kind of regular movement. But in this case, and as we examine the phenomenon more closely, we see that at each stage human agents spontaneously act out the drama of innovation. But they do so in a larger pattern of dynamic regularity. Their actions seem, on the one hand, timed according to a rule, yet distinctly personalized according to time and place. These are 'free' innovations. And yet they seem caused.

If we reread the paragraph from Kant's essay, we see that the apparent contradiction is directly stated. We wish to find 'laws' to describe the motions of history. And yet we wish at the same time to find a regular movement in the play of freedom. The phrasing corresponds to our situation. And what is remarkable is that we have found an empirical analog, and one on a stupendous scale.

But there is more to this. As we map out our eonic sequence we find more to the 'play of freedom', we find what we can call the 'discrete freedom sequence', a more explicit example of the 'dynamic of freedom'.

First we need to see the rise of modernity in this larger context.

1.3 The Modern Transition The rise of modernity has been a puzzle to almost all thinkers but the resolution can be found in a conjecture as to an integrated transition based on an almost discontinuous passage from medievalism to a new era in world history. This idea will come into its own when we enlarge the context.

One of the surprising implications of our perception of the eonic series is the new significance seen in the rise of modernity. The eonic model, once developed in detail, suggests a basic distinction here of the 'early modern' and the period that follows, with the concept of a transition leading to a divide period at its conclusion when the 'modern age' period gets underway. This transition, clearly visible in the rough three century interval from 1500 to 1800 is packed with the seminal innovations we characteristically assign to the concept of the 'modern', and encompasses a full set of so-called 'eonic emergent' factors from the Protestant Reformation to the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment, and much else. It is these emergent processes that make this period stand out against the backdrop of world history, and whose suddenness and depth draw comparison with the Axial Age. The depth of this transformation is seen in the multitude of innovative effects across the spectrum of culture, from philosophy to science, to

religion and the arts. Seen rightly it is a spectacular integrated transformation that gives expression to our intuitive sense of modernity passing beyond the Middle Ages.

One key point for us to notice here is the phenomenon of the so-called 'Great Divide'. As we observe the eonic effect, and construct our model, we are availing ourselves of the idea of a 'discrete' series of transformations, the eonic sequence. This interplay of the continuous and discontinuous yields an implication: that the period of transition is a finite interval and comes to a close, even as it ignites the stable period of 'modernity' as such.

What is remarkable is the way this model, with its simple derivation of a 'divide', is reflected remarkably in the facts, and we can see the reason why the period near the end of the 'modern transition', that is the period of the divide, is so massively packed with emergent beginnings of things, major innovations, revolutions, new cultural starts, such as to create a genuinely new age period, one starting first in a localized transition zone (characteristic of the eonic effect) and then proceeding rapidly to a stage of globalization.

That the Enlightenment period should be the climax of the transition at the point of the divide orients our sense of this turning point inside a turning point and shows its significance in a broader context. The Enlightenment is a complex multidimensional spectrum, not just the reduced scientism with which it is later associated. There are really several Enlightenments, including various counter-enlightenments, like chords of descanting meaning playing theme and variations on the whole.

And one of these is the phase, almost eerily timed to the Great Divide, of German Classical philosophy initiated by the philosopher Kant. There is something strange about this. We are zooming in on the philosophy of history, only to find its self-referential placement, and its sudden flowering, in the same periodization we have assigned to the eonic sequence itself.

1.4 The Discrete Freedom Sequence This term is really another version of Kant's phrase, 'play of freedom in the large', and we can prefigure a subsequent uncovering of what is implied in Kant's first paragraph: an idea of the 'causality of freedom', a classic antinomy, but one that is given an exemplar in our larger model.

We can extract one surprising property from our emerging conception of the 'evolution of freedom', a specific instance of a 'freedom effect' embedded in our eonic series: the discrete freedom sequence, that is, the double birth of democracy in a precise timing. We have seen the sequence of transitions and their divides. What we notice is that

twice in row we see the birth of democracy timed to the divide period of our transitions, first in the Greek transition, precisely indicated by the appearance of Solon and his generation, and then at the Great Divide in the modern period. Most remarkable! We don't suspect that the massive wave of democratic revolutions in the modern period, around the period of the French Revolution and after, correlates with a larger pattern of effects. To be sure, the modern transition is associated with a whole series of revolutions, the Protestant Reformation being the first, the English Civil War being the seminal generator of much that will come later.

But it is the period of the Enlightenment and its immediate aftermath that sees the massive transition toward democratic enfoldment. For reasons we don't at first understand this is not chance! It beggars belief, at first, but with careful study we can begin to see the logic in all of this.

The issue is simple: the eonic series seems to induce change, here corresponds to a 'causal' principle. Yet if we 'induce freedom' there is a paradox that this freedom will be less than free. In fact, the evolution of freedom might require an assisting evolutionary process, yet freedom must also be spontaneous. Our eonic system resolves this as best as is possible by a hybrid method: we see that it seems to confine induction to the transitional series, triggering a 'freedom emergence' phenomenon at the point of its conclusion, i.e. the divide period. How strange, yet compellingly simple the logic!

1.5 Freedom's Causality The full implications of Kant's deceptively simple remarks often lead scholars to intuitive rediscoveries of his meaning.

The discovery of the pattern has stumbled on something that Kantian philosophy of history predicts or assumes must exist, without actually showing an example.

As Elizabeth Ellis notes in *Kant's Politics*,

What would "bridging nature and freedom" mean outside of politics? For Kant the big questions are nearly always epistemological: thus, bridging freedom and nature might mean specifying the conditions under which investigators of the empirical world (scientists) are able to find evidence of spontaneity in the physical world (that is, of freedom's causality). Either freedom and nature are strictly alternative perspectives on the same set of empirical occurrences, or there are some things in the world that can only be explained according to freedom (in other words, the second alternative posits empirical evidence that some thing has no antecedent cause). I am not the first person to point out that it is not an easy thing empirical evidence of a lack of a cause. Kant himself assumes that a good scientist will operate under the presumption that absent natural causes may eventually be discovered. Elizabeth Ellis, *Kant's Politics*

We have actually discovered such a phenomenon. It is implicit in the very way we address the question of, first, the Axial Age, thence of the eonic sequence. A finite interval formally satisfies the rubric of a spontaneous, hence 'uncaused' or without an antecedent cause. Of course, our language was deliberately designed to show a different, not antecedent 'cause' on another level. But this cannot be truly causality in the standard sense, and in fact we have seen its association with, among other things, the discrete freedom sequence. It is as if a 'freedom effect' appeared spontaneously in the midst of a causal stream. This is not an abstraction. We can measure the phenomenon down to the century level to see a precisely timed effect satisfying the category of 'absent natural causes'!

2. Reformation to Enlightenment

It is useful to delay our projected solution by looking at length at the 'modern transition'. This will bear fruit in the spectacular context uncovered of a self-referential system in action.

2.1 Protestantism and Secularism It is useful to take a close look at what we have called the modern transition, and the sudden take off in the sixteenth century puts its beginning somewhat earlier than what most scholars allow. But the Reformation stages a clear onset to a new era, although its religious character makes some thinkers fail to see the dynamism involved.

Conceptions of modernity frequently adopt a narrow view of scientism to characterize secularism, so-called. The resulting lack of a philosophy of history leaves the secular in a chronic, and misleading, conflict with religion, so visible in the Darwin debate. But in fact the study of the modern transition in light of the eonic effect shows us something deeper and much richer as a perspective on the question of ideological modernism. Our eonic model posits an integrated transformation we have called a 'transition' in an eonic sequence. If we take this idea for what it shows us we see that the question of religion is left ambiguous by the nature of the case, and we can see that the Protestant Reformation, a complex remorphing of one of the religions issuing in the wake of the Axial Age, is, along with the scientific revolution, one of the crucial steps on the way to the climax of the Enlightenment. The point here is merely that our definition of secularism must reflect, not just an ideological 'ism', but the change in epochs created by the transition itself. The result is a 'secular' age, to be sure, but one that allows the elements of science, philosophy, and religion to indulge a fruitful dialectic with themselves on the way to creative renewal. The 'secular' is thus really a token for the modern transition itself, indeed, that is the original sense of the term.

Thus we see that, like the first stage of rocket, the Reformation, yielding to the Enlightenment, nonetheless seems to proceed with its own momentum in parallel to modernity. And that is what we see to be the case. However we interpret this, the point for us is to examine the modern transition more closely, to see that the Enlightenment is more than just the triumph of 'rational scientism', and spawns a considerable dialectic of potential outcomes. The rise of German classical philosophy, a prime candidate for such a dialectical description, itself seems to sow the seeds for a post-religious religiousness, so to speak. We have seen the crux of the issue in the discourse on freedom and causality in Kant. In many ways, the 'rebirth' of religion as secular philosophy is the hidden treasure behind the modern transformation, and we can see how its full depth truly gives meaning to the phrase the 'Axial Age'. We should note how the Reformation produces as its first born the world of liberal politics and action, an outcome obviously visible in the spectacle of the seminal English Civil War. This parallelism of rising science representing the causal line and the world of liberal action representing the realization of freedom leaves us with a more balanced and perspective on what we mean by the 'secular'. And this duality was perfectly addressed in the critiques of the philosopher Kant and his successors, themselves, in a true sense, the last exemplars of the Reformation on its way to modern era.

2.2 Scientific Revolutions Between Copernicus and Luther we see a parallel emergentism in the Reformation and the onset of the Scientific Revolution, singular or plural, keyed in the seventeenth century with the dawn of the New Physics. The modern transition if more than science, it is a counterpoint of ideas of causality and freedom, the later emerging as the Reformation yields to the dawn of liberalism.

Our large scale analysis of the eonic sequence uncovers something we often notice without realizing its significance, the seeming double birth of science. We see the spectacular change in the course of world history with the onset of the scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, clear correlates of the modern transition. But we often forget that this is really a rebirth and that there was a 'scientific revolution' in the earlier Axial period, especially in the era of the Greek Axial. This, we can see now, is hardly an accident! And we notice with some suspense for the future that it is as if the first birth was stillborn, science seeming to virtually die out in the middle, or mideonic, interval of our eonic sequence. This characteristic outcome in relation to the eonic sequence, along with the strong eonic correlation, leads us to a larger perspective on the history of science, with the realization that there is an element of historical dynamics to its appearance and gestation, and that this factor may reflect significantly on the way we come to understand the place of science in culture. In a word, there is a larger historical process involved, something more than merely the steady pace of scientific research. The part cannot, as some would have, overtake the whole. This factor should

remind us that the emergence of scientism in the wake of the Enlightenment is suspicious just on these grounds. We have derived a question about science by no other means than simple inspection of its historical periodization! And we have already seen that the larger Enlightenment has as it were already anticipated this problematic and issued forth its correction, prior even to the emergence of scientism. We need to adopt the full scope of modernity as the matrix of future action, prepared to restore the balance of the deeper secularism we discover, and an example of that balance we have already indicated in the elegant symmetry of the causal and freedom poles of a secular dialectic.

2.3 Transition and Divide Our modern transition proceeds at breakneck pace towards the Enlightenment, and we will discover that the apparent discontinuity at the start is matched with another at its conclusion, the Enlightenment being a useful conclusion, followed by the onset of modernity as such. This distinction of transition and its divide with the period to follow will become part of our larger model.

We have already noted the way in which the rise of secularism as we sense it is really the expression of the modern transition, and of the eonic effect itself. The strange, but suddenly obvious fit of the eonic model, as a 'discrete-continuous' phenomenon, unlocks the riddle of the so-called 'divide' point at the end of this transition, the period of the Enlightenment itself, and its immediate wake, so pregnant with new potential, and a prodigious number of cultural innovations, including the onset of a new form of economic capitalism. The point here is that the modern transition is indeed truly secular, and shows a decided tendency to move beyond the religions of antiquity toward a new stage of history, and of religion. A great deal of retrograde thinking wishes to indulge in a kind of postmodern reaction to this process in a false aspiration to move backwards. But the net effect of the transition is to generate a momentum that cannot be matched by ideological movements to erase the phase of secular society. A closer look, as we have already seen, suggests that there is no inherent opposition between the religious and the secular, save that the mechanized remnants of medievalism are going to be reevaluated as to their real status. We have already seen how the essence of religion is regenerated almost at once by the prodigious dialectical action of the new secular age, expressing the modern transition. A good example here is the rise of Biblical Criticism, a characteristic emergent strain of secularism. It is all very well to uphold religious traditionalism, but the 'action of reason' is a ferment that has already sown the seeds of renewal, willy-nilly. The very nature of the Old Testament we have already seen is that of an Axial history, and we must for the future reevaluate its significance on that basis. The point here, in any case, is that the point of the divide leaves a true division point, the onset of a new epoch, just as surely as the analogous period ca. -600 in antiquity tokened an irreversible transition to a new future. There is nothing utopian or fixed in such an outcome, but we do get a sense that the future, whatever it holds, will reflect the modern transition. This realization can

forestall the immense waste of energy that can be applied to the negation of the modern transition. The results, if religious, can never succeed, since, as we have seen, the Protestant Reformation is itself already the first born of that transition.

Thus, the current reaction to the Enlightenment suggests an element of futility. In fact, the issue is not the fact of the Enlightenment, but the limits of our interpretations of that period, and the downshifting of those interpretations into narrowing perspectives. If we examine the period of the divide (e.g. from ca. 1750 to 1850) we discover a cornucopia of potential that has already before the case, so to speak, done the job, and completed

2.4 Enlightenments The Enlightenment is an eighteenth century phenomenon that starts in the seventeenth and it is a very complex entity with many parallel versions: the French, the German, Dutch, Scottish, etc... It is important to consider this point since many one-liners from critics attempt to dismiss the Enlightenment based on one aspect of one version. Note that the German Enlightenment shows the onset of a revolution in philosophy started by Kant.

We speak of the 'Enlightenment', but as we have already suggested, there is a complexity to the phenomenon that eludes later narrow definitions of its meaning. In fact, there are multiple Enlightenments. In the full examination of the eonic effect seen in World History and the Eonic Effect, the discussion is based on the phenomenon of the frontier effect, and the way the modern transition has non-random clustering in a sector of Eurasian Europe, correlated to some degree with the partition created by the Protestant Reformation. This helps us to see the way in which geographical polarization of the modern transition produces almost a separate Enlightenment in each of the zones of the frontier area.

In any case, we see multiple Enlightenments associated with the modern transition: the English, the German, the Dutch, the French, etc... And the relatively late American version, appearing once again, just at the divide, with its great democratic revolution, is a token of the future potential of those who are to receive the fruits of modernity in the process of globalization that will succeed the divide.

A useful point here is to reiterate the multidimensional nature of the Enlightenment, and to, more specifically, consider the 'running commentary' on the Enlightenment given by the German Enlightenment as this proceeds from the era of Kant.

2.5 Out Of Revolution The Revolutionary character of modernity is reflected in the cascade of revolutions, from the Reformation to the period of the French Revolution, with the English Civil War in the seventeenth century being a seminal period generating the onset of the great democratic revolutions of the period of the French Convulsion.

One of the most obvious correlates of the modern transition, and notably the period of the divide, is the phenomenon of revolution, and its confusions. The modern transition is clearly a revolutionary period, which is not the same as saying that it is a revolution, as such. The point for us is to see that the modern revolutions of freedom claim the mantle of innovation against the retrograde action of traditionalist religions. The Protestant Reformation is a partial exception to this, for the simple reason it was the first of the modern revolutions! The point here is that we forget the proto-revolutionary character of the religions of the Axial Age as these emerged in the wake of the Axial character. They were not champions of tradition for their times!

In general, confusion arises over the question of revolution, in part, because of the ambiguity of the American and French exemplars, and the consequent equation of capitalist dynamics with historical dynamics in general. The leftist surge seen in the far left of the nineteenth century is a secondary stage of revolutionary realization that became frozen in its own ideology of revolution, one that tended to misjudge the nature of the modern transition itself. Whatever the case, the point for us is that we cannot easily mimic the modern transition with an artificially induced 'revolution'. This illusory hope is fully in evidence in the late Russian revolution, which was plagued by a false estimate of nothing less than the eonic effect itself, which was not understood by its agents, to say the least. We see nonetheless that there is nothing final about the outcome of the modern transition, and that the trend toward equalization so characteristic of the period of the Great Divide will endure, and rise to challenge the first fruits of secularism itself. This can easily produce a calamity of confusion since simple revolutions are simply inadequate to produce the desired imitation of the immense scale of the transition. In any case, the point to see is that much of the thrust of religion was wrested by the left for a new disposition toward equality, a consideration fully confirmed if we examine the real dynamics of, for example, Christianity, in the wake of the Axial period. The trend toward equalization is a powerful correlate of the eonic sequence, and this can help us to sort out the classic dialectical confusion over religion, liberalism, and revolution that tends to blur

our understanding of the simple dynamics of the new epoch of secularism issued forth by
t h e m o d e r n t r a n s i t i o n .

3. Enlightenment and Divide

The Enlightenment period, as we have already noted, climaxes at the end of the eighteenth century in concert with much else and then we see the onset of a new era in its wake, what we call the 'modern period' proper.

3.1 Crisis of the Enlightenment The Enlightenment is highly controversial, but it was controversial to itself in staging many debates and in the process invoking a crisis of thought, one that was amply taken up by reactionary critics of modernity. Many fail to see that the modern transition is not the same as the Enlightenment, and that transition includes a clear dialectical counterpoint in the Romantic movement. The transition includes also the Industrial Revolution and the onset of capitalism in its wake.

The spectacle of the eonic sequence shows us a scale and depth of transformation that encompasses world history in its vastness and diversity. The significance of the modern transition must be seen in that context. And the result is a realization that modernity might be in danger of an excessively narrow focus in its realization of secular scientism, as a standard for the totality of culture. But we can see how our transition has already moved to compensate, to some degree, for this possibility. The breadth of the Enlightenment is one indication. Another clue lies in the so-called crisis of the Enlightenment clearly expressed in the 'dialectic of the Enlightenment' that appears with almost clocklike timing in the period of the Great Divide. In fact, the crisis of the Enlightenment is cogently expressed in the classic nexus leading from Rousseau to Kant. It is Rousseau who first produces that characteristic dialectic of critical modernity whose outcome will leave in its wake an enriched secularism that both expresses and potentially transcends the scientific revolution, whose gathering momentum will give first expression to modernity, yet remain dimensioned-down to a technological realization of secular culture. We can create a rubric for this 'crisis' very simply by looking at Newton himself, a man of diverse perspectives whose understanding of the limits of the new physics was implicit. This seed understanding gestates throughout the Enlightenment and finds expression most transparently in the writings of the philosopher of Kant who cogently both assumes and challenges the legacy of rising Newtonianism. This challenge takes the simplest of forms: the stoking of the idea of freedom in the context of causal mechanics. From these elements, and little more, Kant is able to suggest a fuller realization of the scientific flood underway, along with a bridge between the realm of science, as knowledge, and freedom, as action (or ethics). The suggestiveness of this revolution in

thought completes at a stroke the foundations needed for a fully integrated culture of secularism.

3.2 Romantic Interlude The Romantic movement is a clear counterpoint to the Enlightenment and an attempt to challenge the rote mechanizations of Reason as the key note of the philosophers of the new era.

We can note in passing additional evidence of the complexity of the Enlightenment by noting that just as the nexus from Rousseau to Kant and onward produced a counterpoint to the standard chorus of Enlightenment rationalism, so synchronously and in direct correlation, despite its complexities of definition, the Romantic Movement arose in perfect correlation, and its own logic, as a dialectic of the Enlightenment, a parallel movement in the multi-dimensional symphony of secularism cascading from the divide. From a rubric of the arts to a celebration of nature in its fullest scope beyond the reductions of physicalism this surge at the cresting point of the secular tide played a descant on the thematic of the rational that is taking off in the forms and instruments of science. The phenomenon reminds us that our modern transition is almost mysterious in its logic of emergence, and yet its net outcome shows clearly an enrichment of potential peaking at the moment of the 'ship's departure' into a new age of world history. The Romantic movement is a vast subject, yet we can by simple eonic analysis manage a deft overview, to see at a glance its dialectical significance in the greater movement of the eonic series, and its latest manifestation, the modern transition.

3.3 Critiques of Reason The many-sided Enlightenment comprised the German Enlightenment and this saw an explosion of philosophy in the period after Kant who appears like a comet with his Critique of Pure Reason. The ambiguous double aspect of enlightenment 'reason' and romantic 'critique' staged a revolution in thought that moved rapidly via Schopenhauer and Hegel to the world of Marx and the onset of the era of scientism...

We are coming to an eye-popping realization of the structured complexity of the modern transition, where very little happens by accident. In that context we see the sudden, perfectly timed, appearance of German classical philosophy, initiated by the philosopher Kant whose gesture resulted in the net production of three classic critiques, a critique of reason, ethics, and the aesthetic, in a mysterious triad, perfectly expressing the potential completion of science beyond the realm of causal mastery given by the rising tide of research, limited we can see by the very nature of its questions against reality. The brilliance of the achievement of Kant lies in the way he both fulfills yet challenges the triumphs of reason with a critical examination of the limits of metaphysics, as this falls short of the standards of science. The result is both a framework for a more intelligible

science, and at once a recreation of the potential for religion in the future. The limits of metaphysics so suggested express fully the crystallized remnants inherited from the Axial Age, and their immersion in a 'dialectic of illusion'. The complexity of Kant's thought is matched with a realization of the essential simplicity of the overall architecture of his majestic chord played at the Great Divide.

3.4 Ethics and Freedom The thinking of Kant is in many ways a challenge to the New Physics, and to the philosopher Spinoza. The need to find a deduction of freedom in the realm of physics leads to his classic critiques of 'practical reason'.

Kant's system of philosophy suffers from a seeming complexity of detail, yet proceeds with almost military precision to survey the gist of a new perspective on the nature of thought and action, visible in the classic, and profound, discovery of transcendental idealism, a perfectly conceived framework to stand as a superset to 'common sense realism'. In the wake of Kant's first critique of reason, Kant seemingly moves almost as if to contradict himself, in the emergence of a triad of philosophic discourses, and attempts to formalize a metaphysically cautioned discourse on ethics. We can grasp the nature of case very simply by seeing his activities in the context of the Newtonian revolution of causal science. Kant is saying that this revolution must be complemented by 'additional axiom' of freedom, and that this requires a particular construct expressed by his scaffolding of transcendental idealism. In this framework the nature of the 'self' is itself cut short on its hope of any simple empirical description. Given those limits the nature of ethical action must be understood in terms of a real human will, whose place in space-time must remain partially obscured, undoubtedly the reason his classic ethical discourse induces a double-take: it seems at once completely right, yet somehow a new metaphysical adventure, one subject to critique on its own terms. But if we stand back we can see the brilliance and simplicity of the gesture, and the cogency of its 'deductions' in the 'fact of moral consciousness'. We need not conclude that Kant has fully completed this project to see that it expresses the nature of the problem to be solved with unmatched clarity.

3.5 Teleology and Biology We can interject a remarkable premonition in the wake of Kant of the capture of biology by scientism. This was inevitable in the confusions of the physical and life sciences. The emerging school of so-called teleomechanists laid a foundation for a new biology, but this foundational moment was lost in the onset of darwinism.

One of the at first oddest aspects of Kant's critical system is the sudden appearance of a full-blown discourse on aesthetics at the conclusion of his critical enterprise. And yet if

we stand back we can see the overall logic, imperfectly intuited by Kant himself, and in the context wherein his thinking is soon transformed by a variant of non-dual metaphysics, visible in his successor Hegel. We should be wary of such thinking, but the point for us is that, to use an old-fashioned jargon never quite given any proper foundation, a dialectic will attempt to resolve itself in a triadic completion. Presto, we see the appearance of an enigmatic 'third critique' dealing with issues of aesthetics and teleology, this to perform the task of bridging the divide between his two prior critiques. The precision with which Kant 'carries out the calculations', unwittingly fulfilling a triadic logic, is matched only by the difficulty of assessing the final result. And yet, his point is brilliantly transparent in one sense, and overflows the boundaries of his own scientism into the realm of the biological. We should conclude with the hypothesis that scientific reductionism, matching Kant's thinking, should do well to seek its completion in the ethical and the aesthetical, and that this will involve the question of teleology.

The rise of science has perhaps produced confusion here. Its success almost presupposed a rejection of teleological thinking. And yet, while this produced a great breakthrough in physics, the nature of the biological remains elusively beyond this gesture of scientism. And this Kant brilliantly put forth as a renewed consideration just at the dawn of modern biology, which, unfortunately, has dimensioned-down into a rubric of reductionism that has imperfectly resolved the question of the nature of living organisms.

In fact, Kant, and his successors, the so-called teleomechanists, should be seen for what they are, a part of the considerable spectrum of thought that graced the birth of modern biology, soon overtaken in the age of Darwin by the limited perspectives of physicalism.

4. Reason in History

The theme of Reason in history really brings in the figure of Hegel in the wake of Kant and this creates a complex chord of counterpoint to the transcendental idealism of Kant and his successor Schopenhauer. This theme will be one alternate way of seeing the 'eonic effect' with its spectacular uncovering of a rational pattern of historical development.

4.1 Revolutions Per Second The symphony of effects at the 'divide' period is stunning, including the revolutionary onset of a new form of economy, what we now call capitalism (with roots in earlier history). This economic revolution will complicate

the interpretation of modernity and will lead almost immediately to the birth of socialist and communist responses.

We can move relatively swiftly toward the conclusion of our brief overview of the gestation of the philosophy of history and that suggested by the discovery of the eonic effect by considering the developments in the wake of Kant. But first it is important to consider the issue of economic theory on the way toward a foundation for study of the immense ideological combat to come in the wake of the modern transition. It is no accident that the economic revolution of capitalism accompanies the modern transition, and produces a stunning take-off effect just at the Great Divide. This mystery is a spectacular concordance of cultural facts, but it has produced confusion on its own terms. Looking at the eonic effect we can see that the obsession with economic explanation is misplaced: the dynamics of large-scale history transcend the economic. We summarize this very simply by looking at the two poles of economic freedom: the freedom of agents producing 'free markets' and the freedom of such agents to produce economic systems that satisfy a set of prescribed rules and behaviors (e.g. capitalist or socialist, etc...). We tune Adam Smith and Karl Marx to one definition by that definition. The point is that men are free to create economic systems of their own devising, this fact therefore contradicting the implications of economic determinism. In fact, we see that the eonic effect resolves the perplexities that confounding Marxists with their confusions over **h i s t o r i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y** .

The point for us is that our Kantian rubric resolved into eonic periodization reminds us that ethical action and economic action must find a resolution in action. The de-ethicization of history through economic determination has proved a false form of reasoning. The immense simplicity of Kant's framework applies as well to the question of a leftist gesture in a liberal context, and this requires the deliberation on the 'categorical imperatives' that give foundation to the trend toward equalization that both fulfils and challenges capitalist realizations. The evidence is starkly clear in nineteenth century cultural politics for the parallel emergence and collision of these twin perspectives and **t h e i r t w o r e v o l u t i o n s** .

4.2 Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer As noted three remarkable philosophers in a complex 'dialectic' suddenly appear at the dawn of the modern period and leave a universe of philosophy in their wake. This will be followed by a rapid decompression in the onset of positivism and the historical materialism of figures such as Marx.

A very remarkable outcome of the Kantian revolution is visible in the brief flowering of philosophy in his wake. This flash of effects is an immense study in itself, but

we can look at the sudden polarization of Hegel and Schopenhauer in the context of our thinking about religion and secularism. We see, remarkably, one philosopher try to reinvent Christianity, as it were, and the other, Buddhism. Particularly in the case of Schopenhauer we see an instant clarification of the nature of many ancient sutras from Indian religion in the renewed context of transcendental idealism. Schopenhauer produces an effective framework for the recasting these ancient perspectives in the context of the modern scientific world view.

Almost as mysterious as these divide-clustered effects is their sudden waning, and by the mid-century the onset of scientism will become the dominant cultural force, to the impoverishment of the meaning and significance of secularism.

4.3 The Rational the Real This famous conjunction of ideas is one of Hegel's classic notions, but one setting him open to criticism. Our larger model can resolve its contradictions easily.

The strange symmetry of Schopenhauer and Hegel is one of the notable characteristics of the Kantian aftermath. While the prospect for evading the confusions of Hegelianism might drive us to be wary of his post-Kantian exploration of the non-dual, so reminiscent of Indian religious metaphysics, there is a transparency to Hegel's overall system of thought, although we should claim a more cogent version visible in the implication of the eonic effect and its philosophy of history.

Whatever the case, a famous debate, and confusion, surrounds Hegel's pronouncements on reason in history, and his statements of the equation of the rational and the real. Unfortunately, Hegel's treatment of this issue resulted in an ideological implication that his insight did not deserve, and which caused that basic insight to be frittered away in false debate, thence to be rejected out of hand by the darwinization of philosophic discourse.

We can fairly easily restate the issue (avoiding Hegel's treacherous terminology) by observing how we have uncovered a 'logic of history', and that this mimics a form of rationality visible in the eonic sequence itself. And this insight is not subject to the ambiguity of Hegel's version, since our eonic model clearly distinguishes a macro-action of historical dynamics, and its realization as micro-action. There is a rational aspect to history, suddenly uncovered, but it is an evolutionary history crucially dependent on the actions of men, whose decisions might not fulfill the logic of that greater action, to wit, by conservatizing reactions to the inherent logic at hand in the greater field of development.

4.4 Antinomies Of Teleology The philosophy of Kant is steeped in the issues of the antinomies of metaphysics. The antinomial character of teleology is directly reflected in the clear directionality of our pattern, but we can deduce the more specific pattern from an antinomy of teleology: our sequence of transitions is a discrete series inside a continuous stream: the net result shows directionality alternating with the simple streaming of history in between.

Let us conclude by noting that while the eonic effect, and its sequence, give expression to issues of teleology, they do so in terms of a particular type of discrete logic of alternation, which is not teleology at all, as we see it, but historical directionality, visible looking toward the past. While this may be evidence of a teleological factor, it says nothing about the future, hence is unable to resolve the nature of the case as to some 'telos of history'. And in fact a close look at Kant's architectonic of discourses shows us the precise appearance of an 'antinomy of teleological judgment'.

We should not be so surprised either at the grand gesture of Hegel's teleology of freedom, and its associated breakdown in the 'antinomy' so visible in the 'splitting liberalism' of the age of the Great Divide. As we examine history we see the majestic sweep of a teleological process, yet it is one matched to our own evolving actions and the divergence of potentials from the present we live does not indicate any mechanical computation of that future we must create as free individuals.

4.5 Kant's Challenge Resolved We begin to see the solution of Kant's Challenge, although this will require a larger picture of world history as a whole.

We conclude our brief 'induction of a gestalt', visible as the eonic effect, and we can see in spectacular fashion the resolution of what we have called Kant's Challenge, and its opportunity to liberate Kant from the confusions in his essay over 'asocial sociability'. The majestic sweep of the eonic sequence fulfills exactly the subtle question expressed in the first paragraph of his essay.

Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view, concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like every other natural event, are determined by universal laws. However obscure their causes, history, which is concerned with narrating these appearances, permits us to hope that if we attend to the play of freedom of the human will in the large, we may be able to discern a regular movement in it, and that what seems complex and chaotic in the single individual may be seen from the standpoint of the human race as a whole to be a steady and progressive though slow evolution of its original endowment.

We have the basis to proceed to construct a philosophy of history, at once theoretical and practical, giving expression to both the scientific study of the causal stream and the realization of freedom in that context.

Conclusion

We conclude our short series of essays covering the basic ground of the eonic effect, and the result generates a new sense of universal history, in a fashion that is adapted to a perspective of science, yet able to encompass the breadth of human emergence in the context of civilization, in all its complexity, including the diversity of religion, especially against the backdrop of the Axial phenomenon. Kant's acute analysis of the issues of causality and freedom matches our analysis in the eonic model almost perfectly, and the result is a coherent outline of history that shows the direct action of evolutionary processes on human self-consciousness as this becomes the medium for the evolution of freedom. We are left with a question, has man's evolution completed? And we can see that the answer is that history is emerging from evolution, and that man's completed evolution must be his self-evolution as a free individual both within and beyond the matrix of evolutionary civilization.

Our discussion of Kant and the philosophy of history lays a foundation for a larger discussion of world history, along with a perspective on modernity, the period in which we live now. The solution to Kant's Challenge requires looking at the genesis of civilization in antiquity, and the larger sequence of historical or 'eonic' transitions, in particular the Axial Age. But we begin to see already something spectacular in the emergence of modernity from the early modern. And not least is the self-referential manner of the appearance of Kant's famous essay at the 'divide' period of the modern transition. And his essay will ask for a solution to the puzzle of history in the generations to come.

APPENDIX 3 : FROM SAMKHYA TO DIAMAT

One of the mysteries of marxism is the legacy of dialectical materialism and the odd resemblance of that to the classic legacy of *Samkhya*. We can pursue this question with a look at the work of J. G. Bennett on the systematics of n-term systems. We should say at once that there is a strong resemblance of Bennett's system to that of Samkhya: not direct comparison was ever offered, but the connection is obvious.

In the marxist legacy, we can see a confusion between dyadic and triadic systems and the general confusion over attempts to sneak mystical logic into the stark materialism of the marxist canon. But the instinct to produce a 'materialist' dialectic is apt and we can see that the realm of *Samkhya* does just that. It is important to proceed with caution in a field where an ancient Indic legacy at loggerheads with the idealist versions of what in the end are one and the same subject, e.g. Advaita, has passed into Sufism, we must suspect, thence to become the object of some nineteenth century derivative passed via the occultist Gurdjieff into the Ouspensky field. Bennett's version echoes this but has many elements from a different source. It is important to insist on the public domain aspect of the Indic original, as one of the components of 'santana dharma' and not get entangled in the 'private properties' of rogue Sufis and their devious tactics. Bennett, despite the hopeless mélange of subjects in *The Dramatic Universe* has a self-contained module of discourse here which may or may not be 'Samkhya' but which is a clear derivative of the (probably itself corrupted) legacy Samkhya, and that from some unknown primordial version.

J. G. Bennett and Samkhya

One of the mysteries in the history of philosophy is the resemblance of the ancient Samkhya and dialectical materialism. An inspection of this resemblance is a caution to marxists about the significance of the dialectic and the confusion it creates, at least in those in a variant mindset. The solution to the 'problem' is a universal model of dyadic and triadic logics and a means to sort out the two in both subjects. That equates to rockets to the moon or hyperdrives in the degree of difficulty. We might recommend sidelining dialectical materialism as a research project and using standard dualistic logic on the order of 'science'. But the resemblance can also be an introduction to a new form of universal materialism, one not connected to scientism.

This is an attempt to briefly outline some of the ideas in J. G. Bennett's classic New Age text, *The Dramatic Universe*, also a controversial work, in four volumes, appearing in

the late fifties to early seventies. This book has so many problems that the appearance of endorsing should be called misleading. The issue has considerable commentary in a parallel text, *Enigma of the Axial Age*. But it contains one way to demonstrate the derivation of *Samkhya*. This is therefore not a promotion of that work so much as a demonstration of the way dialectical materialism so strangely echoes that ancient legacy. We should distinguish dyadic dialectic and triadic systems, the two being often confused by marxists, diodes and transistors are perfectly good dyadic and triadic systems. Bennett tried to create a general calculus of n-term systems, up to the dodecad, and the result clearly distinguishes 'dialectic' in two forms. Of interest here is his distinction of three levels, the hypnomic, the autonomic, and the hypernomic. The manner of casting the 'spiritual' as the material aspects of the hypernomic is classic *Samkhya* 'flavor' and can help to free discussion from just such distinctions of the 'material' and the 'spiritual' that so bedevil discussion.

Marxists might have better realized the occult sources of (triadic) dialectic in Hegel, influenced by various mystical traditions: that the dialectic is a descendant of the many genres here from the doctrines of the Trinity to figures such as Boehm might be a caution of the poor chances of success in a 'materialist' dialectic. But wait, Marx stumbled into something, why not a materialist dialectic? Bennett's version is precisely that: a universal materialism, but the triads are elements of 'will' in a sense like that of Schopenhauer in a distinction of being, function and will: materiality is an aspect of being. Consciousness and materiality are thus a complementary unity, as fascinating exit from scientism in a universal material framework. Bennett is thus confusingly a funny sort of empiricist who had 'grounded' the 'will' of Schopenhauer as a triadic element in a three term distinction of 'being, function, will'.

This Indic legacy filters through some mysterious Sufi version of the subject. The debate over materialism and idealism is limited and tends to lead to confusion. A new modern entrant, transcendental idealism, threatens to overtake all other versions, and this should not be taken as such a stark opposite to materialism. *Advaita*, the rival antagonist to *Samkhya*, is perhaps actually a cousin. It is phony debate. Like two distant languages in a larger family both show suspicious resemblance and are finally the same subject. We don't propose leftists adopt any of this. But it might help to put dialectical materialism in perspective as a very limited unwitting echo of this ancient legacy. However, the subject could re-self-found itself in some other fashion, if the key to dialectical dyadic/triadic thinking could be found.

Samkhya was an ancient materialist perspective that was appropriated by reactionaries and appears in the figure Gurdjieff as a rightist tactic to confuse modern leftist materialism. It is good to be wary of the wiseacred versions of all of this and not

become entranced by the 'master game' dogmatism applied to subjects that have become shibboleths of a rogue Sufi cult.

The Bennett book rescued the subject, but his overall text was flawed, but important, for various reasons, among them Bennett's ambiguous adaptation of the 4D space-time metric to his extended reckoning with the six-dimensional model of the universe proposed by Ouspensky, in turn a model inherited from some nineteenth century source around the time of Abbott's Flatland. The world of 'spooky physics' will have to take over here, but the bold assertion of the reality of two extra dimensions of time was an interesting train wreck in the realm of metaphysics. Let us take Bennett's construct critically, but we might at least agree that the 'timeless' is a logical opposite in good standing, and beckons the student of time into uncharted waters, a field physics itself has now entered. The three dimensions of time, eternity, and hyparxis seem obscure, but in the next section our 'new model of the universe' unwittingly stumbles on the whole set in another way: the interaction of time/timelessness is hyparchic, as a discrete series of intervals that seem discontinuous. If this clue could be rescued from crackpot metaphysics much of the confusion of historical theory, religious apocalypticism, and much else could be cleared up.

Bennett's construct is as compelling as it is controversial: it is very hard to move beyond the space-time metric into a fifth and sixth dimension. But, as Bennett clearly knew, this had been already done in rigorous physics research in the classic work of Kaluza-Klein. Later in the century, our 'now', the issue of dimensions beyond the Big Four became a staple of versions of string theory. The realm of current physics research has confirmed the question of higher dimensions, but not in the fashion of these nineteenth century ruminations. The issue is finally metaphysical and points to a timeless aspect that lurks behind human psychology. This is the great clue to the problem no one can solve of the soul or larger dimensionality of man. To see man as a larger than an entity in three dimensions might rescue psychology for a materialism/neuroscience done right.

The audacity of this experiment in theory is founded with an error with respect to Kant and his categories: the influence of Whitehead appears to have made something of a realist of the spiritual seeker in the New Age Movements of the early twentieth century. What a muddle. We need to reintroduce the 'noumenal' aspect to the issues of the category 'will' that Bennett seems to take from Schopenhauer, on the way to a brilliant solution to the riddle of the 'gunas'. Marxists might not agree, and side with Bennett.

The work is belied by the difficulties of dealing with such complicated entities with mathematical constructs, even those of advanced tensor analysis such as tensor analysis: a space-time metric with eternity and hyparxis in tow is not exactly validated as science. I can't completely deny the possibility of the space-time metric extended to six dimensions including eternity and hyparxis, but the intuition speaks to something here. The idea of the 'eternal' is a clue to human psychology and the hyparchic future is highly suggestive and seems to say something about the emergence of historical entities. Marxists might

join the fun, and consider that 'communism' is hyparchic, awaiting them in the virtual
f u t u r e .

One must defer momentarily to someone who had the knack of visualizing a hypersphere. And one must adopt as a dismal hypothesis, suspicion, one hasn't understood his work, seeing levels in eternity is not a common talent. Bennett's work makes one think of a Roadrunner cartoon. He takes off all at once in an exotic new direction as the Coyote is left in the dust. But much of the result is nonsense, overheating with 'conscious' energies that churn out fudge. But the overall core of the work has a set of potential solutions to the spiritual perplexity of modernity, if one can evade the dire kidnapping by rogue Sufis by whom Bennett was victimized.

The results of this daring trial were illuminating, and introduced what was in reality a set of metaphysical concepts in Halloween math disguises, eternity and hyparxis. It all sort of makes sense, in the process triggering a remarkable visionary spell, a genuinely expansive view of the cosmos, before the construct falls back to earth to find refuge under the category of science fiction. The timeless/spaceless dimension is clearly touched on in non-local physics, more we should not say. This is an atavism that has resurfaced in the realm of the dialectical materialists, and the ancient Samkhya seems to seek a new future
h o m e .

There is one unfortunate confusion in Bennett's work: his collation of material that he clearly got from some other source than Gurdjieff with what this author considered the unusable and speculative themes of supposed occult esotericism. One must be very careful to distinguish this work from Bennett's other books which promote Sufi propaganda such as the doctrine of reciprocal maintenance, an arch-reactionary
i m p o s t e r .

The concept of a seven term sequence and a triad are central to Bennett's work, and originate in Samkhya or some relative, and appear to be influenced by something deeper than the sophistic sources he seems to use. This has been taken over by Sufis, and is an occult sophistry and exploitation in Gurdjieff. Feuerbach was only the beginning of the expose of ideas used to control man. Bennett in his original work was not a part of that.

I fear no one really knows the original meaning of these constructs. The triads in Bennett never quite make sense and are placeholders, a severe caution on the whole effort. Such ideas have entered into concoctions such as the 'enneagram' and the whole subject is liable to mumbo-jumbo. It would seem that a useful discussion of Bennett might simply enjoy the ride through this exotic framework until the inevitable 'crash and burn' encounters the inevitable skeptical stance of 'science current' as we know it now. The impression at many points of a work seeded by alien cone heads trying to communicate advanced superscience must be balanced with some strange blunders, notably the preposterous adoption of the cyclical lore of the Great Year to depict the background of evolutionary development. It is hard to believe that a superintelligent mind would be still stuck in the confusions or ur-astrology. This suggests that Bennett's

spiritual sources were quite human, all too human. Sufis, after all, have often hinted at this issue of alien contact. Bennett offered the real answer in his thinking about 'demiurgic powers', a subject discussed at length in the author's Enigma of the Axial Age.

These issues encounter a 'dead halt' in any case, due to the inability to advance properly into the realm of triadic logic. The author is a bit of a spoiler on this question, but the fact must be faced that the work advanced as the passage into a new and higher logic, exemplified in the 'boy's marble game' of thinking in threes, has stalled at the point of beginner's enthusiasm and never gotten much further. This would be grounds for dropping the whole subject if one wasn't confronted with frequent almost unconscious moments of non-dual insight, almost without trying. The moment one tries to analyze the mind reverts to dual logic trying to do the 'tertium organon' with lame results. That is a reference to Ouspensky's classic, that seems to linger on the threshold to the last page, without really resolving the enigma. Marxists have stumbled into this mysticism and may

a s w e l l s t u d y i t s h i s t o r y .

Ironically, it might be of value to simply follow mechanically Bennett's extravagant rendition of the triad in a unique cascade of levels and types of the triad. This tour de force hardly makes sense even as it gives form to the whole project of triads and seven term 'rays of creation', and it is clear that Bennett has finally put an ancient subject on paper, as a pile of dried wood, with a question mark. Mission accomplished in the sense of bringing to the modern world one version of the classic Samkhya that animates the background of the Gurdjieff movement. It is highly improbable these rogue Sufis ever understood the subject, and the work of Bennett breaks away into a new experiment, one

f l a w e d b y h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f K a n t .

It is thus very hard to know just how to deal with Bennett's mysterious classic. We should be wary of the considerable amount of rubbish here. What we can do here is to outline a few of the key ideas, and make it clear that these are public domain ideas with no real connection to the new age cult of the Ouspensky/Gurdjieff schools. The Samkhya we suspect was already ancient by the time of the Buddha, and it appears to have suffered a corruption of its concepts and terminology. We have made an exotic claim: it is mutated parallel of the equally ancient Advaita. If Bennett's version really uncovers some part of that mystery, that is worth the price of the book, save only that the version using Schopenhauer remains to be written. Let us outline a quick idea along those lines:

The cosmos of materiality comprises the phenomenal aspect in a grand triad of the hyponomic, the autonomic, and the hypernomic. Or the realm of matter, life and... well, there's the rub, the 'spiritual' now actually material. We suddenly see that there is a simple and elegant solution to the whole set of confusions. The hypernomic is the 'spiritual', now seen to be a higher materialism, while the noumenal as the real 'spiritual' is beyond all three levels, including the hypernomic, which we thought spiritual. Over and over Samkhya warns that the rise to spiritual planes is in reality a new form of the material (or prakriti), the basic point we have made via Bennett. Since the 'will' factor is

likely to be noumenal, Bennett's framework has a serious flaw, but we can use the results as is, up to a point. The above is a bit confusing, but can be filed for reference.

Stand back, and we see another case of just what confounded us a few paragraphs back: right under our nose we see some unknown ancient and/ or alien supermind doctrine filtered through a limited Sufi medium. We can therefore attempt to go over a few of the key concept frameworks of Bennett's text, finesse the 'triadic enigma' with a simple description of the many probably controversial issues connected to that 'lower mind attempt at thinking like a higher mind'. The first and last volumes especially are of interest on the level of a survey, on the way to some future age of man that can bring science to the study of more than physical reductionism.

The author outlined a short book in three chapters and five sections each via a set of concepts and sections from the book, originally intended for eonic-effect.net, but was never completed but we can go through the scheme constructed in MS Publisher in 2008 at a quick step to understand the brilliant solution to the riddle of ancient Samkhya. This corresponds roughly to Volumes 1, 2, 4 only.

Let us move rapidly through a short sketch:

1.1 Consciousness, Life and the Categories Bennett's system is based on a variant of Samkhya and assumes the materiality of everything. We should note the contrast of Advaita and Samkhya, and the failure of Bennett to stay with classical Samkhya: consciousness becomes an energy inside a larger material system. And consciousness becomes an aspect of man's transition to homo sapiens. Both approaches are needed, in the hopeless muddle of the term 'consciousness'. There are problems here but we can still use the overall sketch, as an historical note on the resemblance to 'dialectical materialism', a failed lesser model. Bennett's Samkhya (never so named) deviates from the original. Best to have faith and avoid an ancient quarrel here: Advaita and (now scrambled) Samkhya are really the same subject, one in an idealist, the in a materialist framework.

Life and consciousness are different things, with consciousness as a cosmic energy. The categories of Kant are rejected/replaced, a dubious procedure, and Bennett adopts a strange set of substitutes, but strangely interesting. His treatment will thus strip his treatment of will of its noumenal character...

1.2 Being, Function, Will Bennett has a useful new way to slice the pie: instead of material/spiritual we have a triad of being, function and will. But the rubric of 'will' is given a status in a triad, rather than in some distinction of the noumenal: the resemblance to Schopenhauer is remarkable, but this change is drastic. We can ignore this as we proceed, mindful to be wary of reduced Schopenhauer. But this exercise is useful to get past the 'material/spiritual' terminology.

1.3 Time, Eternity, Hyparxis Bennett constructs a remarkable, perhaps now out of date (and perhaps always contradictory), geometry of space/ time extended via eternity and hyparxis in a six dimensional universe (after the fashion of Ouspensky and his nineteenth century sources. The ideas of eternity and hyparxis are more metaphysical

than scientific and the space/time metric is not really open to a metric at all. But the gesture is evocative of the physics we now confront of non-locality and spooky physics.

1.4 Hyponomic, Autonomic, Hypernomic worlds Bennett creates a useful new classification in the distinctions of material, living, and spiritual worlds. This triad of tetrads is a useful reminder that there is a 'material/spiritual' domain, as opposed to really spiritual one. It is evocative of Samkhya. The interest here is also the way Bennett puts man on the threshold of the hypernomic world, in the way he partakes of the 'cosmic energy' of 'consciousness' beyond the autonomic and the first rung of the hypernomic. This model is likely to suffer a set of problems but it is an interesting take on human evolution and the way in which homo sapiens enters a new realm of conscious energies.

1.5 Cosmology: Stars, Planets, Biospheres The scheme of Samkhya enters once again (in some unknown Sufi version) in the form of a cascade of levels (supposedly seven). This no longer makes much sense in the cosmologies now current (a sign of its esoteric pretense): all galaxies stars planets/biospheres earth moon

A great deal of nonsense has been written about this pastiche from unknown sources, grated onto Samkhya, but with Bennett it becomes a useful version of Schopenhauer in the sense that the 'Will in Nature' is closely related to the laws of cosmology ('will' and 'laws' are thus correlated) and we can see that the distinction of cosmic phenomena and life phenomena, normally lost to thought, clarifies the place of the cosmic bodies in...science? metaphysics. But the six or seven term aspect is clear here from the redoubling of 'gunas' or triads: 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96. It is worth studying commentaries on the concept of 'Will' in the philosopher to see how they diverge from psychological concepts and more closely resemble the ideas of 'laws of nature'.

One use is to caution theories of evolution: is life a phenomenon inside the domain of a planet/biosphere? Note that the planet 'earth' has 'will' but is not alive.... A very suggestive nexus of concepts...

Foundations of Moral Philosophy Bennett's moral thinking has no particular status save that anything is better than current science, and his overall outline is useful, in the way it connects to Samkhya: the 'gunas' become 'triads of the will', a stroke of genius in Samkhya re-interpretation.
2 . 1 Facts and Values
This is fairly standard...

2.2 Will and The Triads Bennett's key insight is to cast the gunas of Samkhya as in the category of will. But his failure to maintain Schopenhauer's distinction of the 'thing in itself' leaves will in an ambiguous status. In any case, the foundations for a complete derivation of Samkhya are possible. The last problem is the artificial character of the 'law of three forces', and its cliché version as affirming, denying, and reconciling. No full clarification of this is provided, and the resemblance to the dialectic is remarkable.

2.3 Six Fundamental Laws These triads are ‘affirmative, denying/passive, reconciling’ or 1, 2, 3. These combine in numerous ways.

By permuting the three types of force (and this isn’t force in known dynamical sense), A, D, R, Bennett produces six basic types: ADR, ARD, RAD, RDA, DAR, DRA,...and then ascribes to these some rather arbitrary names. But the overall idea is ingenious and suggestive. These ‘laws’ will then be a part of the cascade of cosmic laws at each of the seven levels, producing 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96 aspects of the triadic system.

2.4 Self and Individuality Potentially the whole system is able to provide a new form of spiritual psychology with some powerful implications and distinctions, one of them being the nature of ‘self’ under the different levels: we can reach the ‘true self’ at the level of 24 laws, and individuality at the level of 12. This is too abstract for practical meditation, but the scheme, reviewed once in detail can help to clarify the nature of man’s real psychology. None of the religions of man have ever gotten straight this distinction of self, and individuality (at level 12). The paths of being and will are thus shown a concrete definitional line of argument.

2.5 Materiality, Vitality, Deity There are two aspects in Bennett’s system: that of will, and that of being, and this spawns a parallel set of concepts in the realm of being.

Skipping the third volume of The Dramatic Universe, we take up the fourth, for a quick look at his views of world history. WHEE is a far better system, and Bennett for reasons that are baffling sticks with the ancient idea of the cycles of the Great Year. This idea is very ancient, but it doesn’t work: the cycles fall out of sync with any reasonable sequence in history. But Bennett somehow ditches his own rubric and correctly takes the rise of the modern as a new era, and the period of 1848 as the onset of a ‘new age’.

History and Evolution (the fourth Volume) ...

3.1 War with Time This speaks for itself, interesting set of ideas...

3.2 Evolution, Life, Demiurge...

3.3 The Advent of Mind

3.4 Creativity and Man

3.5 World History and Modernity

We can do these as a set. The distinction of autonomic and hypernomic realms is useful for theories of history and evolution. One of the early critics of the darwinian theory of evolution, and also an early proponent of design arguments, Bennett’s view of evolution is nonetheless still relevant to a science viewpoint...Our interest is in later evolution of man. Bennett’s work contains a remarkable take on the issue of spiritual powers in nature, or demiurgic powers. Life evolves under the scope of the hypernomic, and we see the influence of demiurgic powers on human evolution, taking homo sapiens to the stage of consciousness, and creativity. The idea of a ‘creative energy’ doesn’t quite make sense, but we see the point: man enters a new form of consciousness and mind and

this is the point at which man exhibits the creative aspect we begin to see in the
P a l e o l i t h i c .

The overall world history of Bennett is confused by its association with the idea of the Great Year, whose cycles fall out of sync with the overall pattern of world history. Bennett could think of no other way to suggest a cyclical history, but the result is the entry of astrological confusions, and Bennett should have known better.

But Bennett's better insight was to ignore this cyclicity in practice, and he is clearly aware of the Axial Age and modernity as successive epochs. The patterns of the Great Year simply don't match the real pattern.

One of the great ironies of this text is the way Bennett sneaks away from his own periodization and realizes that the onset of modernity, against all the prejudice and confusions of new age gurus and their muddle, has to be taken seriously as a new era in world history. This has made Bennett a heretic in new age lore and his view has been ignored completely. His depiction of modernity is very weak, but almost unbelievably at the very end he stumbles on the key insight that the period around 1848 signals a new era in world history, in a very close concordance with the scheme of WHEE. In addition, out of the blue he makes a reference to the birth of communism, as a key idea of the new era. We have discussed this in the author's Last and First Men, and suggested what Bennett himself suspected, a contact with spiritual agencies beyond the sophistic agencies he appeared to be involved with. Whatever the case, he surprisingly breaks out of his periodization to get the right answer relative to the solution given in WHEE, a much better world history, which should be taken as a correction of Bennett's outlandish use of astrological cycles, which have confused people for millennia.

The solution to the problem of world history is to explain its curious cyclity, and Bennett stumbles on it, but can't get it right. The view in WHEE uses a different form of model, and clearly demonstrates the epoch following the 'Axial Age' and the rise of modernity, and shows how the period around 1848 is much to the point.

This now classic reconstruction of the classic Samkhya using the idea of Schopenhauer on the 'Will' in nature and the ideas of the gunas as triads of the will is a very brilliant piece of intellectual archaeology, worth the price of the book which is otherwise of dubious quality, and lost in all the other new age confusions in his four volume book. This scheme enabled Bennett in other works to try and illuminate the extraordinarily complex spiritual psychology of man and the rare moments when any of it comes to public attention. In another work it might be useful to consider the various types of spiritual psychology that Bennett outlined. but he the point for us here is to offer a caution to marxist proponents of dialectical materialism, who have so strangely stumbled via Hegel on a fragment of this ancient Samkhya. A future version that does justice to Schopenhauer and the thing in itself/representation might be of value. Let us note that this might clarify some of the mystery in Bennett's scheme: the phenomonal and the noumenal might thus be aspects of the hyponomic and hypernomic realms, with life

in the fully phenomenal middle zone. This different take on Bennett would require a rewrite of the whole text but at this point the book is at best an archaeological site. But we should not forget again the key to Samkhya suggested. And the question remains, what practical use is this? It is, pace science, and even more monumental folly than dialectical materialism. Both groups must be onto something, we hope for the best for some future clarification. We waited 2400 years for Bennett's clarification of Samkhya (in many ways Schopenhauer's), so we should be patient. Many confronting nineteenth century materialism became very frustrated by its one-sided reductionism. A universal materialism if fine but its meaning it not to banish all the terms of abstract idealism such as are inevitable in the mathematical equations of physics. In the same way the concept of will, and this is not psychological 'will', is the framework correspond to the laws of the lower level of physical objects. Just as physics must invoke the ideal domain of mathematics to do physics, so the 'materialism' of Samkhya must invoke the cascade of 'gunas' in seven levels of redoubling sets to buttress that fundamental perspective on the cosmos. The quarrel between Samkhya and Advaita, the original conflict of materialists and idealists, is a false one. No one has seen that Samkhya realizes the core of Advaita is a very simple way in its distinction of purusha and prakriti, or, in some formulations, the g u n a s a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s .

That discussion must be taken up elsewhere. We have enough to suggest a simple way for marxist legacies to rescue their now dated materialism from disaster. We must scratch out heads in wonder that Engels sensed the answer but wandered into a swamp. The 'dialectic' would need a careful understanding of its three categories, permuted into the s i x f o r m s t h a t B e n n e t t i n g e n i o u s l y p r o p o s e d .

This, then, scheme is of use because we can see that cosmic bodies can have will, but this not imply they are alive or have consciousness. We must remind readers of the elusive brilliance of Schopenhauer's almost miraculous rediscovery of the core of Samkhya, oblivious to what he had done. We need to caution that 'will' is not the same as 'will power', and is a more general idea so deeply explored in his classic texts, the orphans of the Kantian revolution. It would seem to have been somewhat egregious to claim to have replaced Kant's categories (which Schopenhauer simply scrapped for the sole category of the 'causal'), but the exercise is useful nonetheless, and suggests a way to generalize the forms of logic to n-term systems, as in fact Bennett not only proposes but attempts to carry out. But his systems seem to become placeholders in the hypernomic, not surprising, since the 'conscious, creative, unitive, and final twelfth category' are attempts to name the nameless. In any case, the idea of n-term systems can allow mathematicians to review the material. We can see at once the distinction of 'dyads', and 'triads' and the way the dialectic confuses the two. A whole reconstruction of dialectical m a t e r i a l i s m m i g h t b e o f u s e i n t h i s l i g h t .

The use of the term 'consciousness' in Bennett is in the legacy of confused jargon that has always muddled religious and new age thought. But it is of great interest to see the

cosmic aspect of consciousness. It begins to stumble into the Advaita emphasis on the 'one' as 'consciousness'. It is also helps to clarify the nature of the evolution of homo to h o m o s a p i e n s .

The stark emptiness of the cosmic space belies their mysterious aspect of generators of life and consciousness. This is more easily seen in the planetary aspect of the biosphere as a cosmic object in the context of the emergence of life on an 'earth' in a solar context.

